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The dissertation explores the theoretical and political implications of the recent 
emergence of autonomist claims within Okinawa’s struggle against US military 
presence. Combining a world-historical perspective and ethnographic approach, I 
show how political shifts within the Okinawan demilitarization movement over time 
are seen as mutually constituted with the historical construction of not just the 
Japanese state, but state formation more generally: postwar decolonization and the 
conjoint transformation in military expansion, and more recently the emergence of 
alternative self-determination claims globally. Postwar decolonization and state-
making legitimized military expansion in ways that obscured the continuing role of 
colonial relations in overseas basing, while it created new forms of colonial 
militarization via relations of citizenship. Okinawan autonomist claims against the 
Japanese state shed light on relations I conceptualize as internal colonial basing. This 
concept expresses enduring relations of coloniality between Japan and Okinawa 
making possible America’s continued occupation of the islands, but which are 
obscured by the representational claims of the Japanese state. Rather than a relation 
through which Okinawans’ rights are protected, Japanese citizenship is the mechanism 
through which colonization and militarization shape and sustain one another. 
Everyday experiences of foreign military basing intertwine with national and interstate 
 arrangements to shape Okinawans’ perception of their citizen relations. Conditions of 
internal colonial basing reinforce Okinawans’ experiences as ethnically marginalized 
citizens, while simultaneously eroding the legitimacy of the Japanese state in ways 
that sustain citizenship as a salient identity. As a relation rooted in coloniality, 
Okinawans’ citizen relations thus shape the struggle in potentially transformative 
ways. Okinawans’ claims upon the state—reflected in new political identities, 
coalitions and alternative visions of the state-citizen relation—resonate with 
movements elsewhere, reformulating citizenship rights in substantive, historically 
concrete terms that challenge the abstract rights of the liberal subject, and politicize 
the meaning of sovereignty. Through the lens of the anti-base struggle, the dissertation 
thus sheds light on a broader politics of self-determination. By contributing to the 
erosion of citizenship and the crisis of the Japanese state in the Okinawan political 
context, the United States jeopardizes the legitimating apparatus it has relied on for 
more than thirty-five years.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
On a typically warm and humid Okinawan autumn afternoon in 1987, grocery 
store owner Chibana Sh#ichi gained instant notoriety throughout Japan and beyond 
when he was arrested for setting fire to Japan’s Rising Sun flag. This took place at the 
opening of a baseball game during the country’s 42nd Annual National Athletic Meet, 
the Kokutai. The hugely popular event was being held for the first time in Okinawa to 
commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the end of the US military’s formal 
occupation of the remote island territory and its reincorporation into the Japanese state. 
At the time, Chibana said he considered the Japanese flag a “symbol of the militarism 
that drove many people in Okinawa to commit mass suicide.” He was referring to a 
wartime practice by the Japanese Imperial Army, which had forced Okinawan 
civilians to commit collective suicide rather than face capture by Allied Forces. 
A decade later, Chibana found another Japanese flag buried deep in a closet 
(see figure 1.1). This one was old and tattered. It was from his high school days, when 
he joined his fellow students in the popular movement to end the United States’ 
postwar occupation of Okinawa. “In the 1960s, the teacher’s union had a flag 
purchasing drive, so I bought one myself,” he explained. When asked if he would burn 
this flag too, he shook his head. “No,” Chibana replied. “I’m not going to burn it. It’s 
different from the one raised at the Athletic Meet. This flag was intended to free me 
from American tyranny.”1 
 
 
                                                
1 I thank Chibana Sh#ichi and Okinawan photographer Ishikawa Mao for sharing this story with me. 
Ishikawa highlights Chibana’s shifting relationship to the Japanese flag in her series of photos, What the 
Japanese Flag Means to Me (1995 – 1999). Quotes of Chibana used here are from Ishikawa’s exhibit, 
“Okinawa Soul,” curators Nakamori Yasufumi and Kelly Dietz, John Hartell Gallery, Cornell 
University, March 13 to March 24, 2006. 
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Figure 1.1 Chibana Sh#ichi holds the Rising Sun flag he used during the 1960s, in the 
movement to end US occupation (photo by Ishikawa Mao). 
 
The narratives above capture two historical moments of rule and militarization 
in Okinawa.  The flag Chibana chose to keep, the flag from the 1960s, symbolized the 
hope he and other Okinawans had in the possibilities of citizenship during their 
struggle to end the United States’ postwar occupation. Okinawans were a stateless 
people throughout America’s twenty-seven year rule over the islands. As a subjugated 
people striving for rights conferred by citizenship, theirs was an anti-imperialist 
struggle. What made it different from similar struggles taking place throughout the 
world during the same period was that Okinawans rallied under the Japanese flag in 
their effort to oust the US military. They sought membership in an existing state, 
Japan$the very state that had colonized their territory nearly a century earlier.  
By the time of the National Athletic Meet in the late 1980s, the Rising Sun flag 
had come to symbolize a history of Japanese oppression for Chibana. It had become a 
symbol of Japan’s betrayal of Okinawans in war and in peace. The Okinawan struggle 
successfully brought an end to America’s postwar rule, but not its occupation. Not 
  3 
only did the US military remain after Okinawa’s reincorporation into the Japanese 
state in 1972, but the terms of reincorporation set by the US and Japanese 
governments also relocated several American bases from Japan to Okinawa. Today, 
75% of all US bases in Japan remain in distant Okinawa Prefecture, which constitutes 
just 0.6% of Japan’s total land mass. Fifty thousand US troops, their dependents and 
US civilian employees maintain thirty-seven installations on Okinawa Island alone 
(see figure 1.2).2 Of its occupation-era installations the US agreed to forfeit, many 
were merely transferred to Japan’s Self Defense Forces. In other words, as new 
citizens of a reconstructed Japan, Okinawans became doubly occupied. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Map of United States Military Bases on Okinawa Island (Source: Okinawa 
Prefecture Military Affairs Division3) 
 
Chibana’s shifting interpretations of the Japanese flag and the Japanese 
state$as well as the public manifestations of his different interpretations$are 
                                                
2 Okinawa Island stretches just 70 miles (112 km) north to south, and is 8 miles (13 km) at its widest 
part. The US military also controls 29 maritime zones and 20 air spaces around the island prefecture.  
3 Okinawa Prefecture Military Affairs Division, Map of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa, 
http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&id=592&page=1 
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important not only as expressions of his individual experience, but also for what they 
capture more generally.  First, they embody a much broader political shift in the sixty-
year long Okinawan resistance to the presence of US military bases. Under US 
occupation Okinawans mobilized as Japanese nationals, struggling for well over a 
decade to force the United States to relinquish its control to “motherland Japan.” Over 
the past twenty years, however, a politicized Okinawan national identity has come to 
animate interpretations of and claims against the American military presence. An 
increasing number of Okinawans articulate a desire for greater freedom from Japan’s 
control as well. Demands for more local autonomy vis-à-vis the state have emerged 
alongside citizens’ demands for equal treatment by the state.  
Second, viewed in a global context, this historically novel challenge to US 
militarism in Okinawa is also clearly not taking place in a vacuum. For the 
politicization of Okinawan identity vis-à-vis the state also comes at a time when 
demands for greater ethnic autonomy are increasing around the world. Despite the 
apparent success of anti-imperialist movements and postwar decolonization, 
contemporary movements for self-determination are on the rise and span the globe: 
from Ogoniland in Nigeria to Nagaland in India; from Palestine to Aceh; from 
Scotland and the Basque region of Spain to the Kurdish region transversing Turkey 
and Iraq. Within Japan itself the ethnically distinct Ainu, whose vast territory to the 
north was annexed by Japan in 1869, began to articulate indigenous rights claims 
against the Japanese government in the 1980s.  
Thus the particular kinds of claims emerging within the Okinawan anti-base 
movement$rooted in identities separate from the state but equally territorial$makes 
this transitional moment within Okinawa more than just a window on the politics of 
US military basing in this one locale; it reminds us that the struggle over who and 
what would be the subject of sovereignty continues to unfold globally. New political 
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identities, coalitions and alternative visions of the state-citizen relation mark the 
increasing convergence of the Okinawan movement with contemporary self-
determination movements elsewhere, generating broader, and comparative, questions 
about colonial relations embedded in the modern state system at large. 
Theoretically, this dissertation attempts to understand what links these 
challenges to state sovereignty to one another and to this historical moment. After 
sixty years of struggle against the US military, the relatively recent emergence of 
collective rights claims in Okinawa compels me to ask: What is different about the 
current historical period that makes possible new ways of challenging US forces in 
Okinawa, and what is it about the Okinawan context that makes collective rights 
increasingly meaningful? Put simply: Why now? Why Okinawa? In what ways do 
particular reformulations of sovereignty, such as those emerging in the Okinawan 
context, express changing relations of sovereignty nationally and globally? How do 
challenges to Japan’s sovereign claims to Okinawa shed light on the changing 
relationship between state formation and military expansion? How are challenges to 
citizenship shaped by, yet also displace or rearticulate, dominant notions and 
practices of sovereignty?  
 Methodologically, I use the particular instance of Okinawa as a lens to explore 
these questions. The dissertation combines a world-historical perspective and 
ethnographic approach in my examination of the political shift within Okinawa’s 
demilitarization movement. I draw on the method of incorporated comparison 
(McMichael 1990), through which the contemporary transformation within Okinawa 
in the context of US military basing is seen as mutually constituted with the historical 
formation of the state and the emergence of alternative self-determination claims 
elsewhere. I trace these connections by situating US military basing and the contested 
nature of Ry!ky!an sovereignty in relation to structural changes in the world system, 
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particularly the intertwined processes of state-making and military expansion. 
Conceptualizing militarization as a “peacetime” process and a lived experience, I 
examine Okinawans’ everyday experiences of US military presence under conditions 
of internal colonial basing. I focus in particular on the politics surrounding a campaign 
to stop the construction of a new air base. I pay close attention to how meanings of ties 
to “place” in Okinawa shape social and political identities in relation to changes in 
political context. I consider how, while citizenship remains a meaningful category for 
some, it is challenged and reworked by others. I thus employ the Okinawan struggle in 
a methodological sense, as a window on the structures, experiences and meanings of 
particular world-historical processes and relations rather than as an object of study in 
itself. 
In the chapters that follow, I advance the following three main arguments: 
First, in chapter two I argue that the political shift within Okinawa’s struggle against 
US military presence sheds light on historically specific relations of rule and foreign 
military basing I conceptualize as internal colonial basing: military presence in 
indigenous or otherwise contested territories obscured by the representational claims 
of the state. Internal colonial basing reflects the postwar process of state-making, 
which, under particular hegemonic conditions, legitimized foreign military presence in 
a way that served both to conceal the still central role of colonial relations in overseas 
basing and to create new forms of colonial militarization. Second, I argue in chapters 
three and four that, under conditions of internal colonial basing, Japan’s colonial 
regard for Okinawans and the US military’s occupation of the islands shape and 
sustain one another through Okinawans’ compromised citizen relations. The Japanese 
government’s privileging of the US-Japan Security Treaty in the Okinawan context 
creates the conditions for maintaining US military presence via systematic political 
coercion and exclusion, and economic inducements that reinforce the notion that 
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Okinawans are dependent on rather than because of the bases. Simultaneously, the 
“everydayness” of US military presence in Okinawans’ lives creates a sense of 
inevitability and even normality with regard to the bases, which fuels the ambivalence 
necessary to sustain them. Finally, in chapters five and six I show that the relations of 
internal colonial basing leads to an inability to legitimize the Japanese state in a way 
that sustains citizenship as a salient identity for an increasing number of Okinawan 
activists. The emergent claims for greater autonomy within the Okinawan anti-base 
movement, and the Japanese government’s response to these, reflect a broader politics 
of collective rights and the struggle over the meaning of sovereignty nationally and 
globally. In this way the Okinawa case sheds light on the transitional character of the 
current historical moment.  
 
Okinawa as a place in/of struggle  
What is now known both formally and popularly as Okinawa, or Okinawa 
Prefecture, is a group of 160 or so islands that together make up the Ry!ky! 
Archipelago. Situated roughly 500 miles off China’s southeast coast, the Ry!ky! 
Islands stretch south and west from Japan to Taiwan, where the East China Sea meets 
the Pacific Ocean (see figure 1.3). The Ry!ky!s Islands are known for their diversity, 
both within the islands and in relation to surrounding countries. Their relative distance 
from any significant landmass has led to the nickname “Galapagos of the East” for the 
extent of their unusual endemic flora and fauna. The Ry!ky!s’ isolation, together with 
considerable distance between many of the islands within the archipelago, also led to 
their historically multicultural and multilingual population. Although this began to 
change after the Japan government extended its nationalizing efforts to the islands, 
they are still known for their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness. 
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Figure 1.3 Map of the Ryukyu Islands in East Asia4  
The dissertation’s narrative centers on the largest and most populated island in 
the archipelago, Okinawa Island. Historically, Okinawa Island has been the political 
and economic center of the island chain. It was the hub of the Ry!ky! Kingdom’s 
vibrant maritime trade between peoples in China, Korea, Japan and throughout 
Southeast Asia (see Kerr 1958, ch. 4). Its city of Naha became the capital of the 
Ry!ky! Kingdom after its unification in the 15th century, the headquarters of both 
Japan’s colonial administration after 1879 and the United States’ occupation after 
1945, and finally the prefectural capital in 1972. Today, home to one million of the 
prefecture’s 1.3 million people, Okinawa Island is the location of the majority of US 
military installations in the Ry!ky!s, and therefore the epicenter of Okinawa’s 
struggle against the presence of American forces.  
                                                
4 “Map of Far East Asia,” My Travel Guide, http://www.mytravelguide.com/g/maps/Far-East-Asia-
map.gif. 
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The geographical location of the Ry!ky!s and Okinawa Island, in addition to 
shaping their dynamic ecological and socio-political development in the region, has 
also figured centrally in representations of the islands as a naturally strategic military 
outpost. Its particular location off the Asian continent and relative isolation earned it, 
in US military and civilian circles, the nickname “Keystone of the Pacific,” for being a 
geo-strategically ideal site for the US military’s “defense of the free world in the 
Pacific.”5 Echoing arguments made by feudal Japanese leaders in the 1600s, American 
imperialists in the mid-1800s, and the leaders of a fledgling Japanese state in the late 
1800s, military and civilian leaders today represent US military presence in Okinawa 
as a self-evident, and therefore more or less permanent, function of geography. At the 
same time, that US military presence there today rests on representations of the 
Ry!ky!s as being naturally part of Japan highlights that such ideas about a place can 
rarely be reduced to its geography. The fact is, Okinawa Island, like most of the 
islands in the Ry!ky!s, is closer to Taipei, Shanghai, Manila and Seoul than it is to 
Tokyo.  
Okinawa is the site of unusually public debates over the “self-evidence” of its 
intertwined military occupations, its relationship to Japan, its place in the region, and 
Ry!ky!an difference. Exposed in these debates is the fact that geographies of military 
occupation, like geographies of political occupation, are rooted in ideological notions 
of the relationship between people and place. As such, these linkages must be 
continually reestablished in order to sustain the structures of power and mechanisms 
of regulation that make them appear natural. Also exposed in Okinawan politics is 
that such efforts to establish natural relationships are always incomplete and shaped by 
                                                
5 In its introduction to Okinawan history, the US Marine Corps’ Okinawa web site explains, “Because it 
was considered the key to the invasion of Japan, and because it is also considered a key geographical 
factor to the defense of the free world in the Pacific area, Okinawa now owns the nickname, ‘Keystone 
of the Pacific.’” See www.okinawa.usmc.mil/About%20Okinawa/History%20Page.html. 
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concrete social relations; the contradictions between discourses and experiences of ties 
to place have given rise to questions and struggle on several fronts.  Okinawa thus 
provides a rich context in which to explore how ideas and practices of sovereignty are 
appropriated, contested and transformed in the current historical period. 
 
The Okinawan struggle as a lens on global change: Military expansion and the 
shifting subject of sovereignty  
Okinawan challenges to the Japanese state: A new form of an old problematic 
The United States’ military presence in Okinawa exemplifies its current 
overseas military configuration and its contemporary mode of engagement with the 
world in a number of ways. Like the majority of US installations around the globe 
today, the concentration of US forces in Okinawa is a legacy in search of a future. The 
US owns or leases at least 761 installations overseas, with over half still concentrated 
in Western Europe and East Asia, especially Germany, England, Japan and South 
Korea (US Department of Defense 2007, 2008). US presence in Okinawa is thus a part 
of the United States’ “just inheritance” from World War II by virtue of the American 
blood spilled there, but one whose rationale and infrastructure quickly took on US 
ideological imperatives of the Cold War. After an uncertain decade of relying for its 
raison d’etre on proclamations of Taiwanese independence and provocations from 
(and of) North Korea, the massive network of bases in Okinawa has been recently 
refitted with the durable double-mantle of “message to a ‘rising China’”6 and, of 
course, “bulwark against terrorism.”7 
                                                
6 As relations between North and South Korea warmed and North Korea faded as a key justification for 
the U.S. military build up in Japan and South, U.S. military and civilian leaders began raising the 
possibility of a future conflict with China as a key threat and reason for maintaining troop levels in the 
region. Although President Bush revived North Korea as a justification when he included it in the “Axis 
of Evil” in his 2002 State of the Union speech, China has taken center stage in military planners’ 
reasoning. The Pentagon began citing China as a potential adversary in 2000, referring to China as a 
“peer competitor” in its Joint Vision 2020 (see http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1225.pdf.) 
Despite previous internal calls for troop reduction, the report calls for much closer military cooperation 
with Japan and continued US troop presence in Okinawa and Korea, even after the latter’s reunification 
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Justifying America’s continued militarization of Okinawa over six and a half 
decades is thus a well-practiced exercise in legitimacy, but one characterized by 
constant crisis. Okinawa is also exemplary because of the continuous protest against 
US military bases and practices in and around the islands. That US military presence 
has also become a catalyst for nationalist sentiment in Okinawa is not surprising. 
Accounts of anti-US military base movements from Puerto Rico to South Korea and 
the Philippines, to Germany and the United Kingdom, demonstrate that resistance to 
US military presence is often rooted in a concern over the impact of security 
arrangements on national sovereignty.8 In particular, it is rooted in concerns about 
basic rights and accountability, and the extent to which national or local authorities, 
not to mention the average individual, have any say regarding US military practices 
within their borders.  
                                                
with the North. Since then, representations of China have grown more explicit. In the Pentagon’s 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review, a strategic planning document issued every four years, it warns that 
“[t]he pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk.” The 
QDR goes on to call for “prudent hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by 
themselves may fail to preclude future conflict” (see www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf).  
7 US forces in Okinawa are referenced in relation to the “War on Terror” and fighting “terrorism” in 
conjunction with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities under the Pacific Command. 
Okinawa-based Special Forces, in particular, routinely conduct joint operations and joint training 
exercises with military forces of countries in the region intended to “combat extremist violence” in 
Southeast Asia and “terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region” more generally. See “U.S. Security Policy in 
Asia and The Pacific: The View From Pacific Command,” Joint hearing Before the Senate 
Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Serial No. 107–76, February 27, 2002; and Andrew 
Fieckart, “U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the 
Philippines, and Colombia” Congressional Research Service Report, RL32758, August 26, 2005. For 
example, Special Forces based in Okinawa participate in Operation Enduring Freedom’s Philippines 
“front.” This effort centers on joint exercises known as Balikatan (a Tagalog word meaning “shoulder-
to-shoulder”) and joint operations targeting Abu Sayyaf, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the 
Moro National Liberation Front. See Michael Lim Ubac “Palace: GIs all look alike” Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, September 7, 2008, Retrieved on September 10, 2008 from 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080907-159154/Palace-GIs-all-look-alike).  
8 See, for example, Amilcar Antonio Barreto, Puerto Rico Vieques, the Navy, and Puerto Rican Politics: 
University of Florida Press, 2002; John Feffer. “Korea: Liberation and Self-Determination.” Foreign 
Policy in Focus, 2001; Ed Garcia and Francisco Nemenzo. The Sovereign Quest. Freedom from 
Foreign Military Bases. Quezon City, 1988; E. San Juan, Jr. “Cultural Politics, U.S. Imperialist War of 
Terror, and Socialist Revolution in the Philippines.” Bulatlat 4, 2004; Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The 
International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
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However the politicization of Okinawan identity in the Okinawan 
demilitarization movement implies a different story and different potential outcome 
than the nationalist sentiments animating, for example, anti-US military movements in 
South Korea, the UK, and even mainland Japan. In these places, nationalist sentiment 
is rooted in a notion of citizens’ popular sovereignty and a desire to strengthen state 
capacities vis-à-vis the United States.9 In contrast, claims and efforts aimed at securing 
greater autonomy in Okinawa implicate Japanese practices of rule in ways far beyond 
a critique of particular administrations that bow to US pressure, or to pressures from 
domestic forces benefiting from, or ambivalent to, the presence of US forces. 
Contemporary Okinawan rights claims employed against US military presence 
increasingly challenge the legitimacy of the Japanese state itself; they call into 
question its very meaning within the Ry!ky!s’ territorial and socio-political context. 
What from a distance often looks like profound anti-Americanism in Okinawa’s anti-
base movement, in other words, is instead an emerging challenge to the Japanese state 
and its historical complicity in American empire. 
My primary focus is on this particular challenge within the Okinawan anti-base 
movement, and how it is articulated across a diverse yet intertwined set of issues and 
groups. The anti-base movement means many things to many people. For some it is a 
way to lessen the destruction of Okinawa’s unique and fragile biodiversity (Taylor 
2005). For others it is a way to name and end a central source of sexual violence and 
other crimes against Okinawans (Takazato 1999; Fukumura and Matsuoka 2002; 
Akibayashi 2002). Some seek to end Okinawa’s role in US wars and militarism 
(Yonetani 2003a), while others seek to end Okinawa’s dependence on an economy 
organized chiefly to maintain the bases (Tanji 2009). In other words, the long and 
                                                
9 I am not suggesting here that nationalism, understood here as a temporally and spatially grounded 
phenomenon, plays out in the same way in these different contexts.  
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varied anti-base struggle gives voice to the multiple ways that US military presence 
continues to impact the ecological, social, economic and cultural relations of Okinawa. 
But in recent decades, nearly all strands of this diverse and fluid movement 
increasingly give voice to a recognition that Okinawa’s historical relationship to Japan 
underpins this impact, and that this, too, must be explicitly named and confronted.  
This challenge to Japan’s sovereignty suggests that the “legitimacy problem” 
historically associated with military expansion is taking on a new form in the current 
historical conjuncture. War making and the buildup of military power more generally 
have been a project in state legitimacy since the initial formation of states (Anderson 
1974; Tilly 1975, 1985). And although today the link between sovereignty as a basis 
for state monopoly over force and a basis for the protection of citizens’ rights is taken 
for granted, the relationship between force monopoly and protection under the rubric 
of sovereignty emerged piecemeal over time, within different historical relations and 
out of different kinds of struggles. Famously asserting that “war made the state, and 
the state made war” Charles Tilly (1975:42) demonstrates how the modern state form 
emerged primarily out of the need to wage and prepare for war. Polities with the 
ability to extract capital needed for warfare and establish control over a given 
geographical area gave rise to the state form in Europe.  Anderson’s (1974) work on 
the emergence of absolutist states shows how the bourgeoisie established their “rights” 
as a quid pro quo for absolutist centralization. Tilly (1985) captures this arrangement 
in his notion of the state as “protection racket.” But citizenship and still other rights 
came later (and for some groups, even later) as liberal revolutions extended and 
demarcated the scope of the protection racket(s) as nation-states emerged (Marshall 
1973; Poggi 1978; Wallerstein 2003). Thus rights, citizenship and state claims to a 
monopoly on force all emerged in relation to one another, but under different 
historical conditions of tension and struggle.  
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In part the analysis presented here picks up where Tilly and others leave off. 
The challenges to state sovereignty emerging in the Okinawan struggle direct my 
attention to how the relationship between state formation and militarization$and the 
meaning of sovereignty itself$continues to change precisely as a historical 
consequence of the apparent “completion” of the state system. But the nature of the 
Okinawan demilitarization movement compels me to depart, on the one hand, from 
social scientists’ traditional concern with warfare and, on the other, from the 
conventional assumption that state formation somehow stopped once the state system 
was extended across the globe. 
Foreign military basing and state formation 
Social science scholarship on the relationship between state formation and 
militarization has traditionally focused on warfare (Hooks and Rice 2005). The focus 
on war makes sense to a point. Its transformative impact throughout history makes war 
the more obvious phenomenon to examine when it comes to understanding how 
military power intertwines with state formation. However, increasingly consequential 
for our understanding of the state-military nexus and related tensions inherent in state 
sovereignty in the postwar period is military expansion of the preparatory sort, namely 
foreign military basing. By this I mean the extension to other sovereign territories of 
one state’s always-ongoing efforts toward readiness for warfare.  
One might argue that war and foreign military basing go hand-in-hand, and 
indeed they do. The majority of US bases around the world today are, like those in 
Okinawa, a legacy of US military expansion during the Second World War, with their 
purposes routinely refitted with the imperatives of both cold and hot wars since. As 
late as the 1930s, America’s military presence overseas paled in comparison to nearly 
all European powers. This ratio reversed dramatically by the end of World War II, 
with the US retaining most of its 500 installations it acquired in the interim (Stambuk 
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1990). Moreover, US leaders used the war itself as a means of acquiring overseas 
bases, rather than the bases being merely a means, and therefore a consequence, of 
waging war (Sandars 2000:5-7).10 Given that over half of the US military’s overseas 
installations remain concentrated in Western Europe and East Asia, it is hard to 
imagine that the US (or any other country) could have the extensive network of bases 
it has today without the wars of the past sixty years.  
But it is also the case that continued, long-term presence of most foreign 
military bases is not immediately or even solely related to warfare. Political and 
economic aims tied to the projection of state power have always been central to 
maintaining bases beyond national boundaries, even if these aims officially take a 
back seat to more publicly acceptable representations of security threats (Harvey 2003, 
ch. 3; Sandars 2000:6,16; Smith, D. 2004). US military presence in Okinawa typifies 
how justifications for continued existence of American military bases overseas rely 
more on the threat (real or invented) of an indeterminate future conflict rather than on 
the actual imperatives of immediate warfare. Moreover, once foreign military bases 
are in place, bureaucratic and organizational inertia contribute to their continued 
existence, as does sheer stubbornness and a sense of entitlement on the part of US 
military leaders to hold onto America’s foreign bases, especially those originally 
acquired in battle.11 Speaking to a public forum in Okinawa, Deputy Assistant 
                                                
10 Christopher Sandars details the planning that took place in Washington in the early 1940s toward 
creating a foreign network of bases meant for the postwar era. While Roosevelt was decrying 
imperialism at the 1941 Atlantic Conference, he was instructing his Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin 
preparations for a network of overseas military bases after war’s end. This culminated in a March 1943 
paper disseminated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which cited the acquisition of overseas military bases in 
itself as a “primary war aim.” See Christopher Sandars, America's Overseas Garrisons. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, pp 5-7. 
11 A 1970 report of the Sub-committee of the Senate Committee Foreign Relations highlights the US 
government’s own recognition of the enduring nature of American military presence overseas: “Once 
an American overseas base is established, it takes on a life of its own. Original missions may become 
outdated but new missions are developed, not only with the intention of keeping the facility going but 
often to actually enlarge it….Within the government departments most directly concerned$State and 
Defense$we found little initiative to reduce or eliminate any of these overseas facilities” (quoted in 
Sandars 2000:16. A similar sentiment is expressed in a report prepared for the Senate Committee on 
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Secretary of State in the Clinton and Obama Administrations and lead US negotiator 
on Okinawan base matters, Kurt Campbell, pointed to this tendency as a key factor 
impeding base reductions in Okinawa. A major problem for current military 
commanders, he explained, is that “none of them want to be remembered as ‘the one 
who lost the bases on Okinawa’.”12 Such resistance, alongside the range of 
justifications for continued foreign military basing, helps make the stationing of 
military forces abroad for reasons other than war a distinguishing characteristic of 
international relations in the postwar period (Harkarvy 1982:88).  
The centrality of “peacetime” foreign military basing in postwar relations is 
quite remarkable, not least because it challenges fundamental principles of modern 
state sovereignty. And yet foreign military basing is widely accepted and represented 
as a routine and legitimate aspect of international relations today. This taken-for-
grantedness obscures two things. First, it obscures a transformative moment in its 
history, which sheds light on how this form of military expansion came to be 
considered a “normal” aspect of interstate relations. Second, taking foreign military 
basing for granted as a routine matter between “already-formed” states obscures how 
the normalizing process itself, specifically how the principles of sovereignty and 
citizenship that legitimize the practice in the contemporary era, create the conditions 
for foreign basing to have a transformative impact on states and the state-citizen 
relation.  
                                                
Foreign Relations a decade later: “Overseas facilities must be constructed over long periods of time and 
tend to become self-perpetuating…without regular and comprehensive review, there is a danger that US 
foreign bases will reflect historic, rather than current and emerging needs” See “United States Foreign 
Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations,” Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 
Library of Congress, April 1979, p. iii. 
12 Personal notes on Campbell’s speech, Naha City, Okinawa, December 14, 2004. 
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Foreign military basing as “unbundled territoriality” and a site of change 
The centrality of foreign military basing to international relations today is also 
quite unremarkable, for there is nothing new about the long-term deployment of 
military forces beyond national borders. Empires and colonizers have always 
depended on overseas military outposts to extend and preserve territorial reach, secure 
commercial interests and enforce rule (see Stambuk 1963:15-22). What is relatively 
new, however, is the emphasis on constructing formal processes to legitimize the 
siting of one country’s military forces within the territory of another. In chapter two I 
show how deliberate efforts to institute formal security treaties and other arrangements 
in the postwar period intersected with the twin processes of decolonization and state 
making. Imperialism as form of rule and military expansion was in dramatic flux in 
the decades following the Second World War. Anti-imperialist struggles transformed 
the political landscape, compelling the extension of the state system via 
decolonization. This meant that governments of powerful states were thereafter forced 
to work within the parameters of the expanding state system to site their military 
forces overseas. Institutional and negotiating imperatives for foreign military basing 
thus emerged through the constitution of an increasingly shared notion of territorial 
sovereignty.  
Given its mutual constitution with modern territoriality, the collective 
institutionalization of foreign military basing in the postwar period can usefully be 
understood as an historically specific instance of what Gerard Ruggie calls the 
unbundling of territoriality (1993:165). By this he means the deliberate institutional 
devices created by state governments to compensate for the inherent contradiction in 
the construct of territoriality, namely its absolute exclusivity. “In the modern 
international polity,” Ruggie explains, “an institutional negation of exclusive 
territoriality serves as the means of situating and dealing with those dimensions of 
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collective existence that territorial rulers recognize to be irreducibly transterritorial in 
character” (165).  
Ruggie uses the notion of unbundled territoriality to explore the condition of 
postmodernity and transformation in international politics. Because “unbundling” is 
employed to overcome real-world limitations imposed by the exclusive territorial form 
of the modern state, he argues, it is in the coordinated negation of territoriality that 
international sociality takes place in the modern era. As such, instances of 
“unbundled” territoriality are the “terrain” where we should look to understand how 
the rearticulation of international political space is occurring today. He cites 
contemporary examples such as common markets and political communities (e.g. the 
European Union and NATO). Particularly relevant to the current study is Ruggie’s 
emphasis on the doctrine of extraterritoriality$whereby governments have long 
recognized mutual “islands of alien territory” for the purposes of diplomatic 
representation and activity (i.e. embassies)$as the most enduring instantiation of 
unbundled territoriality. 
I contend that “peacetime” deployment of military forces into another country 
is a particularly potent expression of “unbundling” and extraterritoriality, and as such 
is significant in terms of its potential to condition change. Today’s formal basing 
arrangements between states serve as a legal-rational technical fix for the very practice 
that arguably constitutes the ultimate rupture in the relations between states—foreign 
military occupation. As Chalmers Johnson (2003) points out, contemporary legal 
protections accorded foreign deployed forces have their roots in nineteenth century 
imperialist practices of extraterritoriality in China.13 However, foreign military basing 
                                                
13 The doctrine of extraterritoriality provided a white foreigner charged with a crime the “right” not to 
be charged under “barbaric” local law. Johnson writes, “Following the Anglo-Chinese ‘Opium War’ of 
1839-42, the United States was the first nation to demand ‘extrality’ for its citizens. All the other 
European nations then acquired the same rights as the Americans. Except for the Germans, who lost 
their Chinese colonies in World War I, Americans and Europeans lived an ‘extraterritorial’ life in China 
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is qualitatively different from most instances of unbundled territory and 
extraterritoriality Ruggie points to, because it is not just about occupying space. It 
involves a range of existentially violent economic, cultural, and ecological 
relationships that compromise sovereign territory and the representational claims of 
the state in profound ways. While the long-term siting of foreign armed forces is 
decided at the highest political levels, as chapter three details, its effects are 
experienced bodily and psychologically by people in the physical and social spaces of 
their everyday lives. For this reason, popular struggles that emerge in relation to 
foreign military basing reveal how the international political space created through 
interstate military arrangements is also simultaneously local political space. It thus 
becomes a site of interrelated political transformation on both dimensions.  
The transformative potential in the Okinawan instance derives significantly 
from the contradictions in a postwar regime of foreign military expansion that, on the 
one hand, is framed in terms of state sovereignty and citizenship; and, on the other 
hand, rests on power relations obscured through these same terms. The global 
expansion of the state form via postwar decolonization made the conjointly emerging 
regime of foreign military basing a matter of state-citizen relations in unprecedented 
ways. For in the “UN era,” military basing is grounded in the notion of the state as the 
locus of sovereignty, where citizens’ sovereign rights are safeguarded and expressed. 
In other words, contemporary military expansion rests on the supposed coincidence of 
sovereignty as a basis for state monopoly on force and protection of citizens’ rights. 
  This double abstraction of state sovereignty facilitates the assumption that 
people’s rights as citizens remain intact under “legitimate” military expansion. By 
virtue of the territoriality of the modern state, few would doubt that popular 
                                                
until the Japanese ended it in 1941 and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang stopped it in 1943.” See 
Chalmers Johnson, America’s Abominable Record in Okinawa.” History News Network, January 5. 
Retrieved January 30, 2004 (http://hnn.us/articles/2867.html).  
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sovereignty and its attendant rights are among the first casualties when a country 
invades and militarily occupies another (e.g. Iraq under US occupation). However, 
when two governments deliberately arrange for the deployment of one country’s 
military within the territory of the other via security treaties (e.g. US military bases in 
Okinawa), citizens’ rights are widely presumed to remain intact.14 Liberal citizenship 
upholds the presence of foreign forces in the same way it underpins claims to a state’s 
monopoly over the use of force within its own territory: as the embodiment of a 
political bargain between state and individual in which the former is represented as the 
neutral arbiter of national security and the common interest of the latter. Foreign 
military basing, as state-organized violence coordinated between states, is thus a 
global protection racket (c.f. Tilly 1985), insofar as it is framed in terms of global 
security as well as state sovereignty and citizenship, and extracts payment from the 
host state, and by extension its citizens.   
The supposed coincidence of territory, state monopoly on force, rights and 
citizenship not only informs security arrangements and their representations, it is also 
the starting point for most scholarship on contemporary foreign military basing. At 
present, the topic of foreign basing remains the bastion of international relations and 
security studies within political science.15 As Hooks and Rice (2005:569) point out, 
                                                
14 Writing in 1963 on the relationship between overseas basing and the spread of the institution of state 
sovereignty, political scientist George Stambuk (1963) marveled at the unprecedented “permanent, 
peacetime arrangement” of American forces overseas performing the “normal peacetime functions of a 
domestic military force.” As further indication that postwar foreign military basing marked a break 
from the past$when overseas basing depended on the use of force against local populations$he points 
to the local “public acceptance of the arrangement as a normal factor in life, presumably to remain 
indefinitely.” For Stambuk, the implications of this new experience of citizenship were only 
problematic insofar as basing arrangements impacted “the status of the American soldier.” See George 
Stambuk, American Military Forces Abroad: Their Impact upon the Western State System: Ohio State 
University Press, 1963, pp. 9-11. 
15 This scholarship burgeoned in the postwar period as foreign military presence became a “normal” 
aspect of international relations. Broader studies considered the place of overseas military bases in 
international relations, while more focused literatures tackled approaches to basing negotiations and the 
complicated legal jurisdictional matters that arise when one country’s armed forces live more or less 
permanently in the territory of another. For studies on military bases in international relations, see 
George Stambuk, American Military Forces Abroad: Their Impact upon the Western State System: 
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even among political sociologists there is very little sustained scholarship on military 
basing and other “peacetime” forms of militarization (but see Hooks and Smith 2004; 
Scoville 2006). Although sociology is well suited to analyze the social dimensions of 
sustained foreign military presence and its relation to the state, to the extent the 
discipline has taken up the topic of state formation and military expansion, it remains 
fixated on warfare and is dominated by assumptions that privilege both the state and 
the coincidence of state boundaries and societies (Hooks and Rice 2005:569 ). As a 
result, sociological analyses have so far largely reproduced the central theoretical 
blind spots of conventional international relations theory and security studies. First, by 
privileging the state in general, conventional approaches to the study of foreign 
military basing reduce it to a matter of the state and interstate relations.16 Second, by 
positing social actors in terms of, or situated within, a self-evident state, social action 
explored in relation to state power and military basing becomes explicitly or implicitly 
conceptualized as merely a reaction to state power rather than an interaction with state 
power.  
                                                
Ohio State University Press, 1963; Roland Paul, American Military Commitments Abroad. New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973; Robert Harkavy, Great Power Competition for 
Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy. Oxford: Pergamon, 1982; and Christopher T. 
Sandars, America's Overseas Garrisons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. For scholarship on 
approaches to basing negotiations, see Thomas C. Suter, “Base Rights Agreements.” Air University 
Review July-August, 1983; Daniel Druckman, “Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiating Military 
Base Rights, Spain and the United States.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, 1986; and John 
McDonald and Diane Bendahmane, eds., U.S. Bases Overseas: Negotiations with Spain, Greece, and 
the Philippines. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. For work on jurisdictional matters, see, for example, 
Serge Lazareff, The Status of Military Forces under Current International Law. Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 
1964; John Woodliffe, The Peacetime Use of Foreign Military Installations under Modern 
International Law. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992; and Steven 
G.Hemmert, “Peace-Keeping Mission SOFAs: U.S. Interests in Criminal Jurisdiction.” Boston 
University International Law Journal 215, 1999. 
16 A notable exception within the literature on foreign military basing is the extensive cross-disciplinary 
feminist literature which foregrounds the gendered and other social relations integral to militarized 
international relations. See, for example, Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of 
Militarizing Women's Lives. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000; Katharine Moon, Sex 
Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997; Akibayashi, Kozue. “Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence: A Feminist Challenge to 
Militarism,” Dissertation, Columbia University Teachers College, 2002; and Rachel Cornwell and 
Andrew Wells. “Deploying Insecurity.” Peace Review 11:410, 1999. 
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Incorporating social actors, transnational relations, and everyday experience 
The Okinawan case calls into question conventional interpretations of the 
peacetime stationing of armed forces in other countries as solely a matter of the state. 
Instead it highlights how social actors and social relations figure in the contemporary 
relationship between military expansion and state making. I draw on the insights of 
those whose work de-centers the state as the subject of international relations by 
demonstrating the centrality of (often marginalized) social actors, social relations and 
everyday experiences to an understanding of the politics of military basing (see, for 
example, Enloe 1996 and 2000; Lutz 2001 and 2006; Moon 1997; Baretto 2002).  
While existing studies of the Okinawan demilitarization movement foreground 
the interaction of social relations and state power, most nevertheless posit the 
movement in terms of, or situated within, self-evident Japanese and American states, 
and by extension a self-evident state system.17 I seek to contribute to more recent 
scholarship on Okinawa/the Ry!ky!s that problematizes Okinawa’s historical 
                                                
17 Existing scholarship on Okinawa’s anti-base movement contributes much to our understanding of the 
movement’s internal political and organizational dynamics (see Caroline Spencer, “Meeting of the 
dugongs and the cooking pots: Anti-military base citizens’ groups on Okinawa.” Japanese Studies 
23:125-140, 2004; J. Taylor and Chris Jasparro, “Grass-Roots Movements and Environmental Security 
and Development in Okinawa.” Regional Development Dialogue 23:122-131, 2002; J. Taylor, 
“Environment and Security Conflicts: The U.S. Military in Okinawa,” in Chris Jasparro ed., 
Environment and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region. Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security 
Studies, 2005). Studies have also shed light on its effects on US-Japan relations and US military policy 
(see Masamichi Inoue, John Purves, and Mark Selden, “Okinawa Citizens, U.S. Bases and the 
Dugong.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 29, 1997; Ryan Scoville, “A Sociological Approach to 
the Negotiation of Military Base Agreements.” University of Miami International & Comparative Law 
Review vol. 14, p. 1, 2006; and Sheila Smith, “Do Domestic Politics Matter? The Case of US Military 
Bases in Japan.” Working paper, 2003. Retrieved July 2, 2009 from 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/smith_wp.htm). However most studies focus on the Okinawan 
and/or Japanese context, and nearly always posit the movement in terms of, or situated within, a self-
evident Japanese state. Analyses rooted in a conventional security studies or international relations 
perspective necessarily situate US base issues within regional and/or international relations (see 
Masaaki Gabe, Sekai no naka no Okinawa, Okinawa no naka no Nihon: Kichi no seijigaku [Okinawa in 
the World, Japan in Okinawa: The Politics of Military Bases]. Yokohama: Shobo, 2003; Chalmers 
Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2004; and Julia Yonetani “Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theater.” 
Critical Asian Studies 33, 2001). But here, too, the Okinawan struggle is either explicitly or implicitly 
conceptualized as merely a reaction to US military policies and practices, or as a reaction to unequal 
treatment by the Japanese government.  
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relationship with the Japanese state. In particular, studies that consider the “ethnic 
turn” of the post-1972 era18 go farthest toward shedding light on how self-perception, 
collective memory and notions of nationhood inform shifts in Okinawans’ perceptions 
of their relationship to the bases and to the Japanese and US states. However, these 
analyses nearly all focus on the Okinawan or Japanese context (but see Inoue et al 
2004; Inoue 2007 and especially Siddle 2003). The social relations and social actors 
animating the shift within the Okinawan movement, while often theoretically and 
politically subordinated within states, transcend and problematize the state.  
This study thus requires a comparative approach that historicizes the Okinawan 
movement within global processes and social relations—including transnational 
relations. Although not comparative in the sense of bringing evidence from two or 
more well-delineated cases to bear on my inquiry, situating the emergence of 
alternative forms of self-determination in Okinawa within historical context becomes 
an inherently comparative endeavor (c.f. McMichael 1990). For this reason I take a 
cue from the recent scholarly turn toward exploring transnational dimensions of social 
movements, which offers a necessary corrective to conventional comparative 
approaches rooted in a positivist understanding of social change. By empirically 
demonstrating the interrelationships among distinct actors, movements and 
processes,19 scholars in this emerging field expose as methodologically inappropriate 
                                                
18 See Matthew Allen, Identity and Resistance in Okinawa. Rowman & Littlefield, 2002; Aurelia 
Mulgan, “Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A test for Japanese Democracy.” Melbourne: 
Department of International Relations, Australia National University, 2000; several essays in Laura 
Hein and Mark Selden, Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power. 
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003; Ayako Nakachi, “The Influence of Cultural Perceptions on 
Political Awareness: A Case Study in Okinawa, Japan.” in Sociology. Singapore: University of 
Singapore, 2004; and Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa Routledge, 2006.  
19 See, for example, Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco. Transnational Social 
Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University 
Press. 1997; Jonathan Fox and David Brown. Struggle for Accountability:  The World Bank, NGOs, and 
Grassroots Movements. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1998; John Boli and George Thomas, eds., 
Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875. Stanford: 
Stanford U. Press. 1999; Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston. Globalization and Resistance: Transnational 
Dimensions of Social Movements. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 2002; Sidney Tarrow,             
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conventional approaches that assume cases, or “units of analysis,” form and replicate 
attributes of a predetermined abstract condition independently of one another.  
However, in most studies of global or transnational dimensions of social 
movements, the transnational largely remains a reified, empirical space that exists 
“beyond borders” (c.f. Keck and Sikkink 1998). This obscures our sense of “whole 
movements” if we focus on elites who are positioned to connect electronically with 
one another, travel to other countries, or attend international conferences, and stop 
looking for the ways in which these same actors are fundamentally shaped by, and 
shape, the dense social networks (Tarrow 2005, ch. 3) and everyday experiences in 
which they are rooted. Moreover, because borders are taken for granted as those of 
states, it precludes an understanding of the dynamic character and contingencies of the 
analytical categories and concepts that embody activists’ claims (c.f. Drainville 2001; 
McMichael 2004). Missing is a historical understanding of how such categories and 
concepts might change via social struggle. 
I use the method of incorporated comparison (McMichael 1990; 1996) to 
understand the theoretical as well as empirical connections between the Okinawan 
anti-base movement and self-determination movements elsewhere$theoretical and 
empirical connections that Okinawan activists are making themselves. Grounded in a 
world-historical perspective, incorporated comparison uses particular instances to tell 
a larger story that is cumulative yet contingent, expressing a specific historical 
conjuncture. From this perspective particular political identities (and the claims they 
embody) are mutually constitutive via their relationship to structures of power that 
shape, and are shaped by, their collective demands. This provides analytical space to 
                                                
“Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 4:1-20. 2001, and The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge University Press. 
2005; Joe Bandy & Jackie Smith, eds., Coalitions across Borders. Transnational Protest and the 
Neoliberal Order. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. 
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account for changes in the very categories and concepts like state, sovereignty, 
citizenship and self-determination, which are understood as constituted by concrete 
social relations. 
Fundamentally informing the dissertation, then, is the premise that the state, 
like sovereignty, is an idea that must be continually reestablished in order to sustain 
the structures of power and mechanisms of social and spatial regulation employed in 
the name of the state (Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1988, 2000). “Denaturalizing” and 
exploring rather than assuming the territorial reach of the state allows me to consider 
why and how sovereignty has become an object of contestation and negotiation 
(Nugent 1994; Hansen and Stepputat 2001). Of course from the methodological 
perspective taken here, I also do not assume a natural connection between Okinawan 
identity and place. I follow others who recognize that connecting people, identity and 
place is an “active practice” (c.f. Malkki 1992; Soguk 1999). For Okinawans, too, 
sovereignty (and its conceptual variations) is an idea that must be continually 
reestablished if it is to hold meaning in any broadly consequential sense. 
Understanding how people (re)define and mobilize particular spaces/places in political 
struggles sheds light on how relations of rule and control are apprehended, opposed 
and reworked (Moore 1998). For this reason, conceptions of self-determination, 
however articulated, become important to understanding how ties to place change as 
political contexts change.  
This is where an ethnographic approach to my topic comes into play. I seek to 
contribute what Catherine Lutz (2006) terms an “ethnography of empire.” As she 
points out, the burgeoning of literature identifying the United States as an empire has 
focused largely on the political-economic structural underpinnings. Much less 
attention is paid to “the cultural making of value, or examining empire as more than an 
elite project” (p.1). This dissertation combines both foci. The need to take seriously 
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the meanings Okinawan activists assign to their experiences of US military basing, 
and to the concepts they employ that challenge Japanese sovereignty in Okinawa’s 
socio-political and territorial context, became clear through my interviews and 
observations in the field. There is still a strong tendency among Okinawan activists to 
seek redress via the institutions associated with citizenship (e.g. routine appeals to law 
enforcement, litigation, the electoral process, public protest). Demands for greater 
autonomy are still considerably less common than claims rooted in the rights of 
citizenship. Perhaps this is why most scholars tend not to interpret Okinawans’ 
contemporary “ethnic turn” as being linked to autonomist movements elsewhere (but 
see Siddle 2003), or as posing a new political challenge against the Japanese state and 
US military presence. But to only look for or recognize explicit secessionist claims of 
self-determination as evidence of a “real” challenge to Japan is to overlook 
Okinawans’ ongoing negotiations and reinterpretations of their citizenship. It ignores 
the development of Okinawan subjectivity as a global subjectivity—and what this 
might mean in the current historical period, in which self-determination movements 
have as their object of struggle the state. “Action is shaped by the meanings people 
bring to their predicaments or can wring out of them,” Philip Abrams tells us. Thus 
“an adequate sociology of such predicaments surely has to offer an analysis not only 
of the observable relationships of power and powerlessness within them, but equally 
of what is made of those relationships by those involved in them; an analysis of the 
complex of meaning within which relationships are enacted” (1982:73). Because, as 
Lutz asserts, empire is in the details, only by also making the “human face and frailties 
of imperialism more visible” can we “make challenges to imperial practice more 
likely” (2006:1). 
In this way social struggle becomes methodological, a window on particular 
world-historical relations rather than an object of study in itself. Alternative struggles 
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against state regulation are the instances through which the conditions of state 
formation and the limits of social regulation become known (Corrigan and Sayer 
1985). Social movements, as commonly understood, are thus a key barometer of the 
legitimacy accorded particular practices of rule and control. As such they offer a well-
suited analytical lens through which to understand how experiences of citizenship lead 
to particular kinds of challenges to the state and potential changes in the state-citizen 
relation itself. Persistent popular resistance to foreign military basing in the postwar 
era, and specifically the kind of challenges to the state emerging in Okinawa, expose 
the inability of formal basing arrangements to overcome the kind of compromised 
sovereignty they engender.  
The dissertation draws on fieldwork conducted over sixteen months in 
Okinawa from March 2004 through June 2005. In addition to secondary source 
material, four major sources of data inform the dissertation: (1) interviews (informal, 
semi-structured and structured); (2) participant and semi-structured observations of 
activist meetings and actions; (3) archival documents, including those created by anti-
base activists; and (4) my journal of the research process and experience of living in 
Okinawa kept during my fieldwork. In general, I chose interviewees through 
“emergent” sampling of people I encountered, and the more purposeful snowball 
sampling method. I complemented these by choosing key informants through the 
iterative sampling method employed in qualitative, interpretive research (Patton 2001).  
 
Outline of the dissertation 
I begin the dissertation by historicizing the challenges to Japan’s sovereignty 
emerging within the anti-base movement in relation to broader processes and 
structural changes in the world system. A central aim of chapter two is to theorize how 
US military basing in the Ry!ky!s reflects contemporary changes in the relationship 
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between state formation and military expansion. The chapter demonstrates, 
systematically and comparatively, how the postwar state system sustains and shapes 
new forms of militarized colonial relations. Juxtaposing instances of postwar foreign 
military basing from around the world, I show how the politics of decolonization and 
state making, under conditions of hegemony, gave way to different forms of foreign 
military presence still rooted in colonial relations. 
I trace the history of colonization and militarization of the Ry!ky!s, paying 
special attention to the contested nature of Ry!ky!an sovereignty and the politics 
behind dramatically shifting representations of the islands’ relationship to Japan. 
Japanese and American governments, as well as Okinawans themselves, have sought 
to steer representations of Ry!ky!an sovereignty, alternatively emphasizing or 
downplaying Ry!ky!an difference. For the US and Japan, representations of the 
Ry!ky!s as part of Japan became politically necessary as military expansion 
eventually came to depend on the principle of state sovereignty. For Okinawans, this 
view of the Ry!ky!s came to be seen as the best way to end US occupation. However, 
Japan’s fundamental relationship with Okinawans$that of colonizer and 
colonized$did not change, nor was it resolved through the islands’ “reversion” to 
Japan in 1972. Instead this relationship was subsumed within the Japanese state. The 
emergence of collective rights claims within Okinawa’s struggle against US military 
presence sheds light on these historically specific relations of rule and foreign military 
basing, which I conceptualize as internal colonial basing. The concept of internal 
colonial basing expresses the relations of coloniality that structure and sustain 
America’s continued occupation of the islands, yet are obscured by the 
representational claims of the state. Politically and discursively, US (and Japanese) 
military presence in Okinawa came to rest on the categories that are employed to 
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legitimate military expansion within the postwar state system, namely, state 
sovereignty and citizenship.  
Given that it serves as a key mechanism of military expansion in the postwar 
period, the dissertation foregrounds and problematizes citizenship alongside 
sovereignty. Chapters three and four do so by examining Okinawans’ everyday 
experiences of their citizen relations under internal colonial basing in order to 
understand how the latter is accomplished. Together these chapters demonstrate that 
the intertwining of international basing arrangements and colonial relations creates 
new structures of oppression and forms of inequality through the relations of 
citizenship. Okinawans’ membership in the Japanese state is the mechanism through 
which Japanese leaders’ colonial treatment for Okinawans and US military occupation 
of their territory shape and sustain one another. At the same time, my attention to 
everyday relations reveals that the legitimation of internal colonial basing is not just a 
state-driven process; it is also socially experienced and reproduced amongst 
Okinawans themselves, reflecting what Derek Sayer calls the “accomplishment of 
rule” through “everyday forms of moral accommodation” (1994:374).  
Understanding the conditions of internal colonial basing involves focusing on 
two planes of experience: the quotidian and the extraordinary. Chapter three shows 
how Okinawans’ narratives of everyday life shed light on militarization as an 
everyday process, revealing the extent to which US military presence intersects with, 
and intervenes in, daily routines and ordinary relationships. The synthetic boundaries 
that US military presence has imposed on Okinawa Island for six and a half decades 
normalize a military-centric spatial, cultural and socio-economic order while they 
simultaneously displace, distort and sometimes prevent Okinawans from maintaining 
and creating their own. What comes to light is that the everyday experiences of US 
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military basing condition, and even render routine and “normal,” extraordinary 
violence and struggle related to it. 
Although reversion did not alter Okinawans’ fundamental experience of US 
military presence, it changed the terms through which US occupation would continue 
and be challenged. Japanese citizenship provided Okinawans with a new basis for 
claims-making and new channels for redress, this also has a depoliticizing effect on 
the anti-base movement. Rather than facilitate the continuation of the pre-1972 
movement to end US occupation, the provisions of citizenship redirected anti-base 
activists’ energy and narrowed the focus of their claims within increasingly 
institutionalized politics, bringing Okinawans into the process of managing the impact 
of the bases. Simultaneously, management of base effects happens via international 
institutions extended to Okinawans via their citizenship. The US-Japan Security 
Treaty shapes definitions and representations of “basing problems” in a way that 
locates “basing solutions” and decision-making power at the national and international 
levels, particularly when “local” means of redress cannot channel Okinawan anger. 
The consistent deference Japanese leaders demonstrate to Japan’s security 
arrangement with the US in the Okinawan context makes accountability for base 
effects an elusive prospect.  
Chapter four presents a close examination of this dual mode of managing US 
military presence, which is reflected in the now 13-year old struggle surrounding the 
closure of the Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station and halting the construction of a 
new US air base at Okinawa’s Cape Henoko. The chapter sheds additional light on 
how internal colonial basing is accomplished. I pay particular attention to how the 
Futenma-Henoko struggle reflects the political economy of US military presence more 
generally. US military presence is maintained via a complicated arrangement of 
political coercion and exclusion, and a deeply structural economic dependence 
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punctuated by economic “development” packages—all of which contribute to 
divisions and ambivalence within the Okinawan community. Given the sense of 
normality with regard to the bases, pervasive representations of Okinawa as dependent 
on US military presence rather than because of US military presence are powerful. 
Such representations fuel ambivalence and resignation about their place in Okinawa’s 
future because they reinforce the lived experiences of the majority of Okinawans. 
The campaign to stop the construction of the new base is multi-pronged—
ranging from daily civil disobedience at Henoko to transnational litigation. Discourses 
of the movement and its transnational dimensions de-center the terms through which 
the US-Japan Security Treaty dominates the definition of problems and solutions 
regarding the bases. It introduces alternative conceptions of security that foreground, 
variously, gendered understandings of military force, the environment as a universal 
concern, and non-state sovereignty. Thus the Futenma-Henoko struggle reveals how 
the relations of internal colonial basing simultaneously entrench US military presence 
and increasingly erode the legitimacy of the Japanese state as a rights-giving 
institution. 
Chapters five and six explore how Okinawans’ everyday experiences of 
internal colonial basing is reflected in an emerging ethnic perspective on their citizen 
relations, and what the implications of this are for the state-citizen relation and the 
state system more broadly. Together these chapters demonstrate that institutions of the 
state are not unilaterally depoliticizing. Internal colonial basing conditions 
Okinawans’ experience as ethnically marginalize collectivity, facilitating 
reevaluations and reinterpretations of their relationship to the Japanese state.  
Chapter five adds empirical referents to the thoretical connections I draw in 
chapter two between the Okinawan movement and contemporary self-determination 
movements elsewhere. I demonstrate how the politicization of Okinawan ethnicity in 
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the current conjuncture has provided Okinawan activists with a broader basis to 
interpret and challenge their political position vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. 
This is reflected in new political identities, claims, and alliances, all of which embody 
a different interpretation of the past, and a different vision for the future. 
Okinawan activists are variously interpreting Okinawans’ experience under US 
military presence in terms of their collective identity as an ethnic minority politically 
and socially displaced within Japan; as a nation/people historically connected to the 
Ry!ky! Islands and ethnically and culturally distinct from the Japanese; and (taking 
into account the linguistic and cultural diversity in the islands) as indigenous peoples 
denied their right to self-determination. These political identities are reflected in 
alliances within and beyond Japan. Within Japan, ties with ethnic Koreans and the 
Ainu rest on shared experiences of Japanese imperialism, ongoing ethnic 
marginalization, and (with the Ainu) a desire for greater autonomy. Regionally, 
Okinawan activists’ frequent exchanges with anti-US military activists in the region 
are informed just as much by a sense of shared experience in relation to Japanese 
imperialism, highlighting its historical intertwining with US imperialism. Globally, 
activists connect with other communities seeking greater self-determination. Because 
they foreground Okinawans’ historical claims to the Ry!ky!s, these identities provide 
Okinawans not only with new political partners but also new ways, and even new 
venues, to tell an alternate version of the history and contemporary circumstances of 
the Ry!ky!s.  
The alternative future that most Okinawan activists seek does not (at least for 
now) involve independence. According to prefecture-wide polls regarding Okinawa’s 
future, this reflects a broad consensus. At the same time, those who articulate a 
different relationship with Japan speak of a form of territorialized autonomy, via 
which Okinawans would have greater political, cultural and economic control over the 
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islands than the central government. The contemporary Okinawans struggle thus 
problematizes the very premises legitimating US military presence, namely, 
citizenship and sovereignty.  
Chapter six situates this challenge and the Japanese government’s response to 
it within national and global contexts to understand how contestation over citizen 
relations within Okinawa is shaped by, and shapes, contestation over sovereignty more 
broadly. The chapter explores Tokyo’s seemingly puzzling approach to collective 
rights claims emanating from the Ry!ky!s. The government has remained largely 
silent regarding the Ry!ky! population’s collective position within Japan, namely 
their status as an ethnic minority or as indigenous peoples, even when its international 
human rights commitments oblige it to do so. At the same time, Japanese leaders have 
gone out of their way to officially celebrate the Ry!ky!s’ distinct history and culture 
in other international fora, such as the 2000 Group of Eight meeting convened in 
Okinawa. These different approaches reflect Japan’s shifting national project and 
Tokyo’s efforts to uphold commitments to the US and an international system 
experiencing a crisis of sovereignty. 
Sustained and increasingly prominent mobilization by ethnic groups within 
Japan continues to chip away at the dominant narrative of Japan as a “mono-ethnic” 
country. In this context, embracing Okinawan (and Ainu) difference is a reflection of 
the government’s emphasis on a particular discourse of “multicultural Japan,” which 
emphasizes social variation and regional difference (c.f. Burgess 2007). In contrast 
with other ethnic groups, the historical connection between Okinawans and Ainu and 
their respective territories is difficult for the government to deny. Thus to officially 
recognize and celebrate the distinct culture and history of these two peoples as 
inherently part of a diverse Japan is to reinforce Japan’s territorial reach and sovereign 
claims. 
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Situated in a global context, this stance aligns Tokyo with other state 
governments in a collective effort to delegitimize and/or narrow the meaning of 
collective rights claims within their borders and globally. The autonomist but not 
statist claims of Okinawan activists (and their counterparts making similar challenges 
elsewhere) present an historically novel challenge to the state-citizen relation and thus 
modern sovereignty itself. Contemporary self-determination claims have the state as 
their object of struggle, but not as their objective. Like Okinawan activists, most are 
not seeking independence. Rather than rejecting citizenship altogether, they seek to 
rework its liberal form. For this reason they present the greater challenge to modern 
sovereignty.  
In this way, the contemporary relationship between state formation and 
military expansion reveals itself as a nexus of global social change. Rather than 
rejecting citizenship altogether, Okinawans are challenging citizenship as governed by 
the relations of internal colonial basing. Okinawans’ challenges implicate the postwar 
security relations among states as much as it does the US and Japanese governments in 
the problems of US military presence in the Ry!ky!s. For its part, however, by 
contributing to the erosion of citizenship and the crisis of the Japanese state in the 
Okinawan political context, the United States is jeopardizing the legitimating 
apparatus it has relied on for thirty-five years.  
 
A note about usage of person and place names 
 I present Ry!ky!an and Japanese names with last name first, rather than 
reversing the order to conform to Western practice. Also, in general I use “Okinawa” 
and “Okinawans” to refer to Okinawa Island and its inhabitants, and “Ry!ky!” and 
“Ry!ky!an” to refer to the islands and peoples in the entire archipelago. The latter are 
typically subsumed, both in Japanese and English, under the terms “Okinawa” and 
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In this study I use the particular instance of Okinawa as a lens to understand 
the colonial dimensions of foreign military basing and their relationship to struggles 
over sovereignty more generally. At its most fundamental level, this dissertation is a 
story about the politics of the relationship between people and place. It is about 
struggles over meanings and practices of sovereignty in relation to a particular 
territory, the Ry!ky! Islands, and to particular spaces within the territory: social and 
political spaces, which intertwine with the physical spaces of homes, neighborhoods, 
farmland, roads and coastal waters. Therefore central to this story is that territory itself 
is mobilized in these struggles. This dissertation attempts to show that Okinawans’ 
“defense of place” (c.f. Escobar 2001) is, first, not solely the strategy of Okinawans; 
second, not merely a reaction to state power; and third, not limited in its implications 
to the Ry!ky!s, or Japan, or the US-Japan relationship. The mobilization of territory 
and the (re)defining of place in relation to people by social movements is a dialectical 
process; it is not a reaction by Okinawans to state power but an interaction within state 
power.  
From this perspective, although the defense of place by Okinawans, as well as 
successive US and Japanese governments, is empirically “local,” this study seeks to 
demonstrate how it involves mobilizing global space in conceptual terms. By asserting 
their collective rights in different ways, Okinawan activists simultaneously reflect and 
contribute to the transitional moment in the world more generally, one that is not 
easily understood through a theoretical lens premised on static conceptions of state, 
citizenship and sovereignty. In tracing reinterpretations of their citizenship and the 
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emergence of new political identities and claims in Okinawa, I am not making an 
argument about a linear process of transformation, or emancipation. Rather, I argue 
that it reflects a moment of transition, with Okinawa emerging as a crystallization of 
way sovereignty claims are playing out globally. 




ERASING COLONY: STATE MAKING AND THE CREATION OF 
INTERNAL COLONIAL BASING IN OKINAWA 
 
“This beautiful island is a dependency of Japan, and is governed by the same laws; 
the people are industrious and inoffensive, and I have already made considerable 
progress in calming their fears and conciliating their friendship; and, as I propose to 
make this a port of rendezvous for the squadron, it may be hoped that, in the course of 
time, the whole population of this island may become quite friendly.”  
 
~ Commodore Matthew C. Perry, describing the main island of the Ry!ky! Kingdom 
in a communiqué to US Secretary of the Navy William Graham, June 2, 1853.20  
 
“Though the United States wants no profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are 
going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our 
interests and of world peace. Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for 
our protection we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with 
the United Nations Charter.” 
 




Commodore Matthew Perry’s confident characterization of the Ry!ky! Islands 
as a dependency of Japan in the letter quoted above is notable for two reasons. First, 
the Commodore’s fleet had only arrived in the kingdom’s main port at Naha a week 
before he penned the letter to Washington, and he himself had not even set foot on 
Ry!ky!an soil. Second, less than a year later he orchestrated formal diplomatic 
relations directly between the United States and the Ry!ky! Kingdom itself. Perry, 
whose fleet of black ships is better known for compelling Japan’s rulers to end the 
country’s two centuries of self-isolation in the summer of 1854, landed first in the 
                                                
20 Cited in George Kerr, Okinawa: History of an Island People. Boston: Tuttle Books, 1958, p. 313. 
21 Public Papers of Harry S. Truman, cited in Christopher T. Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrisons, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 5. 
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Ry!ky!s, where he tried unsuccessfully to conclude a treaty of commerce with the 
Ry!ky! Kingdom (Kerr 1958:313). Eager to establish a military outpost in the region, 
Perry knew that promoting the idea that Okinawa was under the control of Japan, 
which Washington had its sights on, was more important than the fact. In the 
realpolitik of the day, it was the most expedient way to deter other colonial powers’ 
designs in the region. 
Perry’s entreaty to Washington worked; he soon found himself overseeing the 
establishment of the first US military installation in the Ry!ky!s, a naval port at the 
capital city of Naha. Upon the successful “opening” of Japan the following year, 
however, Washington ordered the naval port to be reduced to a coal depot, maintained 
to serve as a “technical check” upon potential British, Russian or French interests in 
the islands (Kerr 1958:315). To shore up American interests in this regard, Perry 
concluded the “Compact Between the United States and the Kingdom of Lew Chew 
[Ry!ky!]”, which secured both US citizens and vessels safe harbor and provisions.  
The contradiction between Perry’s insistence on Japanese control over the 
Ry!ky!s and the Compact reveals that America’s contemporary strategy of 
alternatively bolstering Japan’s hold over the Ry!ky! Islands and recognizing 
Ry!ky!an autonomy—both done in order to maintain its military presence there—
began nearly a century before its postwar occupation of the islands. The United States 
would reverse its official characterization four more times before it finally settled on 
formally supporting Japan’s full sovereignty over the distant island territory. By that 
time, validation of state sovereignty had become essential to and aided foreign military 
basing in a new era of empire, as Truman’s nod to the newly minted UN Charter 
suggests. 
Truman’s words capture a transformative historical moment in the relationship 
between state making and military expansion. It expresses at once both the constraint 
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and the freedom that the US and other powerful nations suddenly faced after World 
War Two when it came to establishing foreign military bases. The postwar wave of 
anti-imperialist movements and the subsequent extension of the state system around 
the globe via decolonization initiated an effort to formalize military expansion and 
occupation into a routine practice amongst sovereign states. On the one hand, 
powerful nations could no longer unilaterally expand their militaries in a postwar 
world increasingly organized around the principle of state sovereignty. On the other 
hand, a world of ostensibly sovereign states provided a legitimate cover for military 
expansion by other means. 
In this chapter, I situate US military presence in Okinawa and recent 
challenges to it within this global transformation as a way to understand the 
contemporary relationship between state formation and military expansion. How did 
the institutionalization of the state system in the postwar period change the way 
military expansion happens, and how did this change the conditions of US military 
presence in the Ry!ky!s? Why did the governments of the United States, Japan, and 
ultimately Okinawans themselves all wind up promoting the idea of Japanese 
sovereignty over the Ry!ky! Islands? How does the historical relationship between 
Japan and the Ry!ky!s shape the conditions of US military presence in pre- and post-
1972 Okinawa?  
By historicizing US military basing in the Ry!ky!s, this chapter demonstrates, 
systematically and comparatively, how the politics of state making via decolonization 
in the postwar period both legitimized foreign military expansion and obscured the 
multiple ways foreign military presence still rests on and sustains colonial relations. 
Under conditions of hegemony, decolonization and state making gave way to different 
forms of foreign military presence rooted in colonial relations. I identify four 
historically contingent forms of what I call colonial basing in order to specify the 
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particular configuration of colonial relations governing US military presence in the 
Ry!ky!s.  
The challenge to state sovereignty emerging in the Okinawan demilitarization 
movement reveals how, with the Ry!ky!s’ reincorporation into Japan, US military 
presence in Okinawa took the form of internal colonial basing. This historically novel 
form is distinguished by Okinawa’s status as an internal colony$an erased 
colony$of the Japanese state. The Ry!ky!s’ reincorporation into the Japanese state in 
1972 subsumed the historical relationship between Japan and the islanders—that of 
colonizer and colonized—within the Japanese state and the state-citizen relation. I use 
the term “erased” to capture the deliberate, ongoing efforts to represent Okinawa as 
part of Japan and reject expressions of connection between Okinawans and the 
Ry!ky! Islands that call into question Japan’s territorial integrity. Like other contested 
terrain within countries where the US has a military presence, representations of 
Okinawans and their territory as inherently part of an existing state are critical to the 
United States’ ability to keep its military there due to the postwar institutionalization 
of a new state-centric regime of foreign military basing.  
I begin the chapter by tracing the history of colonization and militarization of 
the Ry!ky!s, paying special attention to the contested nature of Ry!ky!an sovereignty 
and the politics behind shifting representations of the Ry!ky!s’ relationship to 
Japan—including Okinawans’ own self-representation as Japanese during their 
movement to end the US postwar occupation. This leads me to broaden my scale of 
analysis to understand US occupation in the context of postwar changes in the 
relationship between state making and military expansion. After problematizing the 
taken-for-grantedness of contemporary foreign military basing, the third part of the 
chapter explores the different ways colonial relations endure in overseas basing. In this 
discussion my focus on the politics of decolonization helps sheds light on the 
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particular form of colonial relations that condition US military presence in the 
Ry!ky!s since the islands’ 1972 reincorporation into the Japanese state.  
 
(Re)constructing the Ry!ky!s and Japan 
From independent kingdom to colonial subjects  
The seemingly self-evident representation of Okinawa prefecture as part of 
Japan today obscures the Ry!ky! Kingdom’s long history of peaceful and autonomous 
trading relations, as well as the history of invasion, colonization, militarization, 
strategic representations and struggles over sovereignty that led to the kingdom 
becoming part of the contemporary Japanese state. The treaty Perry arranged between 
the US and the Ry!ky! Kingdom in 1854 followed centuries of diplomatic and trade 
relations with peoples throughout the region, and came after diplomatic agreements 
with Holland and France in the mid-1800s. The kingdom began with the uniting of 
Okinawa Island in 1429, soon thereafter consolidating its trade and diplomatic 
relations.22 The Ry!ky!s were at the center of trade between the markets of Southeast 
Asia and those of China, Korea and Japan. Both China and Japan considered the 
kingdom a tribute territory, the latter after invasion in 1609 by the feudal domain of 
Satsuma, located on Japan’s southernmost tip. Satsuma’s invasion of the Ry!ky!s 
followed centuries of peaceful trade between the two regions, and was initiated after 
Ry!ky! leaders refused to contribute warriors to the first of Japan’s two invasions of 
Korea in 1592. The Ry!ky!an court continued to oblige both China and Japan by 
maintaining tributary relations with the Ming Chinese court and successive Japanese 
                                                
22 The Ry!ky! Kingdom had reciprocal trading relations with Siam by 1425 and sent a trade mission to 
Java in 1430. It established diplomatic and trading relations with Korea in 1431, appointed its first 
foreign trade minister in 1459, and sent a trade mission to Malacca in 1463. A diplomatic mission was 
sent to Japan’s Muromachi Shogunate and then to the old capital of Kyoto in 1466. By the end of the 
15th century, trade was established with the eastern coast of Malaysia (See www.okinawan-
shorinryu.com/okinawa/history.html).  
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shogunates.23 In practice, however the Ry!ky! Kingdom retained its autonomy over 
the islands and in its relations with other countries (Kerr 1958, ch. 3). 
The emergence of Japan as a modern nation-state in 1868 is the point where 
the history of the Ry!ky!s irreversibly merges with modern colonial history. Although 
a latecomer to imperialism, Japanese leaders “opened” the country to the international 
community at a time when a powerful state meant not only domestic impenetrability 
but also wealth and power in the form of conquered overseas territories. Japan’s 
fledgling Meiji government wasted little time in extending its formal territorial reach. 
It invaded the Ry!ky! Islands in 1872. Tokyo forced Kingdom officials to hand over 
all treaty correspondence with the US, Holland and France. When Tokyo notified 
foreign governments that it had assumed control over the Ry!ky! Kingdom, then US 
President Ulysses S. Grant sent warning that the Japanese government’s unilateral 
actions might raise concerns internationally. Japanese leaders quickly sent word to the 
US and other powers that Japan would assume all obligations and rights set forth in 
their treaties with the former kingdom. Washington accepted Japan’s position and 
other Western governments soon followed suit (Kerr 1958:364), which helped to 
solidify Japan’s identity as an emerging power and justify its rule over Ry!ky!ans.24 
The Meiji government’s takeover of the Ry!ky!s, which it called the Ry#ky# shobun 
(“disposition of Ry!ky!”), culminated in 1879, when it designated the entire Ry!ky! 
archipelago Japan’s forty-seventh prefecture, renaming it Okinawa. Exiling the 
Ryukyuan King Sho Tai to Tokyo, Meiji leaders establishing a Japanese-controlled 
prefectural administration and military headquarters in the kingdom’s former capital 
city of Naha. 
                                                
23 The kingdom paid tribute to the Muromachi shogunate (1336-1573) and the Tokugawa shogunate 
(1603-1867) through the powerful Satsuma domain. 
24 Chinese leaders did not recognize Japan’s claim over the islands until the end of the Sino-Japanese 
War in 1895. 
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Japan’s incorporation of the Ry!ky! Kingdom transformed Ry!ky!ans’ 
relationships with other peoples in the region$from centuries-old maritime trading 
partners to fellow colonial subjects. As Smits (1999) points out, the Meiji state’s 
portrayal of the Ry#ky# shobun as simply an internal administrative reorganization 
belies how the process “called into question previous modes of East Asian interstate 
relations as Japan employed new notions of sovereignty based on European traditions 
and international law” (143). And because these same notions, traditions and laws 
underpinned European practices of expansion and colonization, their embrace by Meiji 
leaders helped set its course of expansion. At roughly the same time it invaded the 
Ry!ky!s, the Meiji government finally solidified its hold over Ainu territory to the 
north. Tokyo set up a formal colonial administration on the northern island in 1869, 
renaming it “Hokkaido.” Both Hokkaido and Okinawa, which today most people 
within and outside mainland Japan consider inherently part of the Japanese “nation-
state,” are thus more accurately characterized as the empire’s first of many territorial 
acquisitions in the decades before the Pacific War. While vastly smaller in size by 
comparison,25 annexation of the Ry!ky! Islands significantly extended Japan’s 
territorial and maritime control southward, facilitating its colonization of nearby 
Taiwan (then Formosa), the Korean peninsula, the Philippines and beyond. 
Ry!ky!ans protested when the central government sought to station an entire 
division of the Japanese Imperial Army, but Tokyo expropriated 61,600 square meters 
of prime farmland for military facilities (Ota 1999:209). Although the economy of the 
kingdom was already intertwined with that of the Satsuma clan, colonial rulers began 
to more systematically redirect economic outputs toward Japan. This was during an 
initial period of neglect for the general welfare of Ry!ky!ans, which Kerr (1958: 400) 
                                                
25 Annexation of Hokkaido increased Japan’s territory by 20 percent, creating a significant “buffer” 
between the heartland of Japan and the Western power it would soon confront and defeat in war, 
Russia. In contrast, the Ry!ky! Archipelago constitutes 0.6 percent of Japan’s landmass. 
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refers to as Tokyo’s “do nothing” era. Finally extending its nationalization efforts to 
the islands, the central government used the local administration to impose the 
national education system and Japanese language on its new subjects. Whereas 
Satsuma rulers prevented Ry!ky!an adoption of Japanese names and customs because 
they considered Ry!ky!ans to be “foreign and barbarian” (Hein and Selden 2003:9), 
the Meiji government initiated strict cultural assimilation policies, outlawing local 
languages, dress, customs such as the tattooing of women’s hands to mark passage 
into adulthood, and spiritual practices like the consulting of shamans (Kerr 1958, ch. 
9; Rabson 1996). Over time, this top-down mode of assimilation was bolstered by a 
bottom-up effort as Okinawans, motivated by admiration for Japan after its 1894 
victory against China, began adopting Japanese names and dress (Rabson 1996; 
Applegate 2003).  
These colonial beginnings set the stage for Okinawans’ experience of the 
Pacific War and relations with Japan and the US since. As Japanese subjects, 
Okinawans were conscripted and often forced to give up their homes, land, and 
schools for use by the southwardly advancing Imperial Army. In addition to 
inadequate provision of food and forced labor, Okinawans faced possible execution by 
Japanese soldiers, who were ordered to treat anyone who spoke a Ry!ky!an language 
as a spy and traitor (Ota 2000a:57-63; Ishihara 1992). That Okinawans were 
considered colonial subjects rather than Japanese subjects was further confirmed after 
the war, when official documents revealed that Japanese leaders had designated the 
Ry!ky!s as a strategic buffer zone, to be sacrificed in order to protect the mainland 
(Ota 2000a:50; Purves 2006, ch. 2). When the United States led the Allied invasion 
against Japanese imperial forces amassed in the islands in the spring of 1945, 200,000 
people, nearly a third of Okinawa’s population, perished in what became known as the 
Battle of Okinawa. Among the dead were the thousands of civilians Chibana Sh#ichi 
  45 
invoked when he set fire to the Japanese flag, those forced by the Japanese army to 
commit “collective suicide” rather than face capture by Allied troops.  
From colonial subjects to a stateless people 
 
By the time of Japan’s surrender in September 1945, the US military had 
transformed Okinawa Island into a major site of operations$one it had every 
intention of keeping (Kono 1994).26 In the short-term, this was straightforward. 
Although the occupation was formally an Allied affair, in practice the Americans were 
in charge. Having emerged as the only economically strong state among the victors of 
the war, the US assumed the dominant role in steering Japan’s occupation to its own 
postwar designs. Thus it was with a simple memorandum in January 1946 that Allied 
Commander General Douglas MacArthur formally separated the entire Ry!ky! 
Archipelago from the occupation’s administering authority in Tokyo and placed it 
under US military rule (Furuki 2003:30).  
In a climate where blatant imperialism was at least officially going out of 
fashion, however, America’s ability to retain Okinawa as a military outpost beyond 
the occupation of Japan required navigating the politics and structures of the emerging 
postwar state system. The United Nations system and specifically its framework for 
decolonization, the International Trusteeship System, became a key mechanism 
through which regional imperial power was transferred from Japan to the United 
States. Established in 1945 as the successor to the League of Nations’ Mandate 
                                                
26 John Purves notes that Department of State (DoS) officials were initially less enthusiastic about 
holding onto Okinawa and advocated returning the islands to Japan, echoing congressional concerns 
about the costs involved in maintaining control over the Ry!ky!s. Military leaders and Department of 
Defense officials held their ground and, as relations with the Soviet Union soured, by 1948 Okinawa 
was viewed by all as a key strategic location in the United States’ emerging policy of “containment”. 
See John Purves, chapter two in Managing a Wild Horse with a Rotten Rope: A Contemporary History 
of Okinawa, 2006. Retrieved from The Ryukyu-Okinawa History and Culture Website at 
www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/wildhorse/chap2-4.html on May 1, 2008. 
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System, the Trusteeship System was set up to oversee the decolonization of newly 
designated “non-self-governing territories.” These included territories 1) held under 
mandates established by the League of Nations after the First World War; 2) detached 
from “enemy states” as a result of the Second World War; and 3) voluntarily placed 
under the Trusteeship System by states recognized as their administering authority.27 
Initially the US government pushed through a 1947 Security Council resolution to 
create what it called a “strategic trusteeship,” naming the US as administering 
authority over all Pacific islands originally mandated to Japan by the League of 
Nations in 1920.28 The special designation of strategic trusteeship prioritized military 
needs over self-determination. Article 5 of the 1947 resolution transferring control of 
the territories to the US entitled it “to establish naval, military and air bases and to 
erect fortifications in the trust territory” (UN Security Council 1947).  
Having formalized American military control over the littoral territories in the 
region, US leaders again turned to the trusteeship system to ensure its continued 
control over the Ry!ky!s as negotiations to end the occupation of Japan got under way 
in earnest. By this time, however, the United States faced widespread ambivalence to 
its control over the Ry!ky!s from other state parties to the San Francisco Peace 
Conference. Truman’s head delegate to the talks, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 
met ambivalence with ambivalence. He proposed that Japan “retain residual 
sovereignty, while making it possible for [the Ry!ky! Islands] to be brought into the 
United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority” 
(Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1951; emphasis added).  
                                                
27 See Article 77 of the Charter of the United Nations, www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/trust.htm. 
28 The 1920 mandate, which coincided with Japan’s entry into the League of Nations, recognized 
Japanese control over all former German Islands north of the equator. They were designated as Class C 
mandates, considered to be “best administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of 
its territory.” This included all islands within Micronesia$the Carolines, Marianas, Marshall Islands 
and Palau groups$but excluded Guam and Wake Island, which remained under US control. 
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Dulles’ seemingly incongruous nod both to Okinawans’ future self-governance 
via the Trusteeship System and to Japan’s latent sovereignty claims over the islands 
makes sense only with hindsight. As administering authority, the US never followed 
through with a proposal to place the Ry!ky!s under the Trusteeship System, as 
stipulated in Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty.29 As Purves (2006, ch. 
2) points out, a formal trusteeship relation would have opened US activities to outside 
scrutiny.30 In the meantime, the US enjoyed the “interim” right, elaborated in Article 3, 
to “exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the 
territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.” 
Confirmation that the US was probably never serious about making the Ry!ky!s a 
trust territory came decades later, with the discovery of a secret communiqué from 
Emperor Hirohito to Douglas MacArthur, dated September 1947. Faced with the 
prospect of continued US military presence in Japan, Japanese leaders once again took 
a sacrificial approach to the Ry!ky!s. Hirohito offered the United States long-term 
control over the Ry!ky! Archipelago in exchange for Japan’s own demilitarization 
and independence.31 Having quite thoroughly been “de-linked” from the Ry!ky!s after 
                                                
29 Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, under which Japan renounced its treaty and colonial 
rights to overseas territories, reads, “Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the 
United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering 
authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito 
Islands)….Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will 
have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the 
territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.” See “Multilateral Treaty of 
Peace with Japan,” San Francisco Peace Conference. San Francisco, California. September 8, 1951. 
Retrieved October 6, 2007 from The Ryukyu-Okinawa History and Culture Website at 
http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/archive/sanfran.html.  
30 Article 73 of the UN Charter requires administering authorities of trust territories to regularly report 
statistical and other information relating to economic, social, and educational conditions. See www.un-
documents.net/ch-11.htm. 
31 Hirohito sent the message through his advisor, Terasaki Hidenari, to William Sebald, then political 
advisor to MacArthur.  According to American records, Terasaki conveyed the emperor’s offer “that 
United States military occupation of Okinawa…should be based upon the fiction of a long-term 
lease$25 to 50 years or more$with sovereignty retained in Japan.” The note was found in the US 
National Archives in 1979. See William J. Sebald, “Enclosure to Dispatch No. 1293 dated September 
22, 1947, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject 'Emperor of Japan's 
Opinion Concerning the Future of the Ryukyu Islands,' Memorandum For General MacArthur,” edited 
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the war, however, the Japanese government’s ability to lease its former colony to the 
United States depended on reestablishing the notion that Japan had legitimate claim 
over the islands. By recognizing Japan’s “residual sovereignty,” the US laid the legal-
political groundwork for its future long-term occupation via bilateral security 
arrangements with Japan. Thus the long-term fate of the Ry!ky!s was determined 
through a framework and principles elaborated in the moment of welcoming a 
reconstructed Japan back into the family of states. 
In the meantime, Ry!ky!ans would remain a stateless people, subject to US 
military control. The legitimating rhetoric of Article 3 allowed the United States to 
maintain sole control over the Ry!ky!s and build up its military on the islands as it 
saw fit.  That the latter was foremost in American planners’ minds from the outset is 
evident in Dulles’ speech to the San Francisco Peace Conference, in which he spelled 
out the US position on its role as administering authority of the islands:  
 
The future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future 
civil status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan while affording the 
administering authority the possibility of carrying out Article 84 of 
the [UN] Charter, which provides that ‘It shall be the duty of the 
administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its 
part in the maintenance of international peace and security.’32  
 
Thus began Ry!ky!ans’ “part in the maintenance of international peace and security,” 
as a trust territory that never was. The people of the Ry!ky!s would remain stateless 
for 21 more years. For most of this time they struggled for reincorporation into the 
                                                
by Diplomatic Section: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1947. 
Retrieved October 6, 2007 from The Ryukyu-Okinawa History and Culture Website at 
http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/archive/emp1.html. 
32 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “John Foster Dulles's Speech at the San Francisco Peace 
Conference.” in San Francisco Peace Conference. San Francisco: Gaimusho joyaku-kyoku hokika, 
Heiwa joyaku no teiketsu ni kansuru chosho VII, pp.267-284 (1951); emphasis added. 
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Japanese state, to become citizens of the country that had colonized their territory 
nearly a century earlier.  
From a stateless people to second-class citizens  
Hindsight offers, perhaps too easily, a critical lens on the struggle to 
reincorporate the Ry!ky!s into Japan. The oppressive conditions that continue under 
Japan’s watch since reversion in 1972, especially for those living with the bases on 
Okinawa Island, beg the question of why the anti-US occupation movement of the 
1950s and 60s sought reincorporation into Japan, its former colonizer. Although the 
view that the Ry!ky!s should become independent was held by some (Taira 1999), 
this was not widespread (Applegate 2003), and their voices were marginalized as the 
occupation went on. As Taira (1997) points out, the Cold War context created an 
environment wherein criticisms of the US or any ideas about the Ry!ky!s that would 
challenge the status-quo were treated by US authorities as subversive and communist. 
Together with the threat of repression, which had a cooling effect on Ry!ky!ans’ 
freedom of speech over time, US authorities denounced the idea of extending 
autonomy to Okinawa as a “myth” (Taira 1997:160). Dominating the discourse of the 
struggle was the aspiration of “reversion to the mother/fatherland” (s"kokku fukki t"s"), 
as the struggle became known. The photographs below capture this discourse and 
some forms of its expression.  
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Figure 2.1 Hunger strikers during the reversion movement demonstrate their 
allegiance to Japan, late 1960s. (Source: Okinawa ken s"kokku fukki t"s" shi shashin 




Figure 2.2 Schoolgirls at a “Okinawa Reversion Day” rally on April 28, 1965 at 
Yoyogi Park, Naha City. 80,000 people participated in the rally. (Source: Okinawa ken 
s"kokku fukki t"s" shi shashin sh# [History of the Struggle for Okinawa Prefecture’s 
Reversion to the Motherland: A Photographic Collection] p. 87) 
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The desire to rejoin the Japanese state also had much to do with the fact that 
Ry!ky!ans remained a stateless people, with their everyday existence profoundly 
shaped by US military presence. The characterization of Japan’s control over the 
islands in terms of “residual sovereignty” had not made Ry!ky!ans Japanese citizens, 
nor did they become American citizens in the interim. American military leaders 
divided the archipelago into 4 zones of control. Under the auspices of the United 
States Civilian Authority in the Ry!ky!s (USCAR) and a purportedly local civilian 
Government of the Ry!ky! Islands (GRI), the military held tight control over local 
political institutions for most of the occupation.33 It was not until 1968, with reversion 
imminent, that the US allowed a popular election for governor of the GRI and 
representatives in the Japanese Diet. 
In this context, accountability and rights were talked about but not protected. 
Privileging of military needs, as well as military personnel, led to neglect and 
systematic abuses under military rule. Forced land appropriation continued throughout 
the 1950s, at times through a combination of “bayonets and bulldozers,” as the US 
continued increasing its military infrastructure. Displaced communities that had finally 
returned to their villages would sometimes find themselves being ordered to “relocate” 
due to base construction (Ota 2000a:243; Purves, ch. 2). The Japanese military’s own 
build-up and the Battle of Okinawa had left the islands, especially Okinawa Island, 
impoverished and in ruins. But basic development, which the US put considerable 
funds towards in the years immediately following the war, happened in close 
relationship to military priorities (Purves 2006, ch. 2).  
Accounts of the occupation reveal the great degree to which individual military 
personnel were allowed to act with impunity. Violent crimes, including rape, routinely 
                                                
33 The military initially orchestrated the occupation through the Okinawa Advisory Council, 
reorganizing this organization into the Government of the Ry!ky! Islands, which existed from 1952 to 
1972.  
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went unpunished (Johnson 2004b; Yoshida 2002). 78-year old Nakamura Mayumi 
spoke of the frustration Okinawans felt about the lack of justice in the face of 
accidents and crimes, but also in everyday experiences. She recalled having to use a 
separate entrance and being refused entry to the base cafeteria as an employee on 
Kadena Air Base in the 1950s. Taira linked experiences of everyday injustices to what 
became known as the Koza riots (Koza s"d"), in which nearly 5000 Okinawans 
clashed with hundreds of military police and personnel in December 1970:  
 
“I liked my job on the base because I worked with a friend of mine, but 
we were always yelled at and called “Japs” and “Jap girls” by the 
soldiers who ran the building where we worked. My husband worked 
for an electricians’ team on the base. They made him test the wire 
fences, and they hit him if he was slow to touch the fence. He told me 
this only once, but I think it probably happened all the time. But as 
individuals, we couldn’t do anything about this kind of treatment. We 
protested all the time when incidents happened, but soldiers could do 
anything and they never got reprimanded or punished. Any time a 
soldier would cause an accident, he could just leave the scene. Soldiers 
always just escaped to the bases. One time a soldier hit and killed a 
woman in a crosswalk. He was acquitted, which caused so much anger. 
A week later some soldiers caused a car accident in Koza, and a crowd 
surrounded the car, I suppose because they expected the driver would 
try to leave. Military police arrived, and they fired shots in the air, and 
this set off a great riot. Uchinanch! burned many cars, I think 70 or 80 
cars were burned in the streets. Everyone was so angry and tired of 
living without rights. After the war, in high school we were taught 
about the great democracy, America, with checks and balances. But we 
didn’t experience it at all.”34 
 
Accountability came into play back in Washington, but it was limited to 
budgetary concerns. The considerable expense of rebuilding the islands often met with 
US Congressional skepticism about US control over the Ry!ky!s. As the reversion 
movement gained momentum and America’s presence in the Ry!ky!s became less 
certain, Congress became much less willing to fund the occupation. By the 1960s, 
                                                
34 Personal interview, February 20, 2005. 
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while Ryukyuans remained deeply dependent on the US military economically, their 
living conditions began to lag considerably behind that of Japanese (Purves 2006, ch. 
2; Yoshida 2002).  
As an effort to quell or at least slow the momentum of the reversion movement, 
USCAR officials deliberately set out to create what Obermiller (2000) calls an 
“identity gap” between Okinawans and mainland Japan by fostering Ry!ky!an ethnic 
nationalism. To this end they ordered the construction of Ryukyuan-American 
Cultural Centers on the main island of Okinawa and on the islands of Miyako and 
Yaeyama. The centers coordinated performances of Ryukyuan dance and folk songs, 
art, pottery, and handicrafts as well as lectures on Ryukyuan history and philosophy. 
Although USCAR officials apparently understood the danger of creating “enmity 
against the proposal rather than developing a nationalistic feeling,” they even went so 
far as to order the creation of a national song and Ry!ky!an flag, using the traditional 
colors and crest of the last royal Ry!ky!an family. USCAR ordered local media to 
publish and broadcast articles and programs emphasizing Ryukyuan cultural and 
historical themes. It also published two magazines of its own, which showcased 
Ry!ky!an history, culture, philosophy, and important historical figures (Obermiller 
2000:11-13).  
Perhaps not surprisingly, USCAR’s top-down attempts to reinforce Ry!ky!an 
identity rather than Japanese identity had the opposite effect. Taira Koji (1997) writes, 
“The Okinawan response was, more often than not: ‘We are Japanese’, ‘we are 
entitled to the same extent of democracy and civil and human rights as the Japanese 
enjoy in the mainland’…reversionists and irredentists alike promoted the notion that 
Okinawa was an inherently integral part of Japan proper” (p. 160). Although this 
amounted to a rejection of their own distinct identity as Ry!ky!ans, Taira suggests 
that while Okinawans would claim distinctiveness for themselves vis-à-vis the 
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Japanese, they countered US attempts to manipulate such differences by asserting their 
Japaneseness (p. 161). 
In the end, the Okinawan struggle against the United States’ 27-year long 
postwar occupation united a majority of individuals and groups from a diverse set of 
interests behind two related convictions: First, that reincorporation into the Japanese 
state would mean protection under Japan’s “peace constitution,” in which Japan 
relinquished its right to wage war and maintain a regular standing military. Second, 
that reincorporation was the most expedient way to guarantee basic rights, a better 
standard of living, and liberate their islands and lives from US imperialism.  
Given the conditions under which Ry!ky!ans lived during the US occupation, 
as David Tobaru Obermiller (2000) observes, the conventional view of the Okinawan 
reversion movement as being a “natural” expression of Japanese identity and 
nationalism oversimplifies and distorts complex and conflicting motivations. It takes 
for granted, he argues, the dominant image of a homogeneous Japan, rather than 
problematizes this image in light of counter-expressions that suggest the Ry!ky!s 
have always been a heterogeneous element within Japan.  
Higa Yuriko, a 64-year old self-described peace activist explains her reasons 
for wanting to “be Japanese” and for participating in the reversion movement in terms 
of a desire for the rights associated with citizenship. Like Chibana Sh#ichi, Higa 
joined her high school peers in the 1960s to end the US occupation. She explained, 
 
“It wasn’t that I or most Uchinanch#35 really felt we were Japanese 
instead of Uchinanch! during the reversion movement, especially given 
the way that Japan had treated us before and during the war$though I 
think many certainly tried. And Uchinanch! grew more and more 
willing to put wartime experiences behind us because more than 
anything we wanted the US military to leave. We wanted our human 
                                                
35 Uchinanch# is the name for both an Okinawan person and Okinawans as a people in the Okinawan 
language. Even though the vast majority of Okinawans primarily speak Japanese, they typically use this 
term rather than refer to Okinawans in the Japanese language.  
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rights to be recognized. We wanted to be citizens. At the time, Japan 
looked very good to us….Most of us spoke Japanese by then, and Japan 
was prospering. It also had a peace constitution. What a revolutionary 
idea! It had renounced war and military in its new constitution. I 
wanted to be a citizen of a country with a peace constitution. I 
remember thinking how proud I would feel if this became a reality. 
This is why I wanted to be Japanese.”36  
 
For this veteran activist, “to be Japanese” did not mean to be ethnically 
Japanese; it meant to become a Japanese citizen and end America’s military grip on 
Okinawa. It meant having rights. Thus like many other colonized peoples who threw 
their lot in with a generalized “big-N” Nationalism in the anti-imperialist movements 
sweeping the globe during the same period, the promises of protection and political 
participation embodied in the state-citizen relation grew to have concrete, imaginable 
consequences for Okinawans during the United States’ formal occupation.  
That the people of the Ry!ky!s would, as Japanese citizens, likely share in the 
burden of Japan’s military arrangement with the United States was begrudgingly 
understood. According to Arakaki Gikei, who was a student in Tokyo at the time, this 
is why students and day laborers he knew from Okinawa were active in the “ANP" 
struggle” (anp" t"s").37 Mr. Arakaki recalled, “Of course Uchinanch! living in Japan 
at the time took part in the struggle. We knew that after reversion we would be subject 
to whatever arrangement Japan had with the US. After decades of suffering under 
American occupation, we knew better than anyone in Japan how the US and its 
military operated.”38 In the midst of fierce and widespread opposition across Japan by 
students, labor and political parties on the left, the two countries renewed their earlier 
                                                
36 Personal interview, Ginowan, Okinawa. March 20, 2005.  
37 “ANPO” is a common contraction of anzen hosh", a key phrase meaning “to guarantee security” 
from the Japanese name of the US-Japan Security Treaty, Nippon-koku to amerika-gassh#koku to no 
aida no s"go ky"ryoku oyobi anzen hosh" j"yaku.  
38 Personal interview, October 14, 2004. 
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security arrangement in the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1970.39 That Okinawans 
would shoulder by far the greatest burden of the arrangement, however, came as a 
crushing blow to those who had struggled in the reversion movement for an equal 
place among the Japanese citizenry. 
Intervening in this struggle was the fact that Ry!ky!ans’ citizenship was from 
the start constituted as a global rather than a national relation, reflecting a particular 
form of compromised sovereignty. Citizenship is always both a negotiated and a 
militarized relation, but Ry!ky!ans’ citizenship was and remains constituted through 
interactions between the US and Japan governments and their intertwined defense 
policies. The very terms of citizenship in the Japanese state were established 
bilaterally between the administrations of President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister 
Sato Eisaku. The two governments negotiated the details of the islands’ reversion in 
the late-1960s, alongside their negotiations over the pending renewal of the Security 
Treaty. Their 1969 agreement stipulated that the US military would remain in 
Okinawa, and several US bases would relocate from Japan to Okinawa Prefecture.40 
Thus Okinawans very membership in the Japanese state was predicated on continued 
US military presence, with their territory as the geographical cornerstone of the two 
countries’ security arrangements. Moreover, most of the military-occupied lands in 
Okinawa that the US agreed to forfeit upon reversion were not returned to the original 
                                                
39 The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (US-Japan 
Security Treaty) was originally signed in 1960 at the expiration of the US-Japan Security Alliance, 
signed alongside the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. The current US-Japan Security Treaty obliges 
both parties to maintain and develop their capacities to resist armed attack in tandem and to assist each 
other in case of armed attack on territories under Japanese administration. Given Japan’s renunciation 
of offensive war-making under Article nine of its constitution, it is understood that Japan’s Self-
Defense Forces could not participate in conflicts abroad or act in the defense of the United States if the 
latter were attacked outside of Japan—hence the contradiction in Japan’s recent deployment of SDF to 
Iraq. Article Six of the treaty elaborates the Status of Forces agreement between the two countries, 
which lays out the legal status and rights of US military personnel and civilian contractors in Japan. For 
the Treaty text see www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html. For the text of the Status of 
Forces agreement, see www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/2.html. 
40 Within a few years after reversion, the US military reduced its presence on mainland Japan by sixty 
percent, while Okinawans saw only a fourteen percent reduction overall. 
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landowners. Instead the land went to Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, marking the 
beginning of Okinawans’ double occupation.  
 By all accounts, the long-awaited rallies held on May 15, 1972$the day 
sovereign control over the Ry!ky!s reverted to Japan—were filled with a mix of anger 
and despair. Yara Chobyo, the head of the Government of the Ry!ky!s and one of the 
leaders of the reversion movement, refused to attend the official ceremony in Tokyo. 
Nearly everyone I spoke with who took part in the protests recalled the day’s 
rainstorms, as if the weather somehow reflected their feelings about the reality marked 
by the day. “It rained so hard on that day, on May 15,” Yui Akiko told me. “The rain 
drops were huge and falling on us hard. We were drenched, but we kept marching. It 
felt like we were marching in our own tears.”41  
What Okinawans escaped in 1972 was US imperialism in a particular historical 
form. After reversion, as Japanese citizens they found themselves confronting empire 
under different world-historical conditions. In order to understand the contemporary 
struggle over sovereignty that emerged in relation to continued US military 
occupation, we must consider it in the context of broader struggles over who and what 
would become the subject of sovereignty, and how this intertwined with the 
transformation of foreign military expansion in the postwar era.  
 
Postwar decolonization, state making, and the transformation of foreign military 
basing  
American military presence in the Ry!ky!s after 1972 took an historically 
novel form, due to broader political changes in the world system since the United 
States had first taken control of the islands in 1945. The decades following World War 
Two saw the institutionalization of foreign military expansion and occupation into a 
routine matter of international relations, as imperialism itself was transformed through 
                                                
41 Personal interview, April 14, 2005. 
  58 
decolonization and state making. Before this time, colonization and militarization 
went hand-in-hand. “Imperial preference” and competition among colonial powers had 
long determined the location of external military bases. This changed dramatically as 
anti-imperialist movements compelled the extension of the state system around the 
globe via decolonization. Institutional and negotiating imperatives for foreign military 
basing emerged through the constitution of an increasingly shared notion of territorial 
sovereignty. The promulgation of the principle of state sovereignty, through its 
codification in the UN Charter and the eventual “completion” of the state system, 
meant that extended siting of military forces overseas required legitimization in places 
and in ways that it had not before. Powerful governments were suddenly obliged to 
negotiate treaties or other formal arrangements to deploy their armed forces in another 
country’s territory.  
At the same time, the constraint that an increasingly globalized reciprocal 
sovereignty imposed on powerful states also made possible the legitimization of 
military expansion in places and in ways that it had not before. For governments of 
newly emerging states, membership in the “family of states” meant they were both 
able and required to take part in the negotiations and formal arrangements associated 
with sovereign states$however unequal the terms. In contextualizing historically the 
institution of modern territoriality, John Ruggie (1993) points to the process of “social 
empowerment” whereby newer and/or less powerful states “vindicated their right to 
exist.” While they were not able to do so by means of material power, they were 
“socially empowered by the collectivity of sovereigns to act as its constitutive units” 
(163). The same process was at work in the postwar period, as the completion of the 
state system transformed the practice and representation of foreign military expansion. 
Paradoxically, by entering into agreements that made possible continued foreign 
military occupation on their soil, governments of new states participated in the 
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reproduction of the principle of territoriality associated with modern sovereignty. In 
this way, international basing agreements became a key expression of the realization 
of the modern liberal project. 
In relatively short order, then, military expansion and occupation was 
transformed into a matter of state prerogative and routine intergovernmental 
negotiations. The language of security arrangements used in policy circles and 
conventional scholarship is instructive. In his study of US security negotiations, 
Druckman (1986) observes that the issue of “foreign basing rights” became an 
increasingly important yet increasingly routine aspect of international relations in the 
postwar period. Although Druckman leaves the language of security negotiations 
unproblematized, what also stands out in his observation is that military expansion and 
occupation itself was reconceptualized and institutionalized as a set of rights.42 
Bureaucratic rationalization of security arrangements took on a particular urgency 
given the negotiating imperatives of an ever-expanding postwar state system and, in 
the West, the Cold War preoccupation with “containment” via forward deployment 
(Harkavy 1982; Woodliffe 1992). Formalization of foreign military basing paved the 
way for a reversal of immediate postwar efforts to scale back forwardly deployed 
troops. Although several governments, mostly in Europe, initially rebuffed US 
attempts to retain military bases in their territories, perceived threats from communism 
led to a rather abrupt about-face.43 The US in particular sought and was able to retain 
most of the nearly 500 installations it held overseas by the end of the war. The West’s 
                                                
42 That most Anglo-American political science (international relations and security studies) scholarship 
on foreign military basing treats it as a self-evident practice within a self-evident state system highlights 
how such scholarship has reflected and reinforced the political effort to normalize it in the postwar 
period.  
43 The US faced governmental opposition to its efforts to retain bases in numerous countries after the 
war, including Iceland, Denmark, Portugal, and even Great Britain and Panama. The latter turned down 
the US request to retain 131 installations outside the Canal Zone. See Christopher T. Sandars, 
America’s Overseas Garrisons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000,12-13. 
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competition with the Soviet Union, as the latter gradually positioned its own forces 
throughout Soviet bloc and Comecon states, led to a second scramble for Africa$and 
beyond. 
Buoyed by a global legitimating apparatus and justified by the Cold War, then, 
extensive overseas basing remained the norm rather than the exception in the “post-
colonial” state system. However, under conditions of hegemony and requirements for 
continuity in economic exchanges, basing negotiations also quickly became a 
complicated and wholly unequal process of diplomatic wrangling. Powerful states 
sought favorable terms of access to land, sea and air for their militaries and their 
capital.44 For weaker “host” nations, the new rules of basing diplomacy meant 
leveraging what power they had to obtain economic and other, often military, forms of 
aid and promises of protection (Harvey 2003, ch. 3). Thus in an era when blatant 
imperialism officially went out of fashion, institutionalized arrangements made 
possible via unequal relations among states became a convenient, expeditious and, in 
the dominant rendering, legitimate means to continue securing economic and political 
interests with military might. 
While not alone in its effort to maintain a military presence around the globe, 
the extent of America’s postwar foreign military basing is unsurpassed and therefore 
warrants highlighting. Today the United States stations its armed forces outside its 
borders in vastly greater numbers and scope than any other country in history. The US 
owns or leases at least 761 installations in over 150 countries, with over half still 
concentrated in Western Europe (especially Germany and England) and Northeast 
Asia (US Department of Defense 2007, 2008).45 The Pentagon deploys roughly 
                                                
44 The United States is particularly notorious for also negotiating, via its “Status of Forces Agreements,” 
immunity from local criminal prosecution for its military personnel and contracted civilian employees. 
45 These numbers do not include bases established in Afghanistan or Iraq, or bases built in nearby 
countries related to US military intervention in the Middle East since September 11, 2001 (e.g. 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). The Department of Defense emphasizes that the Base Structure Report 
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410,500 troops worldwide (US Department of Defense 2007). This figure does not 
include the number of troops deployed to warzones in Iraq and Afghanistan, nor the 
ever-increasing number of civilians “enlisted” to support military infrastructure and 
activities.46 To put this in perspective, this is 13 times more than the 31,000 troops 
deployed by France (French Ministry of Defense 2006), which ranks second in 
stationing its forces in other countries, and 14 times more than the 28,820 troops 
deployed by Great Britain$26,670 of which are stationed throughout Europe (British 
Ministry of Defense 2006).47  
 
Colonial relations in postwar foreign military presence: The emergence of 
colonial basing  
Although postwar state making transformed military expansion and occupation 
into a routine and ostensibly legitimate matter of interstate relations, the kinds of 
challenges emerging in the Okinawan anti-base movement suggest that colonial 
                                                
provides merely a “snapshot” of the DoD’s real property because its base structure is “changing 
continuously.” Considerable under-reporting by the DoD must also be factored into an understanding of 
the extent of the US military’s global reach. Okinawa is a case in point. In the BSR, the Pentagon counts 
eight different US Marine Corps installations on Okinawa’s main island$which together occupy 
78,500 acres of land$as just one general command station, Camp Butler. Chalmers Johnson addresses 
the difficulty of counting US bases overseas, and the implications of such difficulty for democratic 
oversight (see Johnson, “The Arithmetic of America's Military Bases Abroad: What Does It All Add Up 
to?” History News Network, 2004. Retrieved June 4, 2006 from http://hnn.us/articles/3097.html). 
Policies and projections emerging in the Pentagon’s current comprehensive “force transformation,” 
specifically the move to secure “joint use” of military bases of other countries, will make it more 
difficult to assess the extent and character of US overseas forces.  
46 US overseas military presence not immediately related to war takes many forms. In addition to 
permanent military facilities, which range from massive air bases with city-like infrastructure, amenities 
and population, to small outposts used for ammunitions storage, US forces regularly participate in joint 
military training exercises with other militaries. These, too, range from large-scale joint exercises, like 
the annual training operations that US forces conduct with the South Korean military, which typically 
involve over 20,000 US troops, to small-scale exercises in which a single US military unit trains local 
military personnel in tactical operations. The US military’s “peacetime” activities overseas also involve 
transit, refueling or landing privileges in other countries that facilitate training and troop transport. Of 
course military personnel deployed to warzones most often come from and return to these “peacetime” 
activities. 
47 Like the figures given above for the United States, excluded from figures on British and French 
overseas forces are those troops deployed specifically as “peace-keeping” forces under the auspices of 
the United Nations or other multilateral arrangements. Figures for France also exclude other temporary 
deployments (forces temporaires). 
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relations persisted in how foreign military basing is practiced and experienced. I 
contend that colonial relations became a largely invisible mechanism through which 
governments secured foreign basing rights in the postwar period, in Okinawa and 
elsewhere around the world. Like colonialism itself, however, foreign military basing 
rooted in colonial relations$a general phenomenon I call colonial basing$takes a 
number of different, historically contingent forms. I identify four central forms here. 
While only one, namely internal colonial basing, captures the particular historical 
relations that sustain US military presence in Okinawa, taken together the different 
forms of colonial basing shed light on how the state system sustains the historical 
relationship between militarization and colonization globally.  
The most straightforward and still “visible” form of colonial basing is what I 
term direct colonial basing: military presence in an acknowledged colonial territory. 
Far-flung military bases still uphold vestiges of once vast empires. Both Great Britain 
and France, for example, permanently station their armed forces in their respective 
remaining colonies.48 Despite the United States’ high-profile rejection of colonialism 
in the first half of the last century, its own imperial exploits cast a long shadow over 
many current US bases. With at least 96 installations in what it officially terms its 
overseas territorial “possessions,” the US now far outnumbers its European 
counterparts in direct colonial basing.49 
                                                
48 Great Britain maintains overseas bases in Gibraltar, the Malvinas (Falkland Islands), and the British 
Indian Ocean Territory$some might add Northern Ireland$while French forces de souveraineté 
occupy Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Antilles, Reunion, Mayotte, Guiana, Polynesia and Kanaky (New 
Caledonia)$though the latter assumed the status of a non-self-governing territory, or “overseas 
country” (pays d'outre-mer) in 1998, which gives Kanaks greater ability to exercise their right of full 
independence. See British Ministry of Defense, “Global Location of UK Regular Forces.” London: 
Defense Analytical Service Agency, 2006. Retrieved November 1, 2007 from 
http://www.dasa.mod.uk/modintranet/natstats/tsp6/tsp6_oct06.pdf; and French Ministry of Defense. 
“Forces francaises deployees hors du territoire metropolitain.” Paris: Government of France, 2006. 
Retrieved May 4, 2007 from http://www.ac-toulouse.fr/automne_modules_files/pDocs/public/ 
r2399_61_4a.pdf. 
49 The US maintains installations on its territories to the south in Cuba (Guantanamo), the Virgin 
Islands, and Puerto Rico. In the Pacific, US military bases occupy the Northern Mariana Islands, 
American Samoa, Guam, Johnston Atoll, and Wake Island. See US Department of Defense, “Base 
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A second form of colonial basing emerged out of the prevailing power 
relations in the postwar period. Many instances of foreign military presence we still 
see today that are purportedly founded on bilateral security arrangements between 
mutually sovereign partners are direct legacies of colonialism. Such cases embody 
what might best be termed post-colonial basing: when a country sites its military 
forces in its former colonial territory. Both Great Britain’s and France’s current 
foreign military presence offers a skeletal mapping of their respective imperial paths: 
British Royal Forces maintain bases in countries such as Kenya, Brunei, Nepal, 
Australia and Canada, while France has military installations in Senegal, Gabon and 
Djibouti (British Ministry of Defense 2006; French Ministry of Defense 2006). The 
US military’s continued presence in places like Panama, Belau and the Philippines 
also reflects post-colonial basing.50 
 A less obvious way in which colonial relations began playing a role in 
overseas basing after decolonization can be seen in instances I distinguish as cross-
colonial basing, where the deploying state negotiates with another powerful state to 
retain or secure basing rights in a direct colony of the latter. An example of this form 
of basing is the 1951 agreement with the government of Denmark to build a US air 
base and ballistic missile early-warning radar system in the Iunghuit territory of Thule 
                                                
Structure Report.” Washington D.C., 2008. Retrieved July 3, 2009 from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/BSR2008Baseline.pdf. 
50 The highly publicized expulsion of US troops from the Philippines by the Philippine Senate in the 
early 1990s contributes to the generally held belief that the US military no longer has a significant 
presence in its former colony. However, the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement provided for expanded 
military cooperation between the two countries and gives the US military levels of access it never 
enjoyed before. In 2001 the two governments signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement, which 
allows U.S. troops to bring military equipment and supplies into the country from any point. On the 
complicated international juridical ramifications of foreign military installations in colonial or other 
dependent territories after independence, see John Woodliffe, The Peacetime Use of Foreign Military 
Installations under Modern International Law. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1992.  
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(Uummannaq), Greenland.51 Greenland has been a self-governing overseas 
administrative territory of Denmark since 1979, but the Danish government holds 
diplomatic rights in what it considers Denmark’s international relations. A second 
example is US military presence on Diego Garcia, one of the remote Chaggos Islands 
in the Indian Ocean. In 1966 the British government agreed to unilaterally and 
permanently expel the indigenous Chaggossians to enable the United States to lease 
the island of Diego Garcia for a US Naval base.52 The US military remains in Thule 
and Diego Garcia to this day, and continues to face resistance to its presence in both 
locales.  
The character of the opposition to US bases in both Diego Garcia and Thule 
sheds light on the nature of rule in instances of cross-colonial basing. Challenges to 
the British and Danish governments’ sovereignty in these territories highlights the 
extent to which the impact of militarization remains outside structures of 
accountability. In such cases basing agreements are negotiated solely between the 
governments of the deploying state and the colonizing state. In this context the 
legitimating rhetoric of sovereignty allows principal states to exclude from channels of 
representation those who inhabit the colonial territory in question and whose lives are 
most affected by the agreement. This form of foreign military basing happens despite 
often intense opposition by the colonized population,53 whose political marginalization 
in relation to the colonizing state leaves them with little to no means of redress against 
the effects of militarization by the deploying state. While the representative claims of 
                                                
51 Despite ongoing opposition by local residents, the US has in recent years made the site integral to its 
expanding missile defense system. See “The ‘other’ Greenland: Thule radar improves missile defense 
capability” at www.pythom.com/news.php?id=18506. 
52 In his documentary film Stealing a Nation, director John Pilger (2004) details the brutality and racism 
by which the British government, at the behest of the US, effected the removal and relocation of the 
Chaggossians.  
53 This is most often but not always the case. A notable exception is the inhabitants of the Falkland 
Islands. Mainly of Scottish descent, Falkland Islanders are British citizens and overwhelmingly support 
British sovereignty in the territory.  
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the state always provides cover for the effects of foreign military basing, the political 
marginalization characterizing cross-colonial basing allows the deploying state even 
more leeway to engage in practices that would otherwise be open to challenge through 
the relations of citizenship. In such cases, the deploying state is even more easily able 
to officially and, perhaps more important, legally distance itself from the “domestic” 
disputes that arise over the effects of its own military presence. This additional 
separation of the practices and effects of foreign military basing from channels of 
accountability in instances of cross-colonial basing also characterizes the political 
relations of militarization in Okinawa, which I conceptualize as internal colonial 
basing.  
The politics of decolonization: Setting the stage for internal colonial basing  
Critical to an understanding of the conditions of sustained US military 
presence in Okinawa is that the official shoring-up of Japan’s claims to the Ry!ky!s 
by the United States in the early 1950s parallels a global process of “internalizing” 
colonial relations. Postwar efforts to formalize foreign military basing in the context of 
an expanding state system intersected with efforts to control the decolonization 
process in order to limit who would be the subjects of that system. 
The United Nations presided over the completion of the state system, but 
through a deliberately circumscribed decolonization process. In a strategic reading of 
the UN Charter’s central provision of the “right of all peoples and nations to self-
determination,” key Western states involved in orchestrating decolonization under UN 
auspices maintained that the entire populations within the colonial-era borders of 
newly emerging states (largely in Asia and Africa) would benefit from liberation from 
colonial oppression. In UN debates at the time, states seeking to limit decolonization, 
including in particular the United States, Canada and the governments of Central and 
South America, argued that the “primitive” communities living within the frontiers of 
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many of the new states were indistinguishable from the peoples living in colonial 
territories. It is true that anti-imperialist movements often united different ethnic 
groups behind a single nationalist project. Indeed, this was reflected in the Okinawan 
reversion movement. However, the argument advanced in the UN process presumed 
assimilation and, as Anaya (1996) points out, did so for self-serving ends: to diffuse 
the political momentum coalescing against colonialism at the time. For these 
governments, a more open interpretation of the right to self-determination would have 
implications for the sovereign peoples/nations within their own respective borders. 
Therefore their intention was to limit the extension of statehood to existing European 
colonies and exclude from the process of decolonization the countless enclave, or 
indigenous, populations within existing and emerging states. 
At issue was the scope of Chapter XI of the UN Charter, instituted in 1946, 
which pertained to non-self-governing territories. As I explain above, this designation 
was given to those colonial territories slated for eventual independence via the UN 
Trusteeship System. To ensure that their versions of self-determination and territorial 
integrity prevailed, powerful states developed the “blue water thesis” in order to 
suppress moves to expand the scope of Chapter XI to include enclave indigenous 
populations. The blue water thesis limited recognition of non-self-governance (and 
therefore independence) to existing colonial territories where political encroachment 
involved “organized colonization” by European powers of peoples on distant 
continents$across blue water. In other words, colonization that involved crossing into 
adjacent territory or relatively proximate areas (e.g. nearby islands) did not count.  
Efforts to limit decolonization succeeded, resulting in the more restrictive 
interpretation that limited Chapter XI procedures to existing European colonial 
territories overseas.  The implications of this were far-reaching on two dimensions. 
First, Western powers intentionally and effectively excluded nations whose territories 
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lie within and across the borders of newly-emerging states (mostly in Africa and Asia) 
from participating in the expanded international community, or from choosing an 
alternative, non-state form of political organization based on self-determination 
(Wilmer 1993). Second, it excluded those peoples whose territories were unilaterally 
subsumed within settler nations54 (North and South America, Australia and New 
Zealand) as well as other “older” established states like Japan, China, Russia, Turkey 
and Scandinavian countries. 
This circumscribed decolonization process was not just in the interests of 
settler nation governments, though they led the effort to limit Chapter XI. For 
governments of newly emerging or established states, limiting the scope of self-
determination became a means to retain as much territory and resources as possible. 
This meant preserving borders drawn by colonial powers rather than recognizing pre-
colonial political boundaries associated with different and more potent connections 
between peoples and territory within and across states. Fore older established states, 
like Japan, it similarly meant preserving borders—some of them quite recent—deemed 
exploitable, either by the government in question or those orchestrating the 
decolonization process, or both.  
Although this approach to decolonization and state (re)making acknowledges 
and condemns the systematic way in which European powers ruled over other peoples, 
it conceals as much as it reveals. It dismisses the histories of invasion, colonization 
and other forms of systematic discrimination of peoples within emerging and 
established nations. In doing so it reflects a perverse and self-serving hierarchical 
ranking of colonizers and colonial practices, with European colonialism as the only 
                                                
54 The terms “settler state” and “settler nation” are often used in scholarship and discourse on issues of 
indigenous rights. It denotes those nations that were colonized through massive migration and 
settlement of people from the colonizing country rather than ruled from afar via a small cadre of 
colonizers and local elites. 
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“authentic” form deemed worthy of the name or remediation. It discounts the 
significance of ethnic difference, long exploited by colonial powers and now fixed 
within often arbitrary borders that cut across distinct peoples and pre-colonial socio-
political territories. Ultimately, a limited decolonization ignores the salience of the 
relationship between identity and place.  
Today we see the consequences of the postwar politics of decolonization in the 
rearticulation of subjecthood in relation to the state and sovereignty. Contemporary 
self-determination movements are rooted in collective identities separate from the 
state but equally territorial. Their emergence around the globe reveals the sheer extent 
to which postwar state making (and state-preserving) via a carefully limited 
decolonization merely subsumed rather than resolved many colonial relationships. 
Although citizenship became the preeminent subject identity in the post-colonial 
world, the rise of ethnic autonomy movements today is an indicator of how self-
determination ascribed to the state, and by extension to citizenship, did not extend to 
these groups.  
Okinawa’s “reversion” to internal colonial basing 
It is in this context that US military forces in Okinawa and other contested 
territories today$and the popular struggles that emerge and join together under such 
conditions$must be viewed. The internalization of certain colonial relations within 
states created the conditions for such relations to shape how foreign military basing 
would play out in the postwar period. Siting foreign forces in the territories of 
internally colonized peoples—internal colonial basing—was rendering legitimate yet 
obscured by the postwar regime of military expansion framed in terms of sovereignty 
and citizenship. Japan’s colonial regard for Ry!ky!ans and their territory did not 
change with the Ry!ky!s’ “reversion”; it was merely subsumed within the state-
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citizen relationship. US occupation of the Ry!ky!s after reversion took the form of 
internal colonial basing. 
By the mid-1960s, US control over the Ry!ky!s had become untenable in the 
face of widespread Ry!ky!an resistance. But by then the US no longer needed to 
wield direct control over the islands to maintain its bases in the territory. The already 
entrenched postwar institution of foreign basing provided the US with a clear 
incentive to give up direct control over the islands. Under the postwar regime of 
military expansion, the burden of the legitimacy of US military presence in Okinawa 
would become Japan’s, a country that had already demonstrated its willingness to 
sacrifice Okinawa for its own interests.  
Thus reincorporation, which was represented by the US government as 
altruistic responsiveness to local concerns, and by the Japanese government as a 
victorious and long-awaited reuniting of the nation, is better understood as a shift in 
the way empire “works.” America’s long-term occupation of the Ry!ky!s depends not 
only on Japan’s compromised sovereignty vis-à-vis the US, but also on the Ry!ky!s’ 
compromised sovereignty vis-à-vis Japan. America’s economic might relative to its 
Allied partners gave the US control over the occupation of Japan, and its bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki contributed to its distinctive postwar dominance over Japan 
(Dower 1993). Japan’s renunciation of offensive war making under its US-drafted 
constitution put it even further within the United States’ influence. Like other 
countries in the region (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines), Japan was 
incorporated into the United States’ postwar security network under persistently 
unequal terms (Arrighi 1994; Johnson 2004b; McCormack 2007). By the time 
Okinawa was incorporated into the Japanese state, Japanese citizenship was already 
subject to an unequal institutional arrangement upholding US military presence in the 
country as a whole.  
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But Japanese leaders were and are not without options, and so to portray the 
US military’s ongoing presence in Okinawa as a result of American bullying of Japan 
is to disregard the hegemonic character of contemporary foreign military basing, 
particularly under the conditions of coloniality created by reincorporating the Ry!ky!s 
into the Japanese state. The US-Japan Security Treaty guaranteed Japan’s place as 
both object and subject of American hegemony in the region. Reincorporation of 
Okinawa not only became a means for Japan to considerably extend its territorial and 
maritime reach, it shifted the burden of securing the homeland to its new citizens on 
the margins. Like cross-colonial basing, therefore, internal colonial basing reflects the 
intertwining of American empire with the legacies of empires past via the state system. 
In addition to Okinawa, other examples of internal colonial basing include 
Labrador and, since 2002, Diego Garcia. A US agreement with Canada allows the US 
Air Force, under NATO auspices, to carry out regular low-level training flights over 
the territory of the Innu people in Labrador, which has been shown to negatively 
impact the migration patterns of local wildlife that are central to the preservation of 
Innu culture. Diego Garcia shifted from being an instance of cross-colonial basing to 
one of internal colonial basing in 2002, when the British Parliament enacted 
legislation granting all Chagossians the right to obtain British citizenship. 
Of course, for those who view their nation and their territory as sovereign in 
relation to the state within whose borders they reside, “foreign” military presence 
includes the armed forces of the national government. Although Japan’s Self-Defense 
Force (SDF) has a relatively small presence on Okinawa Island, negative attitudes 
toward Japanese forces are prevalent. Okinawan activists have waged significant 
protests against the SDF in the years before and since Okinawa’s reincorporation into 
Japan. This has led Japan’s Defense Agency to create Okinawa-specific policies 
regarding SDF-community involvement and even different protocols for the off-duty 
  71 
wearing of uniforms by its members within the prefecture. I will return to Okinawan 
attitudes toward the SDF in chapter five. Relevant to this discussion is that, in the 
nearly 100 interviews I conducted with Okinawan anti-US base activists, not one saw 
continued presence of the SDF in Okinawa as desirable should the US military leave.  
Thus this scenario$when a state deploys its armed forces or permanently 
maintains military installations in indigenous territories within its borders$must be 
included within the concept of internal colonial basing. While legitimate from a state-
centric perspective on modern sovereignty and contemporary foreign military basing, 
the rise of self-determination and indigenous rights claims against militarization of 
their territory by the controlling state indicates that internal colonial basing is 
perceived as anything but legitimate. The United States’ historically disproportionate 
militarization of and ongoing discriminatory military policies in sovereign territories 
throughout the Continental US as well as Alaska and Hawai’i also provides an 
example of internal colonial basing and its disproportionately negative effects.55 
When an internally colonized people finds its territory occupied by both the 
national military and another states’ military, as is often the case, these communities 
become doubly occupied. Of course, all citizens are militarized to greater and lesser 
degrees by their respective government, and so all cases of foreign basing (e.g. US 
military presence in Great Britain, or British forces in Australia) are instances of dual 
militarization and thus reflect a form of compromised sovereignty. The difference in 
instances of internal colonial basing, as well as cross-colonial basing, is that the 
                                                
55 See Gregory Hooks and Chad Smith, “The Treadmill of Destruction: National Sacrifice Areas and 
Native Americans.” American Sociological Review 69:558-76, 2004; Gregory Hooks and Chad Smith, 
“Treadmills of Production and Destruction: Threats to the Environment Posed by Militarism,” 
Organizations and Environment 18:19-37, 2005; and Haunani-Kay, Trask, From a native daughter: 
Colonialism and sovereignty in Hawai'i. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999. The instantiation 
of internal colonial basing in the United States is further complicated by the federal government’s 
official recognition of the sovereignty of First Nation lands throughout the continental US and Alaska 
(but not Hawaii). Although indigenous peoples whose territories reside within the borders of the United 
States typically understand and articulate their sovereignty to be absolute$to constitute the full and 
collective right to self-determination$the US government concedes only “internal self-determination.” 
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political, social and economic marginalization of a people within a national polity 
exacerbates the negative effects of foreign military basing in their communities, and 
nearly always compounds the problems of redress and accountability. Such is the case 
in Okinawa. 
Table 2.1 Historical forms of colonial basing (Sources: US Department of Defense, 
2008; British Ministry of Defense, 2006; French Ministry of Defense, 2006) 
 
Conclusion 
In an era when sustained foreign military basing is taken for granted as a 
legitimate aspect of international relations, the range of historical forms of colonial 
basing reflects the complicated contemporary relationship between state formation and 
militarization. Table 2.1 sketches out the four historically contingent forms of foreign 
military basing rooted in colonial relations that I identify in this chapter. My intention 
is not to develop a typology of colonial basing through which different instances of 
overseas military basing can be measured and compared independently of one another. 
On the contrary, situating Okinawa in relation to other forms of foreign basing rooted 
in colonial relations is intended to highlight the historical interrelatedness of 
 
Form of basing  
 
 
Character of basing relationship  
 
Current examples  
direct colonial 
basing 
a state’s military presence in its 
formal overseas colonial territories 
US in Guam and the Northern Mariana 
Islands, American Samoa, US States Virgin 
Islands, Puerto Rico; UK in Gibraltar, 
Diego Garcia (pre-2002); France in Guiana, 
the Seychelles, Polynesia  
post-colonial 
basing 
a state’s military presence in its 
former colonial territories  
US in Panama, Philippines; UK in Kenya, 
Brunei, Nepal, Australia;  
France in Senegal, Gabon, Djibouti 
cross-colonial 
basing 
a state’s military presence in 
colonial territories of other states 
US in Greenland, Diego Garcia (pre-2002) 
internal colonial 
basing 
a state’s military presence in 
indigenous territories within its or 
other states’ borders 
US in Okinawa, Mindanao, Labrador, 
Hawai’i, Diego Garcia (post-2002) and 
Native American territories; Canada in First 
Nation territories; Australia in Aboriginal 
lands; Japan in the Ry!ky!s; Philippines in 
the Cordillera; UK in Diego Garcia (post-
2002)  
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seemingly different political structures, and why seemingly differently situated actors 
might employ similar kinds of claims.   
In particular, the concept of internal colonial basing allows me to theorize how 
the politicization of Okinawan identity and emergence of collective rights claims mark 
a convergence with contemporary self-determination movements elsewhere. The 
politics of decolonization that subsumed within states the national territory of, for 
example, the Ainu, Cherokee, Maori, Maasai and Kurds, parallels the politics that 
internalized colonial relations into US military occupation of the Ry!ky!s. Although 
the result of different historical paths within decolonization, those who live under 
conditions of direct-colonial basing (e.g. Chamorro in Guam) and cross-colonial 
basing (Chaggosians in Diego Garcia) share with Okinawans a marginal, colonial 
position vis-à-vis the state, which conditions their experience of US military presence. 
Contemporary movements for self-determination are thus connected and indeed 
mutually constitutive via their relationship to the same historical structures of state 
power, as conditioned by empire.  
This brings us full circle, to Okinawa’s “part in the maintenance of 
international peace and security” over the five and a half decades since Dulles’ 
remarks. For its “part” can be viewed in different ways. From the perspective implied 
by Dulles, sixty years of US military build-up on the islands created an all-
encompassing physical and socio-economic infrastructure to house, train and entertain 
tens of thousands of troops. Okinawa’s transformation into an American military 
stronghold on the front lines of the Cold War made it a key staging area for US 
bombing runs, medical evacuation and troop “R and R” during the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars. US troops rotated in and out of the battle zones of the first Gulf War to 
live and train in Okinawa. Today, they rotate in and out of Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus 
successive US governments, with the consent of Japanese governments since 1972, 
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have made Okinawans and their territory a major instrument of American global 
military policy. 
From a much different perspective, however, Okinawans’ “part in the 
maintenance of international peace and security” is expressed in the sustained efforts 
of many of them to oust the US military, thwart its ongoing training and expansion, 
and put an end to the rights violations, community erosion and ecological destruction 
associated with US military presence. It is also expressed in Okinawans’ efforts to 
challenge, together with other peoples and communities, the colonial roots of the 
structures of power that make possible ongoing militarization of their territory. Taken 
together, both interpretations reveal how the particular history of Okinawa and its 
people are an integral part of a global story of the politics of foreign military basing 
and state making.  
At the same time, how the politics of state formation and militarization take 
shape, how collective movements form (or not), depends on the particular 
configuration of power relations in each instance. Alternative struggles against state 
rule reflect day-to-day experiences within it. Okinawans’ struggle reflects the 
everyday experiences of life under conditions of internal colonial basing. In this 
context, the actual practices carried out in the name of state power depend for their 
legitimacy not on formal intergovernmental agreements but on notions and 
experiences of citizenship. For this reason, I contend that the relations of citizenship 
under internal colonial basing become the central thread by which the legitimating 
apparatus upholding US military presence in Okinawa begins to unravel, thereby 
exposing the contradictions in a postwar regime of foreign military expansion framed 
in terms of state sovereignty and citizenship but rooted in colonial relations. It is to 
this process that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A NEW NORMAL: INTERNAL COLONIAL BASING 
 
“A base structure is more than a military consideration.  It is a political arrangement 
of the first order that has bilateral, international, cultural, and economic 
consequences.” 
 
~Report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the 
United States, May 200556  
 
“Uchinanch# grow up with aircraft noise, looking at broad green lawns through 
chain-link fencing, going to the local A&W, and watching our aunties date US 
soldiers. The bases are just another part of Okinawa.”  
 
~ Toma Shisei, indigenous rights activist and owner of an environmental engineering 
firm that primarily contracts with the US military bases.57 
 
“How could it come as a shock that a helicopter would crash into homes and a 
campus building when hundreds of helicopters circle low over those same homes and 
campus every day? Isn’t it more shocking that a helicopter doesn’t drop out of the sky 
regularly?” 
 
~ Resident of Ginowan City, the center of which is occupied by the Marine Corps’ 
Futenma Air Station, after a transport helicopter from the base carrying out touch-
and-go landing exercises crashed into a nearby college campus on August 13, 2004.58 
 
Introduction 
The above quote by indigenous rights activist Toma Shisei was how he 
described life with the US military to me during my first few days on Okinawa Island. 
His portrayal of “growing up” with the bases captured a sentiment I would hear again 
                                                
56 More commonly referred to as the Overseas Basing Commission, this congressionally mandated body 
has the politically charged task of reviewing America’s overseas facility structure, and making 
recommendations regarding which facilities (and by extension which missions) should remain as is, and 
which should be bolstered, closed, or consolidated. Commission members typically include retired 
members from all branches of the military. For the 2005 report, see Commission on Review of 
Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, “Overseas Basing Commission Report to 
Congress,” May 9. Retrieved January 29, 2006 from www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/obc.pdf. 
57 Personal notes, March 16, 2004. 
58 Personal interview, August 15, 2004. 
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and again during my sixteen months on the island: a general sense that US military 
presence is a normal part of the Okinawan landscape and Okinawan life. How is it 
that the occupation of huge tracts of Okinawa Island by fortress-like structures and 
tens of thousands of foreign military forces could be considered normal by so many? 
How has reincorporation into the Japanese state changed Okinawans’ experience of 
US military presence? How do Okinawans experience the state-citizen relation under 
conditions of internal colonial basing? What has citizenship under internal colonial 
basing meant for the demilitarization movement? How is internal colonial basing 
accomplished? 
This chapter and the next bring evidence to bear on these questions by 
focusing on how US military presence is intertwined with Okinawans’ everyday 
experiences under the terms and structures of internal colonial basing. Even after 
reversion, US military presence continued to impose synthetic boundaries onto the 
Okinawan landscape and into Okinawan society. These boundaries normalize a 
military-centric spatial, cultural and socio-economic order that is inseparable from 
Okinawans’ experience of their Japanese citizenship. Although Japanese citizenship 
provided Okinawans with a new basis for claims-making and new channels for 
redress, this also has a depoliticizing effect on the anti-base movement. It serves to 
redirect energy and narrow the focus of anti-base activists’ claims, bringing 
Okinawans into the process of “managing” the impact of the bases.  
Simultaneously, both governments manage the impact of US military presence 
so that continued military activity takes priority over mitigating or preventing its 
impact. Providing the central political and discursive framework for this is the US-
Japan Security Treaty, which reincorporation extended to the Ry!ky!s. This 
agreement shapes definitions and representations of “basing problems” in a way that 
locates “basing solutions” and decision-making power at the national and 
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international levels. Problems that arise from routine military operations, when they 
cannot be managed via “local” channels of citizenship, are reduced to technical 
matters of interstate diplomacy. Tokyo’s consistent deference to the treaty illustrates 
further why Okinawans’ marginal position within the Japanese citizenry severely 
limits the extent to which citizenship provides protection from the bases’ effects. 
Instead the treaty helps to normalize extraordinary violence as a part of everyday life.  
These arguments build on the previous chapter’s insights into the 
contemporary relationship between state formation and the expansion of military 
power by foregrounding and problematizing citizenship, given that it serves as a key 
mechanism of military expansion and its normalization in the postwar period. In this 
chapter, I seek to demonstrate how the concept of internal colonial basing offers a 
way to understand Okinawans’ everyday experiences of US military presence as 
Japanese citizens. 
I begin the chapter by exploring how the physicality of the bases intertwines 
with their socio-cultural influences to impact Okinawans experiences and perceptions 
of American military presence as a normal part of everyday life. I then address the 
question of how reincorporation into the Japanese state has, and has not, altered 
Okinawans’ experiences of US basing. This involves considering the extension of 
both the rights associated with citizenship and the US-Japan security treaty. I 
conclude the chapter with a discussion of what happened when a helicopter crashed in 
Ginowan City to better illustrate how Okinawans’ membership in the Japanese state is 
critical to managing continued US presence.  
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Normalization of US military presence  
 “American grass on Okinawan land” 
The sheer materiality and expansiveness of US military presence contributes 
significantly to the ordering and regulation of Okinawan space, reinforcing a sense 
that the bases are not just a normal but also a permanent feature of the Okinawan 
landscape. One cannot travel far in Okinawa without having to maneuver around 
miles of the chain-link and barbed-wire fencing surrounding US military facilities. 
And while most of the time one need only look skyward to see military aircraft, 
thunderous jet engines and the jarring staccato of large combat helicopters make their 
presence felt in the most private of spaces and activities. US bases stretch across 21 of 
Okinawa’s 41 municipalities. Their placement rarely aligns with pre-existing borders, 
physical or otherwise. The synthetic boundaries that US military presence imposes on 
Okinawa create a military-centric spatial, cultural and socio-economic order while 
they simultaneously displace, distort and sometimes prevent Okinawans from 
maintaining and creating their own. This happens as these exclusive spaces and the 
activity they engender intervene in the everyday routines and ordinary relationships of 
Okinawans.  
“I think one of the most difficult things for Uchinanch! to imagine is what 
Okinawa would be like, what it might look like, without the bases,” said Iha Yoichi, 
the current mayor of Ginowan City. Elected in 2003 on an anti-base platform, Iha has 
spent his time in office pushing the US and Japanese governments to make good on a 
1996 promise to close the Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station. The air base occupies 
one-third of Ginowan, taking up an area larger than New York’s Central Park in the 
very center of the city. Ginowan’s 90,000 inhabitants live in the densely populated 
areas around the base (see Figure 3.1). As he spoke Iha showed me a detailed plan 
drawn up under his administration for how the area now occupied by Futenma might 
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be utilized once the land is returned. “Most of the residents of Ginowan only know the 
city with the base…For so long we have been without access, without control over this 
space in the very center of our city. By now you probably know that to get from here 
to here”—he tapped the map on opposite sides of the base—”often takes 20 minutes, 
sometimes more, because you have to drive all the way around, right? If the base were 
gone it would only take five minutes to drive across. Did you know that until last year 
the US military even prevented access to our fire trucks and ambulances? Emergency 
vehicles had to drive all the way around. Okinawans’ basic security is not considered. 
Everything has to go around. Even our water pipes, sewage and electrical lines must 
go around. Because it has been this way for all of people’s lives, Uchinanch! have a 
hard time imagining the bases differently, as their own place, where they are free to 
come and go.”59 
 
 
Figure 3.1 US Marine Corps Futenma Air Station, Ginowan City 
 
                                                
59 Personal interview, July 12, 2005. 
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In addition to the logistical complications and related burdens imposed by the 
territorial exclusivity claimed by the US military, important in Iha’s explanation is his 
observation that this exclusivity is often internalized by Okinawans themselves 
because it is all they have ever known. The fact is, no Okinawan younger than sixty-
five knows or remembers Okinawa without the massive US military presence and odd 
jumble of American cultural influences. That such internalization also has something 
to do with how the military uses its space is suggested in 38-year old Shimabukuro 
Yasuko’s description of what it was like to grow up with a view of the military’s 
family housing on the Marine Corps’ Camp Zukeran: 
 
“When I was little, I walked to and from school along the street that 
borders the base….The view through the fence made me think America 
was a wonderful country. It was like the America we saw in the 
movies, you know, big houses surrounded by green grass, with children 
playing. I thought it was amazing that Americans had so much land that 
they could plant nothing but grass around their homes, planted just to 
look at and enjoy!...I was so envious of the life I imagined the children 
I saw playing on the grass must have. I wished to be one of them. 
Maybe you’ll find this hard to believe, but it wasn’t until much later, 
not until my late teens, when I realized it wasn’t America I was looking 
at through the fence, but Okinawa. American grass on Okinawan land. 
Grass that used to be farmland, and fields where Uchinanch! children 
used to live and play.”  
 
The military’s choice to recreate an American suburban landscape in land-scarce 
Okinawa not only reinforced Shimabukuro Yasuko’s perceptions of US prosperity, 
but also served to make military-occupied space appear, at least during her formative 
years, to be unquestionably American space. Okinawan space existed outside the 
fence. The view that amazed Mrs. Shimabukuro as a child in the late 1970s has not 
changed much, as we saw when we walked along the route she took to school (see 
figure 3.2 below).  
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Figure 3.2 A comparative view of on-base housing and Okinawa’s residential 
neighborhoods. Family housing on Camp Zukeran, as seen from atop a building across 
the street that Shimabukuro Yasuko took on her way to school in the 1970s (top). A 
typical view of Okinawa’s urban residential neighborhoods outside the bases (bottom). 
 
At the same time, the constant flow of military-related vehicles, equipment 
and people from the bases into “non-base space” is a reminder that the chain link 
borders throughout Okinawa are permeable, though not equally so. For military 
personnel, US civilian contractors and their dependents traveling in either their 
military or private capacities, the security checkpoints at base gates may, at busier 
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times, be a time-consuming hassle, but they are not barriers. On the contrary, in one 
direction they are gateways to an exclusive military space that intertwines military 
infrastructure and activities with community, home and school life: buildings, houses, 
roads, nightclubs, runways, childcare centers, missile silos, campgrounds, hospitals, 
parks, bombing ranges, golf courses, communication towers, private beaches with 
subsidized jet ski and sailboat rentals, hotels, schools, tanks, banks, bowling alleys, 
aircraft, seacraft and vehicles of all sizes and functions, community centers, jungle 
warfare training areas, restaurants, landing areas for amphibious assault training, 
houses of worship, bombs, shopping centers, naval ports, movie theaters, radar 
towers, bars, airplane hangers, school buses, ordinance storage, supermarkets filled 
with familiar brands, equally familiar chain restaurants, and the ubiquitous expanses 
of green grass. In the interests of morale and “military readiness,” the bases thus 
evoke a culturally American middle-class lifestyle of suburban living and 
consumption (for a military population still disproportionately representing America’s 
working class). 
For military-related personnel going in the other direction, security 
checkpoints are hassle-free gateways to an “exotic” space of consumption: 
restaurants, entertainment, women, shopping, more beaches, more bars, more housing 
options—all promoted on the military’s in-house television network as opportunities 
for Americans to enjoy Okinawa and experience “Japanese” culture. Though after 
more than six decades American culture has left its mark outside the fences: Okinawa 
has the highest number of cars and fast-food restaurants per capita in all of Japan. 
Although the Ry!ky!s still boast two and a half times Japan’s national average of 
centenarians, Okinawans under 50 have the highest rates of obesity in the country.60 
                                                
60 Referring to the health crisis as the “second Battle of Okinawa,” local health department 
spokesperson Asato Yoko points to research showing that “Okinawans consume more fat, smoke more 
and drink more than the average Japanese. We use cars instead of walking or cycling.” Quoted in Colin 
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Flows of Okinawans across the same boundaries are predictable and strictly 
regulated. Exceptions to this are rare and rest on explicit representations of the bases 
as sites for cultural celebration and better military-community relations. For example, 
after much protesting and petitioning, Okinawans gained the “right” to apply for one-
day access permits to visit and care for family tombs located on the bases. Paying 
homage to ancestors is an important part of Okinawan culture, reflected in the 
centrality of shiimi in the Okinawan calendar—the period when those who are living 
gather together at the family grave for a day of food and drink and communion with 
deceased relatives. Although many tombs were likely destroyed in the military’s early 
expansion, their existence on bases throughout the island is due to the fact that most 
of the land the military appropriated was once private land.  
The other exceptions take place on a limited number of occasions through the 
year, when Okinawans are invited to attend events or festivals held on certain bases. 
Since 2000, the Air Force has hosted an annual Special Olympics for Okinawans on 
Kadena Air Base. Festivals, held two or three times annually, include the Marine 
Corps’ Fourth of July celebration, and its sausage- and German beer-laden Oktoberfest 
at the Futenma Air Station in Ginowan. The Navy holds its “White Beach Festival” at 
its installation of the same name—giving Okinawans a glimpse of one of the many 
prime beachfronts occupied by the military. These events, billed as opportunities for 
Okinawans to share in good old (German-)Americana and for servicemembers to 
“build community” with their hosts, are a cross between a small-town carnival and a 
hands-on military hardware show. They offer rides, games and food booths, alongside 
which festival-goers (mostly children) can pretend to pilot a decommissioned 
                                                
Joyce, “Japanese get a taste for Western food and fall victim to obesity and early death,” The Daily 
Telegraph, September 3, 2006. Retrieved from 
www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/3342882/Japanese-get-a-taste-for-Western-food-and-fall-
victim-to-obesity-and-early-death.html. 
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helicopter or try their hand at maneuvering an anti-aircraft missile launcher. Despite 
being exposed to regular criticisms of the bases, Okinawan children, especially boys, 
also grow up experiencing military presence as a source of entertainment and an object 
of play. 
These exceptional moments of interaction are interwoven with more quotidian 
experiences. Thousands of Okinawans enter the bases everyday, as laborers, delivery 
personnel and in other capacities that serve military operations.61 However, as 
Shimabukuro Yasuko’s recollection illustrates, everyday routines and relations 
intersect with US presence even if one rarely or never sets foot on a military base. 
Narratives that have the military as a key referent shed light on how this intersection 
becomes meaningful for individual and collective perceptions of base issues: 
 
“We moved to Ginowan on a Sunday. Do you know why I remember 
such a small detail? Because it was quiet! You won’t believe this, but I 
remember thinking what a quiet city it was compared to Okinawa City. 
There the jets from Kadena had often prevented my children from 
taking a nap. But the next day, on Monday, the helicopter training from 
Futenma started and then I knew Ginowan wasn’t different at all. Of 
course that was a long time ago, the day doesn’t seem to matter 
anymore. And now that the US is at war again, flights seem to be 




“My birthday is November 19. This is the date the B-52 crashed in 
1968. That year we couldn’t go to my grandmother’s home in 




                                                
61 According to a 2005 report by US Forces Japan, for example, in 2002 U.S. bases in Okinawa 
employed 8,703 local residents. (cited in Eric Johnston, “Okinawa base issue not cut and dried with 
locals,” Japan Times, Tuesday, March 28, 2006). 
62 Personal interview, April 9, 2005. 
63 Higa Kyoko, Personal interview, December 24, 2005. 
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“This story may seem a little strange because of the struggle [to stop 
construction of a new US military air base] going on there now but, to 
tell you the truth, when I hear something about ‘Henoko’ I still always 
think of my summer vacations at my uncle and auntie’s house. They 
owned a small bar down the street from their house. At night my sister 
and cousins and I would sneak out and watch soldiers from Camp 
Schwab walking down the street and going in and out of the bars, 
sometimes with women on their arms. It was a little frightening but 
very exciting. We were teenagers and of course so curious. We 
stopped going to Henoko in the early-1980s, because they sold the bar 
and moved to Naha, where my uncle got a new job. I suppose the bar 
stopped making money by then, since the busy time was during the 




“I gave birth on the day they made us start driving on the left side of 
the road. Under the Americans we drove on the right side. Then under 
the Japanese it switched to the left side. It changed all on one day, can 
you imagine? Of course my husband drove very carefully, but we 
were so afraid that other people would forget and we’d find them 





“See that open land on the other side of the road? It’s all contaminated 
with PCBs. It was returned to the owners years ago, but they can’t use 




“My little sister was just one year older than that [twelve-year old] girl 
[who was gang-raped by three US soldiers] in ‘95. I was already in 
college, but I was still living at home. We wouldn’t let her go 
anywhere alone for months after that….Even I became nervous about 
going out alone for a while. But eventually we did. We again 
gradually got used to not being concerned.”67 
 
                                                
64 Uema Yuriko, Personal interview, April 9, 2005. 
65 Personal interview, December 12, 2004. 
66 Arakaki Gikei, Personal interview, November 2, 2004. 
67 Personal interview, September 16, 2004. 
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As most of these narratives demonstrate, incidents, accidents and ongoing 
problems associated with routine US military policy and the actions of US personnel 
are also a fact of everyday life in Okinawa. It is no exaggeration to say they are a 
permanent feature of local newscasts and the front pages of Okinawa’s newspapers—
even the military’s own Stars and Stripes. The sheer regularity of such reports lends a 
peculiar mundaneness to the extraordinary effects of US military presence: oil and 
chemical spills; destruction of habitat due to jungle warfare training and base 
construction; wildfires and cracks in the walls of homes and buildings from bombing 
practice; stray bullets from live-fire machine gun training hitting buildings and cars; 
construction of an urban warfare training facility near a residential neighborhood; 
revelations of covert use of depleted uranium in bombing exercises; discoveries of 
unexploded ordinance; pieces of aircraft and other equipment dropping out of the sky; 
the sinking of an amphibious assault vehicle on a coral reef; revelations of a four-to-
one ratio of garbage production by military base households compared with 
Okinawan households; muggings, burglary and sexual violence by US servicemen 
and contractors; increases in nighttime aircraft noise due to the demands of the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq; higher rates of physical and psychological health problems, 
such as low birth weight and decreased concentration among school children due to 
aircraft noise.68  
                                                
68 See, for example, “Okinawa government checking water after fuel leak at Kadena,” Stars and Stripes 
Pacific Edition, June 8, 2007; “Protect citizens from gunfire,” Japan Press Weekly, July 21, 2005;  
“Construction starts on UCT facility” Ry#ky# Shimpo, June 3, 2004; Live-fire training begins at 
controversial new Camp Hansen range,” Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, July 15, 2005; “Hansen 
kazai de akatsuchi ryuushutu no yogore mozuku gyougyoushara fuanshi” [Red soil runoff from Camp 
Hansen fire causes concern among seaweed harvesters] Ry#ky# Shimpo, April 6, 2005; “U.S. slow to 
inform Japan of accident: Hundreds of radioactive bullets were fired in training exercise near Okinawa” 
The Washington Times, February 10, 2006; “US Helicopter Crash in Okinawa” BBC News, August 13, 
2004; David Allen and Chiyomi Sumida, “Chatan protests drop of jet junk,” Stars and Stripes Pacific 
Edition, August 13, 2004; “Abura no ryuushutsu 11kan kakunin, suirikuryoryousha chinbotsu kaiiki” 
[11 openings confirmed to be leaking oil from sunken amphibious assault vehicle into surrounding 
waters] Ry#ky# Shimpo, June 12, 2005; David Allen, “Bases push residents to change trash habits” 
Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, July 5, 2004; Eric Slavin, “Kadena curfew aims to curb alcohol-
related incidents,” Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, January 27, 2006; David Allen, “Japanese 
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The same news reports on the effects of US military presence either originate 
from or include coverage of Okinawan dissent. Like the effects themselves, in other 
words, struggle itself is a normal part of life for many. Retired individuals joked 
about the anti-base movement as the job they began doing full-time upon retirement. 
“I used to get up and go to work. Now I get up and go to protest,” they would say to 
me with a chuckle. Their good humor notwithstanding, the dominance of the struggle 
in activists’ everyday lives is a source of profound frustration for many. Higashionna 
Takuma, a 45-year old activist, told me, “Of course I would rather begin my days 
wondering, ‘What shall I do today? Where shall I take my kids to play?’ But I don’t. 
On the weekend, my kids are home from school, but I say good-bye to them and go 
off to do whatever needs to be done. Of course I do this for them, but I wonder how 
our lives might have been different if the bases hadn’t been here.”69 While it was 
commonplace—as it seems to be everywhere—to hear Okinawan activists explain 
their participation with reference to future generations, to their children or their 
grandchildren, I also occasionally heard activists speak of their parents and 
grandparents as a motivation. Mia, a resident of Ginowan City, told me that she was 
very worried and frustrated about what she saw as a lack of progress by the 
movement. “I’m worried that my parents will die before they can see that Okinawa is 
going to be different for their grandchildren. This is why I participate [in the 
                                                
legislator says U.S. hasn't paid its share of Kadena noise settlement,” Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, 
May 26, 2004; Man runs onto U.S. base without paying taxi fare” Daily Yomiuri, August 16, 2004; 
David Allen and Chiyomi Sumida, “Marines sentenced for mugging of Okinawa man” Stars and Stripes 
Pacific Edition, April 29, 2004;  “U.S. Army employee arrested on suspicion of rape in Okinawa” 
Kyodo News, October 18, 2004; “Kichi!kyofu no kongen"ikari no koe hirogaru, beihei joji waisetsu” 
[Bases are “source of fear”: Angry voices increase following US soldier’s molestation of girl], Ry#ky# 
Shimpo, July 5, 2005; “Fukki gou 42,000 ken, beigunkankei jiko/jiken” [Since reversion, 42,000 
incidents and accidents related to US military] , Ry#ky# Shimpo, July 2, 2005; “Beigun douenshutsu de 
kadena no souon gekka” [Kadena’s aircraft noise intensifies with US military’s simultaneous training 
maneuvers]! Ry#ky# Shimpo, August 11, 2005; Matsui Toshihito et al, “Association between the Rates 
of Low Birth-Weight and/or Preterm Infants and Aircraft Noise Exposure” Japanese Journal of 
Hygiene, vol 58 no. 3; pp 385-394, 2003; David Allen and Chiyomi Sumida, “Final arguments are 
heard in civil suit over Kadena noise” Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, July 3, 2004. 
69 Personal interview, March 3, 2005. 
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movement]. They experienced the war, and then constant military oppression. If they 
die without seeing that things will change, they will never have peace.”70  
That US military presence remains fundamental to the Okinawan experience 
despite the territory’s reincorporation into Japan begs the question of what this shift in 
rule—the shift to internal colonial basing—has changed for Okinawans, and for the 
demilitarization movement in particular. The impact military bases have on everyday 
life is well recognized by those tasked with overseeing America’s overseas military 
footprint, as the quote at the beginning of this chapter indicates. Interstate basing 
arrangements shape how these effects are managed. In the Okinawan context, the 
extension of Japan’s basing agreement with the United States upon reversion gave it 
an over-determining role.    
 
“We didn’t get a constitution. We got ANP!.” 
 
 Reversion and the relations of internal colonial basing brought a “new 
normal” that older Okinawans were forced to adjust to and that younger Okinawans 
have only ever known. Rather than alter Okinawans’ everyday experience of US 
military presence, reincorporation into Japan changed the terms through which US 
occupation would continue. It “redefined social spaces and personhood” in terms of 
Okinawans’ compromised Japanese citizenship, becoming a “new means of 
manufacturing the experience of the real” (c.f. Mitchell 1988:ix). This had 
contradictory effects. Japanese citizenship did make everyday life easier in some 
ways; it led to more opportunities for mobility—both physically and socio-
economically. It also opened local and national channels of political representation. 
                                                
70 Personal notes, June 7, 2005. 
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But as a global relation rooted in coloniality, Okinawans’ membership in the Japanese 
state makes accountability for base effects an elusive prospect.  
“After reversion, it was as if everything changed and yet nothing changed,” 
recalls 68-year old former Kadena town councilmember, retired farmer, and long-time 
anti-base activist Arakaki Gikei. The two of us were slowly making our way through 
the congested afternoon traffic on Route 58, a central thoroughfare running north-
south along the western coastline of narrow Okinawa Island. Traffic in the central part 
of the island, where the greatest concentration of US bases shares space with the bulk 
of the population, is forced to weave around and between the bases on just a few major 
arteries, making traveling anywhere remarkably time consuming. A single expressway 
running north and south offers a much quicker mode of travel, but the high toll costs 
make frequent travel on the expressway prohibitive for most Okinawans I know. Like 
most of the key infrastructure build under America’s formal occupation, the 
expressway was constructed to serve the military in particular.71 Mr. Arakaki 
continued: 
 
“We became Japanese citizens. I got a Japanese drivers license. I could 
finally come and go from Japan without a passport. We began using 
Japanese yen. As citizens, our taxes started going to Tokyo, and Tokyo 
started paying us to put up with the bases, which remained just as they 
had always been. We could vote in national elections and send 
Okinawan representatives to the parliament, but their small numbers 
couldn’t do anything about the bases. Even Japan’s so-called 
‘opposition parties’ are not really interested in fighting for Okinawa. 
Our local elections revolve around the US military bases….Okinawa’s 
infrastructure improved. Tourists came and the economy got better, but 
it also remained centered on the bases. And local construction 
companies and other Okinawan businesses have trouble competing 
                                                
71 Just a 30-mile one-way trip on the expressway costs the equivalent of roughly $8. Adding to 
Okinawans’ frustrations with the high cost is the exemption that US military personnel receive under 
the Status of Forces Agreement. It was pointed out to me numerous times that the congestion created by 
the bases contributed significantly to the need for the expressway in the first place, and that it was built 
to primarily serve the military. The close proximity of expressway exits and entrances to the main gates 
of US military installations supports such claims.   
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with big Japanese corporations that came after reversion. Of course we 
still protest the US military and government, but now US officials tell 
us, ‘You are Japanese citizens, you must go to the Japanese 
government’. When we go to the Japanese government they tell us their 
hands are tied by ANP!. In the end, we didn’t get a constitution. We 
got ANP!.”72 
 
Not coincidentally, Mr. Arakaki was taking me to ANP! no Oka, or ANP" 
Hill, named for the US-Japan Security Treaty that was automatically extended to 
Okinawa in 1972. At just three or four meters high, ANP! no Oka is hardly a hill; it 
turned out to be a nondescript, grassy mound alongside Route 58 in the town of 
Kadena. I realized I had driven past the concrete stairway that leads from the road to 
the top of the mound dozens of times without taking notice. But from the top we had 
an unobstructed view of the two runways at Kadena Air Base, the largest US military 
installation in the Asia-Pacific region and one of the largest military bases in the world 
(see figure 3.3).73 Initially seized from Japanese Imperial forces in the spring of 1945, 
US forces transformed the airstrip and continued expanding the base through forced 
land seizers. Today the air base still occupies 85% of the town of Kadena. As the 
sardonic nickname suggests, it is from ANP" Hill that one begins to get a sense of the 
enormity and dominance$physical and otherwise$of the US-Japan Security Treaty 
within Okinawa. “My family didn’t get our land back after reversion. It still lies under 
that runway, or somewhere under those hangars,” Mr. Arakaki explained, gesturing 
toward a row of buildings along the far runway.  
 
                                                
72 Personal interview, March 5, 2005.  
73 Kadena Air Base is home to more than 100 aircraft, 18,000 military personnel and 4000 civilian 
employees (see www.kadena.af.mil/). 
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Figure 3.3 The view from ANP! no Oka. 
 
The relations of citizenship also changed the terms through which US 
occupation would be challenged. On the one hand, the representative claims of the 
state provided Okinawans with a new basis for claims making and new modes of 
struggle: litigation, elections, demands aimed at local and national public officials, 
relatively greater access to information, and greater protections for freedom of 
assembly and protest. On the other hand, the same institutions associated with 
citizenship reconfigured the anti-base movement along increasingly institutionalized 
politics, reflecting the structuring effect that institutions and actors of representative 
democracy often have on movements seeking more fundamental change (c.f. Della 
Porta and Tarrow 2005:1). Rather than facilitate the continuation of the pre-1972 
movement to end US occupation, therefore, the provisions of citizenship served to 
narrow the focus of anti-base activists’ claims making, channeling the greater part of 
their energies into particularistic campaigns to alter specific practices (e.g. ensuring 
access to family graves, or stopping bombing exercises that project ordinance across 
a public roadway) or seek justice for specific acts (e.g. rape). So while Okinawan 
activists have achieved countless successes in the 35 years since reversion because of 
  92 
new avenues for redress, continued US military presence ensures a surfeit of targets 
for particularized claims and campaigns.  
Moreover, intervening in and distorting local efforts to seek redress for base 
effects is the consistent deference the Japanese government demonstrates to its 
security arrangement with the US in the Okinawan context. The US-Japan Security 
Treaty and its elaborate Status of Forces Agreement provide the discursive and legal 
framework for this. The treaty codifies the terms in which basing matters are 
understood and problematized, which in turn locates decision-making power and 
“basing solutions” at the national and international levels. The imperatives of the 
treaty facilitates the approach taken by both governments to the bases, which is not 
geared toward lessening their impact as much as it is toward managing their impact so 
that military needs are not compromised. In this way the local and international 
dimensions of Okinawans’ Japanese citizenship intertwine to create what James 
Ferguson (1994), in referring to the effects of the development apparatus, called an 
“anti-politics machine”: the erasure of politics as the institutions upholding US 
military presence look only to prescriptions that fit within its universalizable technical-
rational mechanisms of resolution. 
What this means in practice is most visible when high profile incidents result 
in popular and official local responses that threaten to jeopardize military operations. 
Such was the case in August 2004, when a large transport helicopter from the US 
Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station crashed in central Okinawa’s densely populated 
Ginowan City. Spinning out of control before it exploded against a school building on 
the small campus of Okinawa International University, the helicopter lost its entire 
tail assembly, a 36-foot long rotor blade, parts of the fuselage and 30 other pieces of 
debris in the surrounding urban neighborhood. 
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Okinawans’ frustration and anger stemmed as much from the US military’s 
actions following the crash as from the incident itself. Without permission, military 
personnel immediately took control of the private campus, preventing Okinawan 
police, university authorities and city officials from accessing the site. News footage 
showed US soldiers shouting at and using force against residents, and blocking 
cameras. This bolstered accounts of soldiers confiscating film and entering private 
property without permission. Okinawan police and fire departments were not allowed 
access to the main crash site for two full days, and then were only allowed to view the 
wreckage and surrounding damage from a distance. In the interim, images of young 
marines freely coming and going from the campus added to residents’ frustration over 
the unilateral control claimed by the military (see figure 3.4). US commanders refused 
Okinawan authorities’ demands to investigate the wreckage and crash site. 
Subsequent footage of US military personnel in full-body protective gear removing a 
large covered object and top soil from the site fueled citizens’ fears about what the 
aircraft was carrying when it crashed. Anger grew when, with the burned-out remains 
of the helicopter still on the ground and the military’s own investigation of the crash 
ongoing, the Marines resumed flights of the same type of helicopter from Futenma, 







                                                
74 David Allen, “Six Futenma CH-53Ds set off for Iraq,” Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, Tuesday, 
August 24, 2004. Retrieved August 28, 2004 from 
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=23988. 
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Figure 3.4 Scenes of the August 12, 2004 helicopter crash in Ginowan City. 
Clockwise, (1) Marines rush to cordon off the area around the crash site; (2) Marines 
and members of the Okinawa prefectural police force guard a propeller blade that fell 
on a residential street and private driveway about 200 meters from the crash site; (3) 
Marines exit from the military-controlled campus of Okinawa International University 
two days following the crash; (4) Officials from the Okinawa prefectural police are 
prevented from accessing the tail rotor assembly, which fell in the grounds of a nearby 
community center about 500 meters from the central crash site. (Photo 1 taken by 
Kaneshiro Junko; photos 2-4 taken by author) 
 
Small protests occurred daily at the crash site and activists began a month-
long sit-in at Futenma’s main gate, culminating in a rally of 30,000 at the campus on 
September 12. But Okinawans’ anger was directed equally if not more so at the 
Japanese government’s reaction to the incident. Then Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro refused to meet with Okinawan officials immediately because he was on 
summer vacation. Within days of the incident and before any formal investigation, 
Japan’s Foreign Minister Machimura announced that the US military had not violated 
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any provisions of the SOFA in the wake of the crash. Machimura’s subsequent praise 
for the “pilots’ superior flying skills” as the reason for no deaths or injuries on the 
ground drew swift rebuke within Okinawa, given eye-witness accounts of the rotor-
less helicopter spinning out of control over the rooftops.75 The government also 
supported the military’s resumption of helicopter flights from Futenma before 
investigations into the crash were complete.76 
For Japanese leaders, the crash was officially “extremely regrettable.”77 But it 
was also a major setback. Under increasing pressure from Washington, the Japanese 
government had tried for eight years to convince or compel Okinawans to accept the 
two governments’ plan to build a massive new offshore US air base in northern 
Okinawa’s Henoko Bay and related training sites nearby. The plan was the 
cornerstone of a 1996 agreement between the US and Japanese governments to “lessen 
the burden” of the US military on Okinawa by closing Futenma Air Station and other 
aging facilities.  
For the US Military, the crash officially warranted “deepest regret.”78 But it 
also signaled more delays in the Pentagon’s plans to modernize its military capabilities 
on the island, as part of a broader goal of realigning its forces in Japan and the region. 
Central to this objective in Okinawa is the new air base at Henoko.  
For Okinawans, the crash and its aftermath were life under conditions of 
internal colonial basing. That Japanese leaders downplayed the crash and dismissed 
any notion of wrongdoing on the part of the US was hardly surprising to Okinawans 
                                                
75 “Machimura apologizes for praising pilot's ability in chopper crash” Kyodo News, October 18, 2004. 
Retrieved October 20, 2004 from www.japantoday.com/e/?content=news&id=315757. 
76 “Japan OKs resumption of U.S. chopper flights Wed,” Kyodo News, October 12, 2004. 
77 “Beigun heri tsuuraku, kawaguchi gaisou ga paueru beimuchokan to denwakaidan [US military 
helicopter crash: Foreign Minister Kawaguchi holds teleconference with Secretary of State Powell]” 
Ryukyu Shimpo, August 24, 2994, p. 1. 
78 David Allen and Chiyomi Sumida, “Governor, general at odds over Futenma flights, Stars and 
Stripes Pacific Edition, August 23, 2004. Retrieved August 28, 2004 from 
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=23976. 
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who long ago stopped viewing the Japanese government as an advocate and a 
guarantor of their rights. “By tomorrow the Japanese government will be handing out 
cash. This is how it handles incidents like this,” my neighbor Nakamura Teruko 
predicted accurately. The Okinawa branch of Japan’s Defense Agency—now the 
Ministry of Defense79—set up shop in an empty storefront a block from the crash site 
in order to facilitate compensation for area residents’ property damage.  
It is precisely the normality of extraordinary incidents like the crash that 
provokes the greatest anger. Mie, a member of a Ginowan City women’s group who 
grew up near the crash site, pointed to the deliberate policies that led to the crash and 
the extent to which these are unknown and largely unimaginable for most Japanese: 
 
“I’ve had several calls from acquaintances on the mainland. Almost 
every one of them told me how greatly shocked they were to hear the 
news of the crash (dai shokku o uketa’tte)…This is the difference in our 
experiences of the US military. I’ll just say it$it was difficult for me 
not to let on that I was angry to hear their simplistic reaction. I guess 
from a distance, from some place where it would be a shock if a plane 
crashed into a neighborhood, the Ginowan crash must seem shocking. 
But it is not at all shocking to Uchinanch!. How could it come as a 
shock that a helicopter would crash into homes and a campus building 
when hundreds of helicopters circle low over those same homes and 
campus every day? Isn’t it more shocking that a helicopter doesn’t drop 
out of the sky regularly?”80  
 
Mie’s comment foregrounds two additional dimensions of the normalization of 
US military presence in Okinawa. The first is the mostly silent majority to the north. 
US military installations on the island rest on the consent of the many and coercion of 
the few. With over 75% of all US bases in Japan still concentrated on Okinawa 
Island—which constitutes .03% of the country’s total land mass—it is the Japanese 
                                                
79 On January 7, 2007, the Japan Defense Agency was upgraded to Ministry of Defense, a Cabinet-level 
ministry. 
80 Personal interview, August 15, 2004. 
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citizenry as a whole that consents to a daily reality that only a small fraction truly 
understand. This is not to say that Japanese do not know or care about Okinawa. But 
in the main their knowledge and attention is selective, shaped by a $375 billion 
dollar-a-year tourist industry largely tailored to them. Okinawa’s subtropical climate, 
white sand beaches and distinct culture quickly made it one of the central destinations 
for Japan’s growing middle class after 1972. As Japanese overseas tourism took off in 
the 1980s, the long-held image of Okinawans as exotic islanders in the Japanese 
popular imaginary$much like the place of Hawai’ians in America’s racialized social 
landscape$made the Ry!ky! Islands a popular “foreign” destination within Japan 
where yen is used and Japanese is spoken. With tourism the central lens through 
which most Japanese view Okinawa and its people, awareness of US military 
presence on the islands remains superficial,81 except when seemingly extraordinary 
incidents, like the helicopter crash, make the news. Thus US military presence in 
Okinawa also depends on a Japanese public predisposed to the normalcy of letting 
Okinawans$whose “Japaneseness” has always been in question$bear the brunt of 
US forces in Japan. 
 Mie also draws attention to the regularity with which Okinawans are put at 
risk as a matter of policy. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reportedly 
agreed with her assessment of Futenma Air Station during his visit to Okinawa in 
November 2003, when he acknowledged the “dangerous and deteriorating” state of 
the base. Touring the city from a helicopter, Rumsfeld was quoted as saying “it is a 
                                                
81 Given that most tour packages to the Ry!ky!s are less than a week, it is quite possible to travel to 
Okinawa Island and avoid experiencing the more destructive aspects of the bases. The most popular 
tourist hotels and resorts on the main island are located in the island’s less populated northwest coast, 
an area not occupied by US bases. Tourists are thus able to arrive at Okinawa’s Naha International 
Airport, travel the 60 kilometers to and from the central tourist region, and only glimpse the expansive 
military bases from the expressway. Of course, those tourists who want to see US military aircraft in 
action, buy American goods, and experience consumer-citizen life alongside young American soldiers 
in Okinawa’s many pockets of “little America” certainly are able to do so. A not insignificant part of 
the tourist industry aimed at Japanese youth relies on the commodification of US military presence. 
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wonder there are not more accidents” (quoted in Takahashi 2004). The majority of 
flights from Futenma are “touch and go” drills for combat operations. This means 
helicopters take off, circle low over the city, touch down and take off again, repeating 
the drill. In other words, it is routine policy for helicopters to fly a few hundred feet 
above the OIU campus and the shops and homes of Ginowan’s urban neighborhoods.  
In an Orwellian twist not unfamiliar to Okinawans, officials from both 
governments cited the helicopter crash as evidence that progress on the construction of 
the Henoko air base is critical for the “safety of Okinawans.”82 Although the crash 
confirmed the Pentagon’s own acknowledgements of the dangers Futenma Air Station 
poses to the residents of Ginowan, it did not lead the Pentagon to reconsider its 
controversial decision to keep Futenma in operation until the new air base is 
completed and operational. Nor did the crash lead to the question of whether 
Okinawans could or should “host” yet another massive military installation elsewhere 
on the island. The question remained how to accomplish it.  
Responding selectively to Okinawan anger and backtracking on his earlier 
statement, Japan’s Foreign Minister framed the problem presented by the helicopter 
crash in terms of the possibility that US soldiers may have overstepped their rights in 
their effort to “ensure the safety of the pilots and those on the ground. Japanese leaders 
and conservative Okinawan politicians called for a review of procedures in the event 
of US military accidents. US officials maintained that military personnel had done 
nothing wrong, but acquiesced to the review. The two governments agreed to convene 
an “Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Accident Site Cooperation,” which a US military 
spokesperson announced would be made up of high-level representatives from both 
                                                
82 “Beigun heri tsuraku, kiken na ‘futenma’: Seifu no Taiou” [Dangerous Futenma in the wake of the US 
helicopter crash: The government’s response] Okinawa Times, August 17, 2004, p. 1. 
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countries, who would then make recommendations to the US-Japan Joint Committee 
overseeing US military affairs in the country.83  
In this way the helicopter crash was reduced to a technical legal problem in the 
two countries’ security arrangement, the solution for which became diplomatic 
attention to the finer points of the SOFA. That both governments used the Futenma 
helicopter crash to renew their push for a new air base and related facilities on 
Okinawa—a plan that had, by 2004, all but stalled in the face of widespread 
resistance—draws attention to how such crises and the terms within which they are 
dealt actually facilitate militarization. 
 
 
“Making lemonade”: Rape and the SACO Agreement 
While maintaining existing military operations is the military’s overriding 
goal when their effects generate a crisis, these moments are often used by the US and 
Japanese governments as opportunities to further plans that would otherwise be 
difficult or impossible. The 1996 plan to build the Henoko air base itself came 
directly out of such a crisis. It was among a sweeping set of changes that emerged 
rapidly out of negotiations between the US and Japanese governments following the 
September 5, 1995 abduction, beating and gang rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan 
schoolgirl by three US servicemen. The public outcry over the rape incident reached a 
level not seen since Okinawa’s reincorporation into Japan. 85,000 people gathered in 
Ginowan City to protest the rape and demand the removal of US forces. Like the 
August 2004 helicopter crash, local anger also stemmed from officials’ handling of 
the incident. Military commanders in Okinawa steadfastly refused to turn over the 
three suspects to local authorities, citing a SOFA clause that allows US service 
                                                
83 David Allen, “Committee to review handling of accidents” Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, 
September 18, 2004. Retrieved September 20, 2004 from 
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=24423. 
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members accused of a crime to remain in US military custody until indicted. Admiral 
Richard C. Macke, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific drew fresh anger one 
week after the rape when he publicly commented, “I think that [the rape] was 
absolutely stupid. For the price they paid to rent the car, they could have had a girl 
[i.e. prostitute].”84 Macke was forced to resign from his post.  
US and Japanese officials responded in two ways to the widespread anger and 
protests. The first was the usual approach of reducing the problem to a technical legal 
matter, the solution to which is always “strengthening” the Status of Forces 
Agreement. Both governments vowed to revisit SOFA provisions regarding custody 
of military personnel accused of crimes. This eventually led to what Chalmers 
Johnson (2003) called a “flexible application” of the SOFA rather than an actual 
revision. The US agreed to transfer any US service member suspected of “especially 
heinous crimes,” such as murder and rape, to local authorities before indictment.  
 The second response linked the rape with ongoing talks over the future of US 
forces in Japan. Calling for “sustained bilateral attention,” the two governments 
convened a “Special Action Committee on Okinawa” (SACO) to discuss the future of 
US military presence in the islands. Like the first response, the second excluded 
Okinawans, elected and otherwise, from participation. The SACO process led to a 
bilateral summit between then US Ambassador Walter Mondale and Prime Minister 
Hashimoto Ry!taro in April 1996. Borrowing a line from the first page of the SACO 
Report, the two leaders announced with great fanfare a multi-year plan intended to 
“reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa.”85 They emphasized their agreement to 
consolidate and close a number of US facilities and installations. But the report also 
                                                
84 Irvin Molotsky, “Admiral Has to Quit Over His Comments On Okinawa Rape,” The New York Times, 
November 18, 1995. 
85 See Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) 
Interim Report,” April 15, 1996. Retrieved September 3, 2006 from www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/security/seco.html. 
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provided for an equal number of “relocations” and “replacements,” which ensured 
that military functions and related infrastructure identified in the report would be 
upgraded, within either existing US facilities or entirely new sites.  
The most significant and controversial part of the plan was the closure of 
Futenma Air Station. This was controversial because SACO called for the 
construction of a “replacement facility” to be built in the shallow waters of Henoko 
Bay, located on Okinawa’s rural northeast coast. The SACO report notes other 
options were considered, such as incorporating Futenma’s military functions into the 
Air Force’s Kadena Air Base or constructing a heliport within the Marine Corps’ 
Camp Schwab (already located on Cape Henoko). But building a brand new base and 
related training facilities was “judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced 
safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people.”86 Adding to the controversy was 
the US government’s condition for closing Futenma. Citing national and joint security 
imperatives, the US made it clear that Futenma base, despite its dangerous location in 
the center of Ginowan City, would not be closed until the construction of a new air 
base elsewhere in Okinawa was completed and operational. 
Suspicious of the two government’s ability to arrive at such sweeping 
decisions in just a matter of months following the September 1995 rape, architect and 
anti-base activist Makishi Yoshikazu convened a study group with other Okinawan 
anti-base activists to examine the SACO plan in depth. “The SACO Agreement does 
not lessen the burden of the bases on Okinawans. It shifts the burden from one part of 
the island to another,” Makishi argued as he showed me documents uncovered by the 
study group. “Taken as a whole, it cements our burden.”87  
                                                
86 See Section 1, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air 
Station,” (December 2, 1996). Retrieved September 3, 2006 from: www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/security/96saco2.html. 
87 Personal notes, July 14, 2004. 
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Despite the randomness with which facilities and areas are listed in the report, 
Makishi (2004) observed that the targeted facilities fell into three general groups, 
which shed light on longer-term plans. The first group consists of outdated facilities 
slated for “relocation” to existing installations, where they would be newly rebuilt.88 
The second group consists of two major installations, the Navy’s Naha Military Port 
and the Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station. Despite official representations of the 
Pentagon’s sudden agreement to close these facilities as a response to the “demands 
of the Okinawan people,” the study group demonstrated that the US had long planned 
to relocate both facilities within Okinawa. Makishi cites the US military’s lack of an 
official long-range “master plan” for Futenma, which it has for its other installations 
in Okinawa.89 A set of documents discovered in 2001 by the late Miyagi Etsujiro, also 
a member of the SACO study group, expose the US military’s long-held plan to build 
a military complex at Henoko. They show that Henoko was among sites surveyed in 
1965 in the military’s search for a suitable site to build a new air base by means of 
land reclamation. Two 1966 designs based on the survey reveal plans for a 3000-
meter long runway in the shallow waters along Henoko’s coastline (see figure 3.5), 
and an adjacent naval port in neighboring Oura Bay (see figure 3.6).  
 
                                                
88 These included facilities originally constructed more than 40 years earlier: The Naval Hospital, Sobe 
and Senaha Communication Stations, and housing units in both Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran. 
89 Citing Hiromichi Umebayashi’s 1994 study, The US Military in Okinawa and the Freedom of 
Information Act, Makishi points out that although the US military has official medium and long-term 
“master plans” regarding the maintenance and modernization of base functions for Kadena, Camp 
Schwab and the rest of its bases in Okinawa, specifically, Makishi notes that “a master plan does not 
exist” for Futenma Air Station. 
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Figure 3.5 1966 US military map of offshore air base plan. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 1966 US military map of offshore air base and naval port plan for Henoko 
and Oura Bays. 
  
Finally, the third grouping the SACO report identifies includes the return of 
parts of the Northern Training Area, the Aha Training Area and the Ginbaru Training 
Area. These three occupy a significant proportion of Okinawa’s forested mountainous 
northern region and are used by the military for jungle warfare and related training. 
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Under the SACO Agreement, helicopter landing zones in Aha and Ginbaru would be 
relocated to the Northern Training Area, which is notable for its proximity to Henoko. 
New and larger-than-average helipads will be built to serve as flight training facilities 
for the proposed Henoko air base. The larger size is needed to house the military’s 
new MV-22 Osprey, a combination fixed-wing and collapsible rotor aircraft that 
remains controversial because of frequent fatal crashes during its development.90 
Incorporation of the MV-22 represents an expansion of Futenma’s existing mission.91  
Although the design for the new air base has changed over time—from a 
“removable” floating sea-based facility to a fixed air base constructed on landfill—all 
versions involve massive destruction of a diverse yet fragile eco-system of coral reefs, 
coastal tideland and the habitats of several endangered species endemic to Okinawa 
Island. In addition to the Okinawa dugong, or sea manatee, whose primary feeding 
ground is the seagrass bed in Henoko Bay, the proposed new enlarged helipads meant 
for the MV-22 threaten the habitat of the Okinawa Rail, a flightless bird, and the 
Noguchigera Woodpecker. Marine experts warn that the combination of the 
construction and ongoing operations of the base will also destroy the fishing resources 
well beyond the immediate site, irreversibly impacting nearby coastal 
communities’cultural and economic relationship with the sea. 
Despite the predicted impact of the project, like the two governments’ response 
to the helicopter crash, the language of the SACO plan also reflects the routinely 
Orwellian character of official representations of US military presence in Okinawa. 
US and Japanese officials initially referred to the Henoko project as a “heliport,” 
                                                
90 See page 17, Department of Defense, “Operational Requirements and Concept of Operations for 
MCAS Futenma Relocation, Okinawa, Japan, Final Draft.” Washington, D.C, 1997. 
91 Based on several interviews with Makishi Yoshikazu, mostly between June and September, 2004. See 
also Makishi, “Issues Pertaining to the Construction of an Offshore Base in Henoko, Okinawa.” Report 
presented at the International Workshop on Military Activities and the Environment, Seoul, South 
Korea, August 2004. 
  105 
evoking images of a small facility, though in reality it would be over a mile in length. 
The construction of a new, state-of-the-art air base to assume the military operations 
of 50-year old Futenma base is formally designated as a “replacement facility” (daitai 
shisetsu) whose “relocation” (itten) from Ginowan is aimed at “ensuring the safety of 
Okinawans.” In this way, military build-up becomes a “reduction of the burden of US 
bases on Okinawa.” To this day, officials from both governments only ever refer to the 
Henoko project as a replacement facility for the relocation of Futenma’s functions, and 
steadfastly maintain that the plan is a response to Okinawan frustrations.  
That Okinawan frustrations and the rape itself were seen as opportunities to 
accomplish broader political and military goals is made explicit in the 2009 memoir of 
retired Air Force General Richard B. Myers, who was Commander of U.S. Forces in 
Japan from November 1993 to June 1996. He recalls how “the US government used 
the rape incident to work with the Japanese government toward moving our relations 
with Japan forward” (Myers and McConnell 2009:95). Myers, who is better known for 
his role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during George W. Bush’s first term, 
points to US gains and accomplishments as a result of the rape. In particular, the 
“public clamor over the Okinawa rape was an ideal catalyst to bring [Mondale and 
Hashimoto] together.” Given persistent questions by civilian leaders about 
maintaining such a large US military presence in East Asia five years after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, “among the summit’s notable achievements was a joint 
declaration that reaffirmed American military presence in Asia was ‘essential for 
preserving peace and stability’.” This led to a “break though” in US-Japanese 
“bilateral military planning.” Repeating official representations of SACO, the general 
notes the need “to try to lessen the burden of the people of Okinawa” and lists only the 
base closures the US agreed to in the negotiations. Although like most US officials he 
leaves out the range of state-of-the-art facilities the US military gained in the SACO 
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agreement, even the new air base, these must have been in Myer’s mind as he wrote 
that the SACO process “helped smooth Japanese feelings but did not weaken 
America’s position” (emphasis in original). “Back in Kansas,” he concludes, “they’d 
call that making lemonade out of lemons” (2009:95-96).  
Thus while hailed by the two governments as an altruistic response to 
unprecedented Okinawan anger and mobilization, what became known as the “SACO 
agreement” was a blueprint for the modernization and overall strengthening of US 
military capabilities on the island.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that, for Okinawans, experiences of US military 
presence are inseparable from one’s experience of being Okinawan and, for those 
growing up after 1972, inseparable from one’s experience of being a Japanese citizen. 
Although the everyday effects of US military presence remained the same, the impact 
of Japanese citizenship on Okinawans’ experience of US basing and on the anti-base 
movement was and remains significant. Citizenship creates cover for greater power 
relations and new forms of exploitation under internal colonial basing. For the US and 
Japan, Okinawans’ citizenship had more to do with extending the US-Japan Security 
Treaty to the islands than it did with providing Okinawans with channels of 
representation and protection. When military practices generate crises not easily 
managed through institutionalized channels of redress, the treaty over-determines 
outcomes. So although the effects of US military occupation are experienced bodily 
and psychologically by Okinawans in their everyday lives, problems are redefined 
within the framework of the treaty such that their solutions cannot be found or 
determined locally, but rather only in intergovernmental negotiation and decision-
making. 
  107 
However, what General Myers and other US and Japanese officials 
overestimated was their ability to push through the SACO plan as a solution, under the 
guise of “lessening the burden” on the Okinawan people. The promised closure of 
Futenma and parts of other smaller bases did not obscure the fact that the plan made 
possible the upgrading of several facilities, and the construction of an entirely new 
major military base. Critically, the far-reaching scope of the SACO plan raised the 
specter of the US remaining in Okinawa indefinitely—a prospect never imagined by 
those who sought to end American occupation by attaining Japanese citizenship. 
Fueled by the surge in anti-base sentiment following the rape, the SACO agreement 
set off a wave of political struggle that has continued for more than a decade. In the 
following chapter I look more closely at the now 13-year long struggle in order to 
understand its impact on activists’ experience and perception of their citizen relations.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE FUTENMA-HENOKO STRUGGLE 
 
“Of course I was happy to tell them I didn’t want another US military base in 
Okinawa. I told each person who came that if ANP! is really as important to Japan 
as they say, then Yamatonch#
92
 should be pleased to accept some of tiny Okinawa’s 
US bases in Japan.” 
 
~ A resident of Okinawa’s Henoko village, describing the persistence of Japan’s 
Defense Agency employees who were went door-to-door before the referendum to 
convince residents to accept the new military base.93  
 
 “We weren’t just fighting against the US and Japanese governments. We found 
ourselves competing with the local chamber of Commerce, business leaders, owners 
of construction companies, and those residents who were struggling to make ends 
meet. Claims by conservative politicians and business leaders led many residents to 
think that maybe the new air base was the answer to Yanbaru’s problems, even 
Okinawa’s problems….After such a long time, it is hard to believe that the bases can 
still be seen as a solution to Okinawa’s problems.” 
 
~ 71-year old journalist, writer and activist Yui Akiko, recalling the social divisions 
that emerged amongst Okinawans in the run-up to the Nago City referendum on the 
proposed new base in Henoko Bay.94  
 
“We cannot trust the Japanese government and Japanese politicians to make any 
effort on behalf of Okinawa if it goes against Japan’s interests or jeopardizes Japan-
US relations.”  
 
Iha Yoichi, mayor of Ginowan City, explaining why he sought to circumvent national 
channels of representation, instead leading a delegation of Ginowan residents to 
Washington D.C. three times. He met directly with American lawmakers and officials 
at the Departments of State and Defense to discuss the lack of progress on the 1996 
agreement to close Futenma Air Station.95 
 
                                                
92 Yamatonch# is the Okinawan word for a Japanese person or the Japanese people. 
93 Personal interview, November 10, 2004. 
94 Personal interview, April 14, 2005.  
95 Personal interview, July 12, 2005. 
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Introduction 
The 1995 rape incident and subsequent SACO agreement provoked broad anti-
base sentiment in Okinawa, setting off a wave of activism not seen since the reversion 
movement. In contrast to the countless campaigns waged by activists since 1972, the 
campaign that emerged around the proposal to “relocate” Futenma elsewhere on 
Okinawa Island has the added significance of attempting to stop what would be the 
first new major military installation constructed on the island in over 50 years. The 
specter of yet another half-century, or more, of American occupation has engendered 
unprecedented actions. For the first time since reversion, an Okinawan governor 
refused to sign over private land leased by the Japanese government for the US 
military. Anti-base activists initiated citizen referendums—the first in Japan’s 
history—in which the Henoko proposal was voted down, and nine out of ten 
Okinawans expressed a desire to see the bases closed immediately or reduced over 
time. Within just a few years, however, for the first time in Okinawa’s history, 
Okinawan officials and voters accepted the construction of the new US military base 
on Cape Henoko.  
What led to this outcome? Why would Okinawans elect pro-base officials, 
when polls consistently indicate that the vast majority of them would prefer to see the 
bases gone? How are the conditions of internal colonial basing reflected in the way 
the campaign has unfolded, and vice versa? How has the course of this particular 
campaign, which has lasted 13 years and engendered some of the most politically and 
economically coercive actions on the part of the Japanese government, shaped the 
demilitarization movement? In what ways has the Futenma-Henoko struggle 
contributed to a reevaluation of activists’ perception of their citizen relations? 
This chapter seeks to further the previous chapter’s inquiry into how internal 
colonial basing is accomplished. I do so by focusing more closely on the Futenma-
  110 
Henoko struggle, considering in particular how the heightened political contestation 
over the SACO agreement merges with everyday experiences of American military 
presence. From the previous chapter, I draw especially on three insights regarding the 
centrality of citizen relations to the maintenance of internal colonial basing. First, that 
the intervention of the bases into everyday routines and relationships contributes to 
the sense of US presence as a normal part of Okinawans’ citizenship. Second, that the 
institutions associated with citizenship make Okinawans themselves party to the 
management of the bases. Finally, that Okinawans’ membership in the Japanese state 
extends the US-Japan security treaty to the Ry!ky!s, which, because of Tokyo’s 
deference to the treaty, over-determines the way base effects are dealt with in the 
Okinawan context.   
Focusing in particular on the political economy of US military presence, this 
chapter demonstrates how structures of economic dependence put in place after 
reversion are integral to Tokyo’s stepped-up political pressure in the face of 
widespread opposition to the SACO plan. The Futenma-Henoko struggle epitomizes 
how US military presence is maintained via a complicated arrangement of political 
coercion and exclusion, conditional economic inducements and the ability to create 
ambivalence and divisions within the Okinawan community.  
 The politics surrounding this struggle furthers our understanding of how the 
legitimation of internal colonial basing is at once state-driven and socially reproduced 
amongst Okinawans themselves. Pervasive representations of the Okinawa economy 
as being dependent on the bases reinforce everyday experiences of most Okinawans, 
whose economic well being, or that of their community or someone they know, is 
connected to US military presence. So while polls routinely show that most 
Okinawans would like the bases gone or reduced, political pressure and structures of 
dependence routinely give way to resignation about their place in Okinawa’s future 
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and everyday forms of acceptance. In recent years, Okinawan officials and an 
occasional majority of voters have accepted the construction of a new US military 
base on the island—for the first time in the Okinawa’s history. At the same time, the 
increasingly coercive tactics and deepening structural dependence characterizing 
internal colonial basing today also contributes to increasing disillusionment amongst 
activists in the efficacy of resolving Okinawa’s problems via the rights of citizenship 
and within the national context. This is reflected in sustained civil disobedience and 
transnational forms of activism. 
 I begin the chapter by charting the rise of activism in the wake of the rape and 
the central government’s early responses, situating this contention within a broader 
geopolitical context that amplified the sense of crisis on both sides. I then explore how 
Tokyo’s attempts to compel Okinawans to accept the new base intertwine with the 
post-1972 “base economy.” This directs my attention to the divisions and ambivalence 
anti-base activists find themselves up against, in this campaign and more generally. 
The second half of the chapter focuses on increasingly coercive measures Japanese 
leaders are compelled to take in the face of activists’ persistence, and how this has 
impacted activists’ perceptions and strategies. I conclude with a discussion of how 
American and Japanese leaders have dealt with the crisis emerging out of the 
Futenma-Henoko campaign. 
 
Upsetting the status quo 
Within the broader anti-base sentiment engendered by both the rape incident 
and SACO agreement, a new generation of activists, particularly women, began 
questioning the “normality” of US military presence. This growing popular anti-base 
sentiment created the necessary conditions for Okinawan officials to also take bold 
steps in challenging the status quo. The combination of both popular and official 
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action became a real concern for US and Japanese officials alike as the two 
governments engaged in high-level talks regarding their post-Cold War security 
relationship—the greatest physical manifestation of which was facing the greatest 
challenge to its legitimacy since 1972.  
Fueling the upswing in popular mobilization following the rape and during the 
SACO process was the disclosure earlier in 1995 of US plans to maintain its troop 
levels in Asia, including Okinawa. The end of the Cold War had led to discussions 
within Congress and the Clinton Administration about a probable reduction in the 
number of US troops in the region. Official intimations led to widespread 
expectations of such a “peace dividend” in Okinawa and the rest of Japan, which were 
heightened by commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War 
Two. However in its February 1995 Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific 
Region, the Pentagon spelled out a rationale for maintaining 100,000 US troops in 
East Asia, which amounted to maintaining its existing forces in South Korea and 
Japan (Department of Defense 1995). Known as the “Nye Report” after its author, 
international relations scholar Joseph Nye, the report eventually had widespread 
influence among policy makers and is cited as a pivotal trigger in the reversal of 
previous plans to reduce troop levels in the region (Johnson 1996; Smith 2003).  
Okinawan women in particular reenergized and grew the anti-base movement 
(Angst 2001; Takazato 1999; Akibayashi 2002; Yui 2004). Women had been 
organizing around the gendered dimensions of US military presence since the 1970s, 
which was in turn a continuation of their deep involvement in the reversion movement 
(Naples and Desai 2002:248-250). In fact a delegation of women from Okinawa was 
attending the NGO forum at the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women at the 
time of the rape. However, “the ‘95 rape woke many more people up,” explained 
Takazato Suzuyo, four-term Naha City councilmember, long-time activist and 
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founder of the group Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV) 
and the women’s advocacy and community center Space Yui. She recalled: 
 
“It was too much for Uchinanch!. It made us ask ourselves, and one 
another, if this is what we want for our future. Japanese and Americans 
expect us to endure for the sake of their so-called ‘national security,’ 
but of course the question becomes, what about our security? That 
[1995 rape] incident made international news because it was 
particularly disturbing, given the age of the girl and multiple assailants, 
the kidnapping and so on. But rape and sexual violence and other 
crimes happen all the time here, and Uchinanch! know it. Most crimes 
of sexual violence go unreported. So suddenly Uchinanch!, especially 
women, were asking ourselves anew, did we really want to continue 
putting up with US forces forever? Because this is what we were 
facing.”96  
 
As Akibayashi (2002, ch 1) highlights in her research on OWAAMV, establishing the 
organization and making it an immediate, visible presence in the months following 
the 1995 rape was itself an act of “breaking the silence.” Official reports estimate 
American military personnel and civilian contractors committed 5,394 crimes against 
Okinawans between 1972 and 2005, with 533 designated as “heinous crimes.” Out of 
the 5,394 crimes reported, 678 suspects were arrested (Okinawa prefecture 2005).  
Nearly all Okinawan activists I interviewed shared a version of Takazato’s 
description of “waking up.” Most told me that it was a specific event$a crime by a 
US soldier or a significant accident or incident related to military operations$that 
“opened their eyes” (me ga sameta) to the bases and led them to question the 
normality of US military’s presence in Okinawa. For Ueshiro Masako, like most 
interviewees now in their late twenties to early forties, the moment that made her 
“see” the bases was the 1995 rape. “It wasn’t really until then that I noticed the bases 
as profoundly strange. Once I realized how strange, and how wrong, it was for the US 
                                                
96 Personal interview, March 5, 2005. 
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military to be in Okinawa, I started wondering why Uchinanch! had to put up with 
most of Japan’s US bases.”97  
For construction worker-turned-eco tour guide Higashionna Takuma, who is 
in his late forties, it was the specter of a massive new air base in neighboring Henoko 
Bay that spurred him to become a central figure in the campaign against it. “I grew up 
looking at the back side of Camp Schwab,” he said, referring to the Marine Corps 
base that has occupied Cape Henoko since 1956. Higashionna lives in a small village 
on Oura Bay, on the other side of the cape from Henoko Bay. “Camp Schwab had 
always been there, and I always thought of the bases as a source of jobs. But then I 
realized that I didn’t want my kids to lose the life we have here. An air base so close 
would completely destroy the sea, all the marine life. I’ve since learned how rich and 
diverse the sea life is in Oura and Henoko Bays. It would destroy all of it.” 
Such popular sentiments buoyed oppositional action within formal political 
channels as well. Exactly one month after the rape, then Okinawa Governor Ota 
Masahide sent another shockwave into the already politically charged environment. In 
his role as governor he refused to sign lease agreements on behalf of the roughly 
33,000 Okinawans whose land is occupied by the US military. Unlike mainland Japan, 
where the land used by US forces belongs to the central government, US bases in 
Okinawa are on private lands appropriated by force during and after World War Two. 
In 1972 the Japanese government began leasing these lands for the US military’s use, 
with the governor of Okinawa Prefecture designated as proxy signatory on behalf of 
landowners. Ota’s action raised the possibility that Japan would fail to meet this core 
obligation of its security arrangement with the US, at a time when the two countries’ 
post-Cold War relationship had grown tense over trade imbalances and what the US 
saw as Japan’s responsibility to contribute more to the military arrangement. Prime 
                                                
97 Personal interview. March 3, 2005. 
  115 
Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro acted swiftly in filing a lawsuit against Ota. It was the 
first time in Japan’s history that the central government resorted to court action 
against a prefectural leader.  
With the lawsuit pending and US and Japanese officials two months into their 
bilateral SACO negotiations over Okinawa’s future, Ota remained emboldened by the 
increasingly widespread anti-base feelings amongst Okinawans (Yonetani 2001). In 
January 1996 his administration preempted the SACO agreement with a plan that 
would move Okinawa in the opposite direction, the “Action Program for the Return of 
U.S. Military Bases.” The three-stage program spelled out a plan to realize the 
withdrawal of all US military forces from the prefecture by 2015. Ota’s plan was to 
advance the Action Program in conjunction with his administration’s “Promotion of 
the Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept,” which set out a comprehensive plan to 
reorganize the economy of a demilitarized Okinawa toward trade with its immediate 
neighbors in the region$its main trading partners in centuries past. It was this kind of 
vision that had put Ota Masahide in the governorship in the first place. Elected in 
1990 on a platform to close the American bases, Ota was not only well regarded for 
his critical scholarship on Okinawa’s colonial history and wartime experiences, he 
also tapped into collective historical memories of a vibrant Ry!ky! Kingdom. Ota’s 
vision of Okinawa’s future resonated with the increasingly politicized notions of 
Okinawan identity, which I explore in the following chapter, and the increasing 
frustration amongst Okinawans toward US military presence. 
Tokyo stepped up its pressure following Ota’s rejection of the SACO plan to 
build a new base within the prefecture. Prime Minister Hashimoto’s administration 
pushed the Supreme Court to move quickly on its lawsuit against the governor. 
Rejecting an appeal by Ota, the court found in favor of the Japanese government on 
August 28, 1996. Ota was undeterred. In order to prove that he spoke for all 
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Okinawans$not just the socialists and communists among them, as his detractors 
often suggested$he called a prefecture-wide plebiscite on US military presence. It 
was the first referendum of its kind in the country, and perhaps not surprising that it 
occurred in the only place within present-day Japan that had a truly popular 
democratization movement. On September 8, 89.9% of Okinawans called for either 
immediate or a step-by-step removal of all US bases. The plebiscite gave Ota a clear 
mandate to continue pushing the US and Japanese governments on the issue of US 
military presence. But in a surprising turn of events the governor’s political undoing 
came just five days later.  Again facing the choice of signing the lease agreements on 
behalf of Okinawan landowners, Ota gave in to Hashimoto in exchange for support of 
his Okinawan Cosmopolitan City initiative, which had been sidelined from its 
inception without support from Tokyo (Yonetani 2001). The sense of betrayal felt by 
Ota’s long-time supporters, particularly among anti-base activists, reverberates to this 
day.  
 Athough Ota’s capitulation was a coup for Tokyo, and by extension the US, it 
could not erase the results of the plebiscite and the growing popular opposition to the 
SACO plan and the status quo. With Henoko Bay designated as the location for the 
new offshore air base, the Nago City Council declared its opposition. Mobilizing as 
the Coalition for Realizing a Nago City Referendum, residents against the base 
project successfully gathered the required signatures to put the new base plan to a 
city-wide plebiscite.  
Despite its non-binding nature, the Nago plebiscite took on huge significance, 
mobilizing anti-base activists from around the island, conservative pro-base 
politicians and business leaders, as well as government officials and employees. 
Especially active from elsewhere on the island were residents of Ginowan City. “I 
think the US and Japanese governments thought that [Ginowan residents] would be 
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satisfied with the closure of Futenma, and not care if someone else had to accept this 
burden,” recalled Shimabukuro Junko, who lives a few hundred meters from Futenma 
Air Station. “So it’s been important for us to voice our solidarity with the people in 
Nago. The US government’s conditions for Futenma’s closure are unforgiveable.”  
 In an unprecedented demonstration of political pressure, the prime minister 
visited Okinawa and Nago. He also sent his chief cabinet secretary and director 
generals of Japan’s Defense Agency (JDA) and the Okinawa Development Agency. 
The JDA then mobilized two hundred employees—most of whom were Okinawan—
from its Okinawa headquarters, housing them in a Nago City hotel for ten days before 
the plebiscite. They went door-to-door trying to convince Nago residents to vote in 
favor of the air base project, handing out color brochures exclaiming, “Henoko’s 
Offshore Airbase Will Be Safe and Revitalize the Northern Region!”98 The JDA 
employees warned residents of a bleak economic future if the city did not welcome 
the new air base. An elderly Henoko resident recalled their persistence: 
 
“It seemed like almost every day someone from the [JDA’s Naha 
Defense Facilities Administration Bureau] would come to my home 
and ask if I had decided which way I would vote. I finally stopped 
answering my door the week before it was held. Of course I was happy 
to tell them I didn’t want another US military base in Okinawa. I told 
each person who came that if ANP" is really as important to Japan as 
they say, then Yamatonch# should be pleased to accept some of tiny 
Okinawa’s US bases in Japan. But they made me tired so I stopped 
answering the door.”99 
 
Accusations of political pressure, subterfuge and lies on the part of the pro-
base faction and the JDA abound. Anti-base activists charge Defense Agency 
employees with making misleading statements and telling outright lies during public 
                                                
98 Personal interview with Ashitomi Hiroshi, July 24, 2004. 
99 Personal interview, November 10, 2004. 
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meetings at citizens’ residential councils (jichikai) in the days leading up to the 
plebiscite, particularly in relation to what the government knew about the kind of 
military functions the new US base would host (Makishi 2004). Many activists 
recalled the confusing language in the plebiscite ballot itself, which was the result of 
political maneuvering by Nago’s conservative leaders. By April 1997, they had given 
their conditional approval to the plan (Inoue, Purves and Selden 1997). Even though 
the December plebiscite would be officially non-binding, Nago’s pro-base mayor, 
Higa Tetsuya, and several pro-base city council members initially balked at holding 
the referendum, fearing that a clear vote against the base plan would make its 
realization more difficult. Threatened with a recall by the Coalition, the officials 
agreed to the plebiscite, but complicated the process by insisting on a ballot offering 
four choices: 1) support; 2) support, subject to measures taken to ensure 
environmental protection and economic rejuvenation; 3) oppose; and 4) oppose, if 
measures are not taken to ensure environmental protection and economic 
rejuvenation.100  
By including the suggestive option of conditional support, pro-base officials 
and their supporters hoped to exploit existing divisions within Okinawan society. For 
although the rape and the SACO plan further awakened the anti-base sentiment that 




Division, dependence and ambivalence 
 The struggle over the SACO plan illustrates the political economy of internal 
colonial basing. In particular, it sheds light on how structures of economic 
dependence shape, and are shaped by, a strong sense of ambivalence toward US 
                                                
100 Personal interview with Ashitomi Hiroshi, July 24, 2004. 
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military presence. Representations of Okinawa’s economic dependence on the bases 
resonate with Okinawans’ everyday experiences and collective perceptions. The 
promise of a reenergized economy, especially in the island’s rural north, add to the 
ambivalence and resignation many Okinawans feel about the US military’s place in 
the territory’s future. The US and Japanese governments rely significantly on such 
perceptions and the ambivalence it generates to help legitimize the bases. 
By all accounts, the year leading up to the December 1997 plebiscite in Nago 
City was marked by deep conflict within the community. “We weren’t just fighting 
against the US and Japanese governments,” explains 71-year old journalist Yui 
Akiko.  
 
“We found ourselves competing with the local chamber of Commerce, 
business leaders, owners of construction companies, and those residents 
who were struggling to make ends meet. Claims by conservative 
politicians and business leaders led many residents to think that maybe 
the new air base was the answer to Yanbaru’s problems, even 
Okinawa’s problems….After such a long time, it is really hard to 
believe that the bases can still be seen as a solution to Okinawa’s 
problems, when most of the problems are because of the bases. But 
perhaps this way of thinking persists precisely because Okinawa’s 
economy has been tied into the bases for such a long time. Uchinanch! 
can’t imagine how it could change. In the run up to the plebiscite, some 
people said to me, ‘In the end, what will struggling accomplish?’ At the 
same time, I think there are many people who worry about what would 
happen if it did change.”101 
 
As Yui’s description suggests, six and a half decades of foreign military 
occupation despite six and a half decades of struggle has led to a palpable sense of 
resignation and ambivalence amongst the general public. The everydayness of the 
effects of the bases normalizes their physical, psychological and ecological toll as 
much as it normalizes the presence of the bases themselves$and Okinawan resistance 
                                                
101 Personal interview, April 14, 2005.  
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to them. Nakashima Yoshio, a 59-year old owner of a used electronics shop near 
Futenma expresses his skepticism about the US military leaving:  
 
“Will the bases go? No, I don’t think so. People protest and protest. I 
myself protested for years, for a very long time, but I realized I could 
spend the rest of my life protesting and the bases would probably still 
be here. Of course I don’t want the US military here, but now I just 
think, if it is going to be here, we might as well get at least some 
benefit from the bases.” 
 
Nakashima’s sense of resignation and urge to derive “at least some benefit” from the 
bases speak to how little the massive US military force is perceived as a source of 
protection. His sentiments also capture how the seeming inevitability of the bases has 
become tied psychologically to everyday needs and ambivalent ideas of how best to 
meet them.  
The poor state of Okinawa’s economy remains a key rhetorical weapon of 
conservative politicians and business leaders who support the Henoko plan and US 
military presence more generally. Okinawa’s GDP and per capita income levels are 
lowest among Japan’s forty-seven prefectures, with the average income at roughly 
70% of the national average, and Okinawan women’s incomes consistently lower still. 
The prefecture’s rate of unemployment ranks highest, at double the national 
average.102  
Under these circumstances, a perennial debate within Okinawa concerns the 
economic contribution of US military presence to the local economy. While 
proponents of the bases tend to broadcast a straightforward message of Okinawa’s net 
                                                
102 In 2006, the average annual income per resident of Okinawa prefecture was ¥2.09 million, in 
contrast to the national average of ¥3.07. In the same year, the unemployment rate in Okinawa 8.08%, 
the national average was 4.1%. See Bank of Japan, “Recent economic developments of Japan and 
Okinawa,” Naha Branch Office, 2006. Retrieved on July 2, 2009 from 
www3.boj.or.jp/naha/pdf/0021sitencyoukouen060901.pdf. For a more detailed look at the 
circumstances of Okinawan women, see Karen Lupardus and Higa Teruyuki, ‘A Statistical Approach to 
Women’s Labour in Okinawa, Japan,’ Sangyo Sogo Kenkyu 2 (1995), 49-86. 
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gain, critics point to a much more complicated story of dependence and distortion. It 
is difficult to deny the latter. Direct contribution by the US military to Okinawa’s 
economy has decreased dramatically in recent decades. Military build-up and waging 
wars in the region kept Okinawa’s economy afloat in the years immediately after the 
war, and still contributed well over half of Okinawa’s GDP through the 1960s. 
However this proportion dropped to roughly 15% by the late 1970s, and today the 
bases directly contribute only 5.5% to Okinawa’s GDP. In contrast, tourism 
contributes 23% (Okinawa Prefecture 2006). The emergence of Okinawa as a major 
tourist destination for Japanese in the 1980s coincided with a drop in off-base 
spending due to the decline in the US dollar’s purchasing power relative to the yen. 
More recently, a broader shift in how the US military provisions itself—it now 
“orders out” for most of what it needs on the island—and an effort to keep US 
servicemembers on base resulted in further declines in local spending.103  
Much more significant to Okinawa’s economy today is the indirect flow of 
“host nation support” for US military presence from Tokyo, which reflects the post-
reversion reorganization of local economic relations into a complicated structure of 
dependence on the central government (McCormack 2003). As Sheila Smith (2003) 
points out, Tokyo’s commitment to its alliance with the US and to a “common” global 
agenda has come to be measured, from the US government’s perspective, in what 
Japan pays to maintain US forces. In contrast to most of the United States’ overseas 
                                                
103 Consumption of local goods and services, both by the military and individual soldiers, traditionally 
made up a significant proportion of the military’s direct economic contribution. Even with Japan’s 
economic downturn in the 1990s, however, a still relatively strong yen kept off-base spending low. Two 
broader, related trends in Pentagon policy are surely also a factor in decreasing direct economic 
contribution from the bases. The first is the decision to make base life more pleasing by creating a city-
like infrastructure on many US military bases as part of the military’s efforts to reduce base-community 
tensions by reducing overall military-community interaction. The Pentagon now contracts with major 
restaurant chains, such as Chilis, Pizza Hut, McDonalds and Subway, provide all the commercial 
comforts of home away from home. The second is the Pentagon’s overall move to privatize the 
provision of military goods and services, which has led to outsourcing to chain restaurants and large 
military provider firms like Halliburton and Bechtel. 
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basing arrangements, Japan now pays a majority of the financial costs associated with 
maintaining US forces within its borders.104 These include all labor costs for Japanese 
citizens employed on the bases, most of the construction and upkeep of base 
infrastructure and base lands, the cost of leasing land from private landowners for use 
by US forces, as well as environmental clean-up costs if and when the US vacates an 
installation.105 Also very significant are payments designated for public works in 
towns and cities adjacent to US bases,106 and the regular injections of money 
represented by Tokyo as general “development” funds, which are understood by all to 
be conditional on Okinawans’ continued acceptance of the bases.107  
                                                
104 Beginning with the 1960 Status of Forces Agreement, Japan agreed to provide and maintain all 
“facilities and areas” used by US forces in Japan (USFJ). In 1978, after increasing US pressure on 
Japanese leaders throughout the 1970s, Japanese leaders agreed to broaden the scope of what the 
Japanese government would pay for. Continued pressure from the US has compelled Japanese leaders 
to broaden its support numerous times, including the following key changes: partial assumption of 
welfare costs for Japanese employed by USFJ (1978), establishment of the Facilities Improvement 
Program which provides funds for the maintenance and upgrade of facilities and areas provided to USFJ 
(1979), partial assumption of labor costs for Japanese employed by USFJ (1987), partial assumption of 
utility costs for USFJ (1991), assumption of USFJ training relocation costs (1996). Since 1987, the two 
governments have signed a series of Special Measures Agreements more formally establishing the 
scope of Japan’s support (See part III, chapter 2, section 3 of the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s 2008 
“Defense of Japan” White Paper. At 
www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2008/32Part3_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf.) 
105 It is standard US policy to ensure in its basing arrangements that it will not be responsible for 
environmental clean-up when it abandons a base, nor is it accountable for any related health issues. 
Article IV of the SOFA with Japan stipulates, “The United States is not obliged, when it returns 
facilities and areas to Japan on the expiration of this Agreement or at an earlier date, to restore the 
facilities and areas to the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United 
States armed forces, or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration.” Clean-up becomes the 
responsibility of the host government, but weak environmental and health standards and the inability or 
unwillingness to enforce such protections often come into play. See the 2000 International Grassroots 
Summit on Military Base Cleanup Summary Report for case studies from multiple countries regarding 
the environmental degradation communities face after the US military leaves. Retrieved August 5, 2004 
from Institute for Policy Studies web site, http://www.fpif.org/basecleanup/index.html. 
106 Since the late 1990s, public works constituted roughly ninety percent of centrally controlled funding 
to Okinawa (cited in Julia Yonetani, “Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theater.” Critical 
Asian Studies 33, 2001, p. 92). But spending figures for public works can be misleading. An economic 
consequence of reversion was the gradual dominance of Okinawa’s construction industry by a few large 
corporations based in Japan. Moreover, given the extent to which US military basing has intersected 
with broader moves to privatize the provision of military goods and services in Japan and the US. Due 
to the scale or particular specifications of military projects, the biggest US contracts typically go to 
these Japanese firms or multinational military provider firms, such as Bechtel and the Halliburton 
subsidiary KBR.  
107 For a thorough analysis of how Nago City and the Henoko proposal fit into “base economy” politics 
in Okinawa, see Miyagi Yasuhiro, “Okinawa and the Paradox of Public Opinion: Base Politics and 
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In the end, representations of Okinawa as dependent on US military presence 
rather than because of US military presence often hold sway. Even the basic 
economic measures of income and unemployment noted above demonstrate that 
substantial largesse from Tokyo and revenues from tourism and agriculture cannot 
make up for the over-determining effects of the bases. The noncontiguous occupation 
and control of 20% of Okinawan land by US installations distorts property values and 
makes impossible even nominally large-scale or spatially integrated economic 
strategies (Okinawa Prefecture 2001; McCormack 2003; Oshiro 2004). Despite this, 
representations of Okinawa as dependent on US military presence reinforce the lived 
experiences of most Okinawans whose own livelihood, or that of family members or 
friends, is somehow tied to the bases: shop and restaurant owners, automobile and 
used furniture dealers, real estate agents, employees of construction firms, employees 
on the bases, and so on.  
For this reason, contradictions abound. Although public opinion polls 
consistently show that the vast majority of Okinawans either want the US bases 
closed immediately or reduced steadily over time, Okinawans routinely elect “pro-
base” officials to consequential municipal and prefectural offices. It is also not so 
unusual to encounter anti-base activists who own land leased to the military—though 
this is often without their consent—or activists who work on the bases. The bases 
remain the second largest employer behind the prefectural government.108 Omine 
Nariko, a young indigenous rights activist who works at a pizza parlor on Kadena Air 
Base, explained, “It’s complicated, isn’t it? As an activist, I want the bases to 
                                                
Protest in Nago City, 1997-2007” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2007. Retrieved October 3, 2008 from 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Miyume-TANJI/2490. 
108 According to a 2005 report by US Forces Japan, for example, in 2002 U.S. bases in Okinawa 
employed 8,703 local residents. During the same year, local labor offices received over 22,000 
applications to work on the bases (cited in Eric Johnston, “Okinawa base issue not cut and dried with 
locals,” Japan Times, March 28, 2006. Retrieved April 4, 2006 from http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20060328a4.html). 
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disappear from Okinawa. In the meantime, I have to work. Because I speak a little 
English, I knew I could apply for a better paying job on one of the bases.”109 For 
Nariko and countless others, being “against the bases” does not mean one can easily 
eschew the opportunities they provide. 
Okinawans’ ambivalent acceptance of US military presence is thus borne of a 
desire to make life livable and shaped by living alongside the bases all one’s life. It 
reflects what Derek Sayer calls the “accomplishment of rule” through “everyday forms 
of moral accommodation” (1994:374). Sayer’s insights into the micropolitics of 
hegemony rest on the notion that state power comes from the implicit threat of 
coercion, rather than overt coercion. Although citizens may not consent to state 
policies, they routinely enact the rituals and practices that directly or indirectly sustain 
such policies in order to make their everyday lives bearable. In doing so, however, the 
individual and the society become disempowered in ways that state reliance on overt 
force may never accomplish.  
In this context, images of a reenergized, vibrant region on the one hand, and the 
continuation of a base-entrenched resource-siphoning stagnant economy on the other, 
amplified social divisions over the issue of the new base. This was further fueled by 
debates over the project’s ecological impact and moral arguments about facilitating US 
militarism. It was the promise of a ten-year, 100 billion yen ($40,000 per capita) 
“economic stimulus package” and the creation of jobs associated with the proposed 
new base that added to the ambivalence among Okinawans, especially residents in 
Okinawa’s rural, more impoverished northern region of Yanbaru. In the face of 
mobilization against the project by Nago residents and others across Okinawa, Tokyo’s 
economic incentive for development of the northern region grew from two to three 
billion yen to 150 billion yen just a week before the Nago plebiscite (McCormack 
                                                
109 Personal interview. April 14, 2005. 
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2003:103). Leaders of the Okinawan chapter of the Japan Trade Union Confederation 
(Rengo), a chapter long involved in anti-base activities, eventually dropped their 
opposition to the new base at Henoko. “Many in Nago say they don’t want the base but 
are afraid of opposing it too loudly because it would mean no central government funds 
for economic reform. It’s a kind of colonial mentality that you see not only in Nago, 
but also throughout Okinawa,” explained city councilmember Miyagi Yasuhiro (quoted 
in Johnston 2006). 
In my own interview with Mr. Miyagi, who leapt into the fray of base politics 
when Nago’s Henoko Bay was chosen as the site of the new base, he spoke about the 
effects of the struggle on his personal relationships, and how the historical 
relationship between Okinawa and Japan figures in tensions and conflict within 
Okinawa: 
 
“Although it’s been seven years since the [Nago city] plebiscite, 
sometimes I see people who were good friends of mine, but we haven’t 
really talked since then. We nod in the street and just continue on. And 
this is a common story from all over Okinawa. I don’t think this kind of 
effect of military bases is noticed much by outsiders.…The conflict that 
bases can bring to private relationships—families, friendships, 
workplaces and even whole communities—is common, even if one is 
not involved in the political arena directly. Base issues enter into all 
kinds of relationships and can really mess them up….I think social 
conflict over the bases has a particular heaviness in Okinawa, because 
for so long Uchinanch! fought together to join Japan. That struggle 
was successful, but what did success bring? The bases remained. So I 
think many Uchinanch! feel we were fooled into thinking that our 
problems would end with reversion. I think this affects people’s 
attitudes today. Maybe it makes people suspicious of others’ motives. 
Uchinanch! are tired and don’t want to be fooled anymore.”  
 
The divisions became especially pronounced in the tiny village of Henoko and 
surrounding villages. Both the construction and the operation of the air base, which 
would include an influx of roughly 2000 more Marines, would have an irreversible 
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effect on this rural area. As an inducement to persuade the local fishermen’s union to 
endorse the new base plan, funds were channeled from Tokyo to construct a large 
two-story union hall at the fishing port of Henoko Bay. The inducement worked, 
despite a dislike for US bases more generally amongst the fishermen. This had the 
effect of pitting local fishermen against local residents opposing the base plan, whose 
headquarters sits just 100 meters away from the new union hall.  
Ambivalence and division within Henoko village also stems in part from a 
certain pride some residents have in the relatively amiable relationship the village has 
had historically with nearby Camp Schwab (Ishikawa 1998), and collective memories 
of better economic times. The village, which now has a population of about one 
thousand, has shared Henoko Point with the US Marine Corps’ Camp Schwab for 
over fifty years. Older villagers talked of Henoko’s “boom time” during the wars in 
Korea and Vietnam, when soldiers stationed at Camp Schwab, and those rotating in 
and out of combat, would spend all their wages in Henoko’s bustling “Bar Street” 
filled with eateries, bars and behind-the-scenes brothels. Today this street and 
adjacent narrow alleyways are quiet, lined with shuttered storefronts. But faded 
English signs with names like “Bar Flamingo” and “The King’s Nightclub” evoke 
images of a different past, and of the potential for “reliving that boom time,” as one 
central Nago resident put it. 
Thus the depoliticizing effects I discuss in the previous chapter are 
compounded by the pervasive structural dependence created by interstate agreement 
and reproduced through Okinawans’ everyday relationships and livelihoods. The US 
and Japanese governments count on this kind of ambivalence and everyday forms of 
accommodation to hold sway in prefectural elections and more generally. When the 
effects of the bases cannot be managed locally in this way, however, officials of both 
governments know the US-Japan Security Treaty provides a means to frame problems 
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and solutions as technical matters of interstate diplomacy. They also know that Tokyo 
has the option of exchanging carrot for stick when democratic forces threaten 
continued US occupation.  
 
Democracy betrayed 
Successive Japanese leaders’ political and economic pressure intensified in 
response to each major demonstration of popular opposition to the Henoko project. 
Although the extent of coercion that Japanese leaders were willing to employ in the 
Okinawa context angered activists, the greater disappointment was the extent to 
which key Okinawan officials bowed to the pressure, because it made Okinawans 
party to US occupation in historically unprecedented ways. 
Tokyo’s year-long efforts to sway the outcome of the Nago city plebiscite 
suggest that, had Nago residents voted in favor of the air base, the central government 
would have hailed the outcome as a legitimate and democratically expressed 
endorsement of the project. But when residents voted the project down in December 
1997 (given the four options on the ballot, 2,562 unambiguously favored the heliport 
and 16,254 voted unambiguously against it), the Japanese government immediately 
dismissed the results of the plebiscite as non-binding and therefore of no consequence 
to the progress on the Henoko base. Although Tokyo’s response did not surprise 
activists, the response of Nago’s mayor shocked them. Higa Tetsuya had publically 
committed to act in accordance with the plebiscite outcome. Immediately following 
the vote, Prime Minister Hashimoto called the mayor to Tokyo for a meeting at the 
former’s residence. After the meeting Higa announced his official acceptance of the 
base project and promptly resigned as mayor of Nago.110  
                                                
110 For an insightful analysis of the politics of the Nago plebiscite and its implications for Okinawan 
consciousness, see Inoue Masamichi, “Nago City Referendum: Constructing Okinawan Citizenship,” 
chapter 6 in Okinawa and the U.S. military: identity making in the Age of Globalization. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007. 
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Yui Akiko (2004) captured the historical implications of the mayor’s 
announcement. “Until that time, U.S. bases in Okinawa were all imposed by outside 
forces, the U.S. and Japanese governments, against the will of the Okinawan 
people….[Okinawan officials’ acceptance of the base] amounts to a denial of one’s 
own history, the history of the war and of the long post-war struggle for peace” (p. 8). 
Yui returned to this in our interview: 
 
“I worry about how Uchinanch! youth interpreted [Okinawan 
politicians’] acceptance of the new base. They have no experience of 
wartime, only stories of their elders and history lessons and school trips 
to Himeyuri.111 They have grown up living with the problems of the 
bases, but their more immediate problem may be finding a descent 
job…. Why shouldn’t they see the bases as a potential solution when 
their Uchinanch! elders tie Okinawa’s economy to its militarization? 
[Mayor] Higa, [Governor] Inamine and other officials’ acceptance of 
the new base at Henoko sent a very different message to Uchinanch! 
youth. The message was ‘the past doesn’t matter anymore.’”112 
 
 Okinawan activists often draw connections between Okinawa’s wartime 
experience and continued American military presence, but older activists who 
experienced the war make them more frequently and more compellingly. Their 
narratives dislodge military power, and even any economic benefit gained from the 
bases, as sources of security. Elderly residents in Henoko formed the moral center of 
the campaign from the beginning. The Henoko campaign has attracted unprecedented 
                                                
111 
Himeyuri is a monument and museum erected to memorialize the Okinawan female high school 
students who the Imperial Japanese Army forcibly conscripted into a nursing unit in March 1945, 
during the Battle of Okinawa. The Army mobilized 222 students and 18 of their teachers from the 
Okinawa Daiichi Women's High School and Okinawa Shihan Women's School to perform surgery and 
care for wounded and dying soldiers. For much of the time, they lived and worked in dark caves in 
southern Okinawa Island. By the end of the Battle, 80% of the students and teachers had perished. 
While some died in Allied air attacks, many also died from forced suicide, believing the (mostly) 
propagandistic message of the Japanese Army that US soldiers would commit systematic rape girls. The 
museum, where surviving Himeyuri students still (as of 2008) provide living testimonials, is a standard 
field trip destination by Okinawan school children (see www.himeyuri.or.jp/). 
112 Personal interview, April 14, 2005.  
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involvement, including by mainland Japanese, because of the environmental threat 
that construction of the base poses. But for local elders the planned destruction of the 
bay is profoundly personal. “I have been living with this sea for over 90 years,” said 
Henoko resident Shimabukuro Yoshi 92, the oldest member of the group. “When the 
war was over, there was nothing left to eat except the gifts of this sea. Thanks to this 
rich sea, I could feed and take care of my children. If you insist on building the base, 
kill me before you do so.”113 Another local resident who has been among the local 
leaders in this campaign, Kayo S#gi, explained:  
 
“It is not surprising that American and Japanese officials only see this 
bay for its military uses. That is their perspective and priority when it 
comes to Okinawan land, sea and sky. But this sea is our home. It is 
where we live our everyday life….For more than fifty years the US 
military has occupied Cape Henoko and treated this whole area as its 
own. We gained what? Before that, we endured the Japanese military. 
Hasn’t this been enough of a sacrifice by Henoko villagers? If this new 
base is built, the whole bay becomes US military property. It won’t be a 
living sea. This is unforgivable. We won’t let the Japanese government 
or wrong-headed Okinawan leaders push this on us.”114 
 
 Following Higa’s surprise announcement, Shimabukuro and Kayo were among 
those who dug in for a long struggle. By then much of the activism engendered or 
reenergized by the rape had become focused on opposing the Henoko project and 
closing Futenma, and the campaign was incorporated into the efforts of established 
groups in the anti-base movement (e.g. peace, labor). Henoko’s Society for the 
Protection of Life (Inochi o mamoru kai), founded by the elders of Henoko village, set 
up a permanent encampment near the fishing port in Henoko village, which became 
the local headquarters for the campaign to stop the new base. They have maintained a 
                                                
113 From the web site of the Society for the Protection of Life (sometimes translated as Save Life 
Society; see www.geocities.jp/nobasehenoko/). 
114 Personal interview, September 18, 2004. 
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continuous presence at the headquarters and during the weekdays since 1997, 
monitoring the port and the bay for construction-related activities.115 As activists 
mobilized, Ota returned to his anti-base roots and officially refused to consent to the 
offshore air base in his position as governor. By law the prefecture has jurisdiction 
over the waters where the air base would be built, so Ota’s stance had legally binding 
consequences and trumped the Nago mayor’s official acceptance of the air base.  
 Tokyo’s response to the governor’s intransigence was swift and calculated, 
aimed at countering the rising and increasingly organized discontent within and 
beyond Okinawa. With the next gubernatorial election just ten months away, 
Hashimoto’s administration cut off all communication with Ota’s administration on 
the base issues and postponed payment on the economic stimulus package to the 
Yanbaru region. While never officially represented as having anything to do with the 
new air base, it was (and still is) widely understood that all purse strings are tied to the 
Henoko project. With so much riding on the gubernatorial election, one month after 
the plebiscite Prime Minister Hashimoto established an advisory body under the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary officially known as the “Commission on Okinawan Municipalities 
hosting US Bases.” The group became better known as the Shimada Commission 
(Shima-kon) after its chairperson, conservative Japanese economist Shimada Haruo, 
“who has been a vital conduit enabling the central government to implement policies 
on Okinawa underhandedly” (quoted in Johnson 2004). The mission of the group was 
to study the “domestic complexities and problems” involving US bases on Okinawa. 
Its informal aim was to reduce the local people’s frustration with the bases through 
increased largesse, but on neoliberal terms that, as Miyagi Yasuhiro (2007) has shown, 
                                                
115 For an extended analysis of Henoko elders’ participation in the campaign, see Tanji Miyume, Myth, 
Protest and Struggle in Okinawa, New York: Routledge, 2006, and Inoue Masamichi, Okinawa and the 
U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007. 
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further deepen dependence, especially of those cities and towns most affected by the 
bases.116  
 The Shimada Commission also provided Okinawa with its next governor. 
Commission members included Okinawan businessman Inamine Kenichi, an 
entrepreneur with close ties to the energy and construction industries and to Tokyo. 
Inamine became Tokyo’s pick in Okinawa’s November 1998 gubernatorial election, 
running against the incumbent Ota with the full backing of Japan’s long-ruling 
conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In effect the gubernatorial election 
became a second referendum on SACO and the Henoko base project. Ota maintained 
his opposition to the new base and calls for immediate closure of Futenma Air 
Station, campaigning on the slogan, “Okinawans, don’t sell your souls.” Inamine ran 
on the platform calling for the air base to be a joint military-civilian facility, with 
Okinawa Prefecture gaining complete control over the facility in 15 years. 
Contrasting himself to Ota’s idealistic calls for an end to US military presence, 
Inamine called for pragmatism, using as his slogan only “9.2%”—Okinawa’s 
unprecedented unemployment level, which was twice the national average. The LDP 
put up posters with “9.2%” all over Okinawa on the day of the election. In the face of 
                                                
116 As Miyagi Yasuhiro (2007) details, the Shimada Commission provided funding in a markedly 
different way than previously practiced. For example, it provided full funding for projects that would 
otherwise be impossible under the previous system of partial subsidies, and local governments could 
negotiate directly with the Cabinet and the Defense Agency. New, expensively built sports and 
recreational facilities, community centers and other facilities sprang up around the island. Nago City 
received funding for a new college and, perhaps the most ironic project, the incredibly high-tech Neo-
Park International Species Protection Research Center, a center dedicated to especially marine 
protection research, which was built less than a mile from the proposed site of the new military base. 
However, because projects funded through the Commission were not classified as “public works,” 
funding would not be given for maintenance or future renovations. According to Miyagi, “38 industrial 
projects and 47 plans were approved to proceed by stages towards completion in 2007….Of municipal 
grants in the period up until 2005, Nago City had received 8.188 billion yen [roughly 100 billion 
dollars], second only to the 15.869 billion yen grant received by Kadena Town (which hosts Kadena US 
Air Base). The largest sum paid to Nago went to the Neo Park International Species Protection 
Research Center (3.322 billion yen, including land purchase cost and the cost of rescuing an institution 
then already on the brink of bankruptcy).” See Miyagi Yasuhiro. “Okinawa and the Paradox of Public 
Opinion: Base Politics and Protest in Nago City, 1997-2007,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2007. 
Retrieved on October 3, 2008 from http://www.japanfocus.org/-Miyume-TANJI/2490. 
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a worsening economy and ten months of silence from Tokyo, Inamine won the 
election with 52.1% of the vote, garnering the votes of unemployed young people. 
Ota’s 46.9% of the vote came from the employed and older people who remembered 
the war (Johnson 2002). 
With a more cooperative prefectural administration in place, Prime Minister 
Obuchi Keizo, who replaced Hashimoto Ry!taro in July 1998, reversed Tokyo’s 
strategy of silence and tightened purse strings. Obuchi had significantly more 
experience with Okinawa’s “base politics” and foreign relations than most prime 
ministers, having served as the director of the cabinet-level Okinawa Development 
Agency for eight years in the 1980s and as Minister of Foreign Affairs under 
Hashimoto. He was well versed in the kinds of political pressure and economic 
inducements that help sustain US military presence in Okinawa. Immediately 
following Inamine’s electoral victory, Obuchi initiated meetings between the 
prefectural government and the Ministerial Committee on Okinawa Policies, using 
“special adjustment expenditures” to authorize twice the funds that had ever been 
made available to Ota (Johnson 2002). He also made the rumors of an economic 
windfall to Okinawa’s northern region official, promising 100 billion yen per year 
over ten years, amounting to approximately $40,000 per capita. In a move that 
highlighted the centrality of the Henoko project to the reopened channels of 
communication and funds, Obuchi’s administration backed the Pentagon’s conclusion, 
which the latter announced only after Inamine’s election, that the new governor’s 15-
year plan was “impractical” on the basis that “current security needs do not suggest 
that such a change in military operations on Okinawa is possible in the foreseeable 
future” (US Department of Defense 1998). The following year the Obuchi 
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administration further rewarded Okinawa and Nago City when it chose Nago as the 
main site of the 2000 Group of Eight summit.117  
Although the central government managed to shift the political landscape 
within Okinawa in its favor for the time being, it further maneuvered to gain 
permanent control over a fundamental issue: Okinawan land occupied by US bases. 
Since leaving the decision of whether or not to renew the land lease agreements up to 
Okinawans’ democratically elected officials presented a problem of unpredictability, 
Obuchi and LDP leaders sought to ensure that the US military’s use of private lands 
in Okinawa would in the future be a political and legal fait accompli. In 1999, in the 
context of passing unprecedented reforms aimed at decentralizing power in Japan, the 
Diet included a directive that permanently shifted the power to lease Okinawan lands 
for use by the US military to Tokyo. The new law designates Japan’s prime minister 
as proxy signatory to Okinawan landowners’ lease agreements, effectively 
reorganizing decision-making power away from Okinawa to the national level.  
By the time of the 2000 G8 summit, it looked as if the political and economic 
structure in Okinawa had shifted back in Tokyo’s—and Washington’s—favor, 
allowing the Japanese government to meet its commitment under the SACO 
agreement. While Okinawans were uneasy about the political motives behind 
awarding Okinawa the summit, it was also welcomed as an opportunity to show 
political leaders and especially journalists Okinawans’ frustration with “the facts as 
they are in Okinawa,” as Ry!ky! University professor Egami Takayoshi recalls 
(2000:1). A powerful way in which they did so was by organizing a 27,000-person, 
17-km “human chain” around the largest base on Okinawa, Kadena Air Base, during 
                                                
117 According to Chalmers Johnson (2002), Tokyo spent 81 billion yen ($1.3 billion) on the Okinawan 
summit. This is compared with the British government’s (equivalent of) 1.1 billion yen on the 1998 G8 
in Birmingham and Germany’s 700 million yen for the 1999 summit in Cologne, the Japanese 
government lavished. See Johnson, “Okinawa Between the United States and Japan.” Japan Policy 
Research Institute. Occasional Paper No. 24, January 2002. 
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the summit. The summit temporarily shifted Okinawan space, from one where local 
relations and democratic institutions intertwine and are compromised by bi-lateral 
interstate relations, to one intertwined with a much broader set of relations amongst 
states, civil society and media.118 This global audience has become increasingly 
important.  
 
Taking the campaign transnational 
Despite Tokyo’s efforts to convince or compel Okinawans to accept the new 
air base, the campaign against it continued, growing into a multi-pronged struggle 
involving coalition-building locally, nationally and transnationally, litigation in Japan 
and the US, formal condemnation in international fora, and daily non-violent civil 
disobedience at the proposed site of construction, which continues to this day. 
Transnational coalition building and activities by Okinawan activists have become 
particularly instrumental in shifting the debate over the Henoko project beyond local 
and bi-lateral “base politics,” providing opportunities to intervene in dominant 
narratives about Okinawa’s relationship with Japan and US military presence in 
Okinawa. Such activism and resulting coalitions help de-center the terms through 
which ANP" dominates the definition of basing problems and solutions, introducing 
instead alternative conceptions of security that foreground, variously, gendered 
understandings of military force, non-state sovereignty, and the environment as a 
                                                
118 For an insightful analysis of the summit and how it became a global stage for activists as well as the 
US and Japanese governments, see Julia Yonetani, “Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic 
Theater.” Critical Asian Studies 33, 2001. See also Takayoshi Egami, “The G8 Summit and Okinawa” 
Presented at the symposium New Directions in Global Governance? G8 Okinawa Summit, held at the 
University of the Ryukyus, Okinawa, Japan, July 19-20, 2000. Retrieved December 2, 2009 from 
www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/egami2000/egami2000.pdf. 
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universal concern.119 Such efforts also highlight the increasing disillusionment in the 
Japanese state as a rights-giving institution. 
 Groups like Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence mobilized 
around the implications of the new base construction at Henoko for the long-term 
presence of US forces, and in turn the implications for security, especially women’s 
security, across Okinawa. Building on transnational networks forged through 
participation in global meetings like the World Conferences on Women in Nairobi 
and Beijing, and in other regional activist gatherings around military violence against 
women, OWAAMV organized the Okinawan Women’s Peace Caravan in the United 
States 1996 and 1998.120 The caravan delegations included teachers, city officials, 
youth and community organizers. Traveling to several cities, they focused both on 
learning about the toxic cleanup and redevelopment involved when military facilities 
close in the US, and raising awareness about Okinawa. Together with the East Asia-
U.S.-Puerto Rico Women’s Network Against Militarism, OWAAMV hosted the 
International Women’s Summit in June 2000, a month before the G8.121 In 2005 
Takazato led delegations to the 2005 World Social Forum in Brazil and to an 
international gathering of anti-base activists in Manta, Ecuador, where she drew 
attention to the then 250-day sit-in at Henoko.122  
                                                
119 For a thorough and nuanced analysis of how the campaign has de-centered conventional Realist 
understandings of security, see Deborah Mantle, “Defending the Dugong: Redefining ‘Security’ in 
Okinawa and Japan,” Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, vol.5, pp. 85-105. 
120 The English language booklet OWAAMV made to distribute during the 1996 Peace Caravan is 
available at:  
www.barnard.edu/crow/archive/militarism/okinawa_womens_american_peace_caravan.pdf. An 
overview of the 1998 Peace Caravan is at http://uchinanchu.com/about/womens_peace_caravan.htm. 
121 See International Women’s Summit, “Final Statement of the International Women’s Summit 
to Redefine Security,” Development Bulletin, no. 53, 2000, pp. 96-97. Retrieved October 23, 2006 from  
devnet.anu.edu.au/GenderPacific/pdfs/20_gen_peace_summit.pdf. 
122 For an analysis of the Manta conference and the emergence of a global network of anti-base 
activists, see Andrew Yeo, “Not in Anyone's Backyard: The Emergence and Future of a Transnational 
Anti-Base Network.” International Studies Quarterly 53(3), 571-594. 
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  “In these gatherings outside Okinawa and Japan, we meet people who know 
all about our circumstances, because they live under the same circumstances. With 
them we can strategize. We can share information and pool information, to highlight 
the systematic nature of the violence that happens around US military bases. And we 
also meet people who can’t imagine living under such circumstances,” explains 
Takazato Suzuyo, founder of OWAAMV. Recalling her trips to the United States, 
emphasized the importance of sharing information that highlights actual military 
practices, and how they are experienced by Okinawans:  
 
“Most of the people who came to the gatherings had heard of the 
[1995] rape. The first Peace Caravan was quite soon after it happened. 
But they didn’t know about Henoko, and they didn’t know about 
Futenma or how many bases the US has in Okinawa. They also didn’t 
know Okinawa’s history. Americans only think that Okinawa is 
Japan….I was surprised at how incredulous most Americans were 
when they heard their government was trying to build a base in a 
beautiful bay, atop a coral reef, and keeping open a base like Futenma 
as a means of forcing acceptance of the new base. Their surprise comes 
from not knowing the history of US military presence in Okinawa and 
other places….We were able to have many discussions about how US 
military presence in Okinawa is not about creating security.”123  
 
 Okinawan activists’ challenges to dominant understandings about US military 
presence in Okinawa also offer critical new perspectives on the territory’s relationship 
to Japan. Members of the Association of Indigenous Peoples in Okinawa and the 
Ry!ky!s (AIPR), whose activities and aims I explore in greater detail in the following 
chapter, continue to bring the Futenma-Henoko issue to various United Nations 
meetings on indigenous issues beginning in 1996.124 By foregrounding the Japanese 
                                                
123 Personal interview, March 5, 2005. 
124 In addition to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, AIPR members have detailed the 
Henoko struggle, in the context of Okinawa’s colonial relations with Japan, in fora such as the World 
Conference Against Racism, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and hearings convened by the Commission on Human Rights 
and Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.  
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government’s complicity in US military basing in indigenous rights fora, AIPR 
members also make explicit the colonial dimensions of US military presence. 
 Such activism also indicates a growing lack of faith in the efficacy of national 
political institutions to resolve Okinawa’s most pressing problems. This is evident in 
efforts by Okinawa’s elected officials to circumvent national political channels by 
meeting directly with US lawmakers and other officials about the Futenma-Henoko 
issue and the bases more generally. The current mayor of Ginowan City, Iha Yoichi, 
is following in the footsteps of former governor Ota Masahide, who made several 
trips to Washington during his time in office. Iha has traveled three times with a 
delegation of Ginowan residents to the United States to discuss the lack of progress 
on the 1996 agreement to close Futenma Air Station. Although well aware that 
Japanese policy toward Okinawa is shaped fundamentally by US demands, the mayor 
wants US lawmakers to make a distinction between Okinawan interests and Japanese 
interests. He explained that meeting directly with US leaders is important because 
Okinawans “cannot trust the Japanese government and Japanese politicians to make 
any effort on behalf of Okinawa if it goes against Japan’s interests or jeopardizes 
Japan-US relations.”125 Iha also sought to leverage domestic politics over US basing. 
In addition to Pentagon and State Department officials, he arranged meetings with 
lawmakers like Diane Feinstein and Kay Bailey Hutchison, who not only serve on 
relevant foreign policy committees but also come from districts that want to maintain 
their significant military presence.126 I traveled with the mayor’s delegation in July 
                                                
125 Personal interview, July 12, 2005. 
126 Iha arranged the 2005 trip to coincide with the most recent round of Base Closure and Realignment 
talks—commonly known as BRAC. Held every few years or so, BRAC refers to the process through 
which a congressionally appointed commission reviews the list of bases and military installations which 
the Department of Defense has recommended be closed and/or consolidated (see http://www.brac.gov/). 
The BRAC process is always characterized by tension and political wrangling at multiple levels. 
Representatives from municipal and state governments, as well as base- and defense-related businesses, 
make their case to the commission, while the numerically much smaller contingent of anti-base activists 
argue for the opportunity to de-militarize their communities. Seeking to intervene in this process, in 
2005 Iha met with state representatives in Washington and local officials in California. He sought to 
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2005. The members of congress the delegation met with had all heard about the plans 
to build a new US military base in Okinawa. However, it was clear from their 
reactions to Iha’s explanation of the issue that they did not know key details, such as 
the conditions the Pentagon had put on closing Futenma, or that the new base would 
be built atop a coral reef.  
Because construction and operation of the new base will destroy one of 
Okinawa’s fragile coastal eco-systems, including the habitat of endangered species 
endemic to Okinawa Island, the campaign continues to bring peace activists and 
environmentalists together in unprecedented ways (see Yui 2004). Coordinating with 
anti-base activists in the region, Okinawans hosted the first International Workshop on 
Military Activities and the Environment in March 2003. There Okinawan activists 
detailed the Henoko plan alongside long-standing problems like contamination of 
water and soil from hazardous military waste, soil loss from jungle warfare training 
activities, health problems stemming from aircraft noise and other issues (Makishi 
2004).  
Okinawans also brought the Henoko base issue to the quadrennial meetings of 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN, also referred to as the 
World Conservation Congress).127 Members of local organizations that emerged out 
of the campaign began participating with Japanese environmental activists at the 
IUCN in Amman, Jordan in 2000 and to Bangkok, Thailand in 2004, which led the 
IUCN Congress to adopt successive recommendations calling on the Japanese and US 
                                                
provide them with more leverage by arguing that, while Okinawans cannot and should not be forced to 
accept a new base to make up for Futenma’s closure, existing military installations in the US would be 
able to incorporate Futenma’s functions. See Darrin Mortenson, “Okinawa group takes base case to 
City Hall” North Country Times, July 19, 2005. Retrieved July 25, 2005 from 
http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/military/article_08219cb8-26cf-564f-93e2-ad2362a34d02.html. 
127 Delegates included members of the Okinawan organizations Dugong Network Okinawa (originally 
“Love Dugong Network”) and the Dugong Protection Fund, and from national chapters of the World 
Wildlife Fund and the Natural Conservation Society. 
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governments to conduct a proper environmental impact assessment of the new base 
project and establish a protected area for the dugong. The US and Japanese 
governments abstained from endorsing the IUCN’s formal resolutions, instead 
countering with statements of commitment to protect the dugong and the other species 
threatened by the air base project.128 
As activists transmit news of the ongoing campaign through peace, indigenous 
and human rights, environmental and women’s rights activist networks, including 
over e-mail and the internet, the Henoko struggle gains national and international 
support and attention. Greenpeace Japan coordinated a multi-day visit by Greenpeace 
International’s infamous vessel Rainbow Warrior to bring global attention to the 
Henoko struggle.129 The Futenma-Henoko Action Network, a coalition of Okinawan 
professors and teachers, a British professor at Okinawa International University and 
this author, raised over $30,000 to bring a director and camera crew to film a 
documentary about the politics and environmental issues surrounding the Henoko 
project, including the Pentagon’s insistence on keeping Futenma open. The resulting 
documentary, Development with Destruction, aired globally on the Earth Report 
series of the BBC’s World Service.130  
While Japanese leaders’ unwillingness to push local law enforcement to arrest 
those engaged in civil disobedience at Henoko has much to do with the inevitable 
increase in local opposition that such a show of state force would engender, the 
international attention brought to the non-violent protests undoubtedly contributes to 
                                                
128 Texts of successive IUCN recommendations and statements by the US and Japanese governments 
regarding the Henoko project are available, from Amman Jordan (2000) at 
www.iucn.org/amman/content/resolutions/rec72.pdf; from Bangkok, Thailand (2004) at www.okinawa-
u.ac.jp/~tsuchida/Save-Dugong/material/takae/200411IUCN_E.pdf; from Barcelona, Spain (2008) at 
www.sdcc.jp/enew/eventsiucn.html. 
129 See Greenpeace Japan’s “Save the Dugong, Stop the Air Base” campaign at 
www.greenpeace.or.jp/campaign/oceans/dugong/en/. 
130 See www.tve.org/earthreport/archive/doc.cfm?aid=1768. 
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the lack of overt repression of the direct action. Actions at the Henoko port itself 
intensified in 2004 when, just before dawn on April 19, contractors working for the 
Japan Defense Agency arrived with trucks and equipment to build a work yard at the 
fishing port in Henoko village for a large-scale survey of the seabed.131 Protesters 
blocked the entrance to the public port, turning away the contractors and staff from 
the JDA’s Naha office, the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau 
(NDFAB).132 From that day on, a sit-in and other forms of direct action have 
continued at the public port in order to monitor and prevent activities intended to 
further the construction project. Participants include individuals and groups from 
around Okinawa, Japan and occasionally foreigners living or traveling in Okinawa. It 
has become a central stop for progressive politicians eager to show his or her 
solidarity with the Henoko campaign and the anti-base movement more generally.  
Just two and a half months after the sit-in began, activists gained the support 
of the world’s leading coral reef and marine experts who, by chance, were gathered in 
Okinawa from June 28 to July 2 for the 10th International Coral Reef Symposium. 
Two Okinawan organizations, the Save The Dugong Foundation and Dugong 
Network Okinawa, set up an information booth in the concurrent NGO forum, held a 
side workshop, and flooded the symposium with a booklet—all detailing the Henoko 
plan and its risks to Henoko’s coral eco-system and surrounding marine habitat. In a 
savvy move, the same activists also arranged transportation from the conference site 
to Henoko, where they gave glass-bottom boat tours of Henoko Bay. By the end of 
the five-day symposium, 889 participants from 83 countries had signed a resolution 
                                                
131 The survey involved boring into the seabed in order to establish the method of dyke construction. 
Having already completed an initial assessment of the seabed topography in 2003, the boring survey 
was expected to be highly destructive, involving drilling 50 meters deep into the coral reef and 
surrounding seabed at over 60 locations. 
132 The civil disobedience began on the initiative of Nago's Association to Oppose the Heliport Base, 
Henoko's Society for the Protection of Life, and the prefecture-wide Citizens’ Network for Peace, 
which comprises 32 peace, environment, human rights, and women's groups. 
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calling on the governments of Japan and the United States to immediately abandon 
the air base project. The signatories included over 150 researchers from the United 
States, and roughly the same number from Japan. US officials from the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, who were at the symposium, expressed disbelief at 
the project. On condition of anonymity, they told this author that the Henoko plan 
would never pass a properly conducted environmental assessment in the United 
States.133  
 This assertion may be put to the test. Following their initial meeting at the 
2003 International Workshop on Military Activities and the Environment in Seoul, a 
transnational coalition of six Okinawan, Japanese and US environmental groups 
worked together to jointly file a lawsuit in US Federal District Court for the Northern 
District of California against the US Department of Defense and then Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld to stop construction of the new base.134 Their case rests on 
a little-known clause in the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), under which 
the Pentagon is legally obliged to conduct its own comprehensive environmental 
impact assessment for military-related construction projects in which it plays an 
active role that risk impacting the cultural property of a foreign nation. The plaintiffs 
argue that the Pentagon is obliged in the case of Henoko because the proposed 
construction site, Henoko Bay, is the primary habitat of the critically endangered 
Okinawa dugong, or sea manatee. Not only is the dugong listed as endangered under 
the U.S. Endangered Species Act, in 1955 the Japanese government designated the 
sea mammal as a national “cultural property” under its Law for the Protection of 
Cultural Properties. As a cultural property of a foreign nation, the dugong is protected 
                                                
133 Personal notes, July 1, 2004. 
134 Backing up the Okinawa dugong are six organizations and three individual plaintiffs: the Center for 
Biological Diversity, Turtle Island Restoration Network, Japan Environmental Lawyers Federation, 
Save The Dugong Foundation, Dugong Network Okinawa, Committee Against Heliport Construction, 
Society for the Protection of Life, Anna Koshiishi, Higashionna Takuma, and Makishi Yoshikazu. 
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under the NHPA clause. In this obscure and circuitous way, Okinawan activists may 
have found leverage on the Henoko issue within the United States. 
 
 
Source: Asia Times135 
 
The Pentagon filed a motion for dismissal of the lawsuit, aptly named Okinawa 
dugong v. Rumsfeld, on two grounds. First, asserting a narrow Western notion of 
culture, it claimed that cultural properties could not be living creatures. Second, it 
argued that, because the new base is a project of the Japanese government, any impact 
or disputes arising from the project are a domestic matter and therefore the US has no 
legal responsibility. Washington’s portrayal of the Henoko base as solely a Japanese 
government project is standard practice and has proven effective in the past. This is its 
official position on all problems that arise in Okinawa and elsewhere as a result of US 
military bases: By virtue of the sovereignty of the host country, problems are 
“domestic” matters of dispute between the host government and its citizens. This 
means that redress depends on the viability of local communities’ citizen relations. In 
contexts where the host state is unable$or, as in the case of Okinawa under 
conditions of internal colonial basing$unwilling to mediate the impact of US military 
operations, communities living alongside the bases have little recourse.136 Against this 
                                                
135 Retrieved September 5, 2007 from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EI30Dh03.html. 
136 The similarities with conflicts over US military presence in other instances of colonial basing are 
particularly important in the context of this study, given that in such cases the US depends on a state-
citizen relation based on coloniality to maintain its presence. A preliminary investigation of court cases 
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backdrop, Tokyo’s collusion in maintaining the fiction of no US involvement also 
enables it to portray itself as a sovereign and decisive partner in the US-Japan security 
relationship.  
Despite consistent efforts by officials of both governments to represent the new 
air base as solely a project of the Japanese government, US federal judge Marilyn Hall 
Patel rejected the Pentagon’s arguments for dismissal in a landmark ruling in March 
2005. Patel denied the first claim because it “def[ies] the basic proposition that just as 
cultures vary, so too will their equivalent legislative efforts to preserve their 
culture.”137 The judge dismissed the Pentagon’s second argument on the basis of 
evidence detailing ongoing, active and direct US involvement in key decisions 
regarding the Henoko project. Central among the evidence is the 1966 map I noted in 
the previous chapter, which indicates the military’s long-held plans to build an air base 
in the exact same location as that purportedly decided upon by Japan’s Defense 
Agency (see figure 4.1). The 1966 map is cited in a 1997 internal Pentagon document, 
in which the DoD detailed its operational requirements for the facility at Henoko (see 
figure 4.2).138 The initial construction design released by the Japan Defense Agency in 
                                                
against the US government reveals a pattern in the way the US distances itself, officially and especially 
legally. In response to a class action lawsuit against the US government filed in 2000 by Chaggossians, 
the inhabitants of Diego Garcia, the US argued for dismissal of the case on the grounds that the conflict 
in question was a political matter between the local community and the British government and, as a 
“domestic” dispute, the US is neither involved nor legally responsible for the removal of the 
Chaggossians or the impact of its base or related training activities. The United States is prepared to 
launch the same defense should it be named in the lawsuit by Iunghuit residents of Thule, Greenland. In 
two lawsuits, one against the Danish Government within Denmark and one before the European Court 
of Human Rights, Iunghuit are suing to end US military occupation of their land and to force the US to 
clean up four abandoned sites. Although the US has not yet been named as a defendant, it made clear its 
position: “The court cases are between the Danes and the former residents, or survivors, since it was the 
Danes who moved them in the 1950s.” See Stephen Fottrell, “Inuit survival battle against US base.” 
BBC News Online. 2004. Retrieved on July 9, 2007 from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3753677.stm. Like the Japanese government, in these cases the “host” 
governments in question deny responsibility for US military actions in these contested regions.  
137 See David Allen and Jon R. Anderson. 2005. “Dugong take first round vs. Marines in suit opposing 
Okinawa base location,” Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, Sunday, March 6. Retrieved March 7, 2005 
(http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=27570). 
138 The operational requirements, dated September 29, 1997, include a design for what was at the time 
being proposed as a floating sea-based facility. The design calls for fixed causeways leading to shore, 
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2002 reflects exactly the specifications the DoD outlined in its 1997 operational 
requirements, including the direction of the runway and the addition of causeways to 
the design (see figure 4.3).139 In a landmark ruling on January 24, 2008, in what had 
become Okinawa dugong v. Gates, the same judge found the Pentagon in violation of 
the National Historic Preservation Act for failing to consider the impacts of the new 
airbase on the dugong.140 Although the Pentagon is currently appealing the ruling on 
similar grounds, it highlights the leverage to be gained through transnational activism 
in overcoming the democratic deficit in Okinawa (Tanji 2008; Yoshikawa 2009). 
While Okinawa dugong v. Gates awaits a final hearing, the dugong and Okinawans 
remain up against the US-Japan Security Treaty. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 1966 US military map of offshore air base plan (Source: US Army) 
 
                                                
explicitly citing the 1966 plan as the basis for deciding the direction of the airstrip See Department of 
Defense, “Operational Requirements and Concept of Operations for MCAS Futenma Relocation, 
Okinawa, Japan, Final Draft.” Washington, D.C. 1997.  
139 A 1998 report to the United States Congress submitted by the US General Accounting Office 
provides further evidence of early US collaboration with the Japanese government in specifying the 
basic operational requirements of the base, presumably referring to the 1997 Operational Requirements. 
It states that “the United States has established requirements that Japan must meet as it designs, builds, 
and pays for the facility before Futenma is closed and operations are moved to the sea-based facility.” 
See General Accounting Office, “Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the 
U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa,” GAO/NSIAD-98-66. Retrieved March 30, 2007 
(http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-66). 
140 Mayumi Tanji, “US Court Rules in ‘Okinawa Dugong’ Case: Implications for U.S. Basing 
Overseas,” Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008), 475–487. 
  145 
 
Figure 4.2 Pentagon’s 1997 revisions to Henoko base design, based explicitly on its 
1966 plan. (Source:  Department of Defense 1997) 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Japanese Defense Agency 2002 design for Henoko air base, which reflects 
the Pentagon’s 1997 requirements (Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
 
Okinawa dugong v. ANP" 
Maintaining the fiction that Henoko is solely a project of the Japanese 
government has its drawbacks. Although this may make it possible for the US to skirt 
legal accountability, it also means that US officials must rely on the Japanese 
government to push the project through. That US leaders can do so with confidence 
has been borne out many times in history. This time, however, sustained opposition 
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has not only prevented any significant progress on the construction, but also forced 
Japanese and US leaders back to the negotiating table.  
The non-violent civil disobedience on land moved out into Henoko bay in 
September 2004, when contractors began building platforms to conduct a drilling 
survey of the seabed. Using fishing boats, diving equipment and a flotilla of sea 
kayaks, Okinawans and their supporters, began a tense and often dangerous daily 
struggle to stop the work—routinely pitting Okinawan protesters against Okinawans 
hired as surveyors and private security. Protesters eventually occupied drilling 
platforms erected around the bay (see figure 4.4). More recently, the effort includes 
trying to stop construction-related surveys by of sacred sites and cultural treasures on 
Cape Henoko, within the US Marine Corps’ Camp Schwab. Direct action at the 
Henoko port made it impossible for JDA contractors to easily access the bay from 
nearby. This forced the Japanese government to seek formal permission from the US, 
as per the SOFA, to access what are officially US-controlled waters adjacent to Camp 
Schwab in Henoko Bay. So while the Pentagon was claiming in US Federal Court that 
it had no relation to the construction, JDA employees, contractors and private security 
personnel were coming and going daily from Henoko Bay from a pier within Camp 
Schwab.   
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Figure 4.4 Protesters in sea kayaks at Henoko blocking the construction of drilling 
platforms (top); Protesters occupy drilling platforms (bottom). 
 
 Among Japanese leaders’ biggest hurdles in upholding their agreement wit the 
US are Japan’s own environmental laws, which the government appears ready to 
circumvent. At issue is what the JDA has excluded from its scoping document, which 
spells out how it will go about conducting an environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
of the base construction—the range of what the assessment will examine, and 
precisely how potential impact will be assessed. The document, which is subject to 
public and expert comment, is a legally required step in Japan’s established EIA 
procedures. Most notable was what the Defense Agency left out of its scoping 
document. It omitted the initial drilling survey, which was expected to entail drilling 
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50 meters deep at 63 sites on and around the coral reef. It also excluded basic 
information about both the construction and operations of the base and routine 
operations of the proposed air base once under US control.141 “Basically, the 
information required to assess the potential for environmental impact was left out of 
the Japanese government’s environmental impact assessment plan,” explained an 
exasperated Higashionna Takuma of the Save the Dugong Network, plaintiff in both 
Dugong v. Rumsfeld and a more recent lawsuit against the JDA brought by Okinawan 
and Japanese environmental organizations.142  
In an unprecedented development in post-reversion Okinawa, the then eight-
year non-violent campaign against the Henoko project forced the US and Japanese 
governments back to the negotiating table. As part of the Pentagon’s broader strategy 
of “realigning” US forces in the region and more globally, officials from the Bush and 
Koizumi administrations met throughout 2005 to create new guidelines for US 
military presence in Japan. From the US perspective, the talks were part of an effort to 
transform the mission of US forces in Japan from a regionally-focused one (as per the 
                                                
141 Regarding the construction of the facility, the scoping document left out information on the size, 
location, and specific purposes of the construction work yards required, or information about the roads 
and other territorial and marine areas that will be used in the course of construction. Regarding 
operations of the base, the plan did not include information regarding types of aircraft, corresponding 
fuel requirements and flight paths, and the expected impact of aircraft noise on residents and wildlife 
along the flight paths. This was expected to included details on the bases new mission, which includes 
operations related to the new V-22 Osprey and the construction of new and larger helipads within the 
military’s nearby Northern Training Area. It also lacked information on natural resources and materials 
that will be used in the operation of the base, such as the procedures through which the US will secure 
water, fuel and other resources for the maintenance of the base; the types of chemicals agents routinely 
used, such as maintenance and cleaning fluids; and the procedures and chemical agents that the US 
utilizes in pollution clean-up efforts. According to the General Accounting Office, a high potential 
exists for the area surrounding the proposed air base site to be “contaminated through routine operations 
aboard the sea-based facility. The accidental runoff of cleaning fluids used to wash aircraft or 
unintentional fuel system leaks could contaminate the nearby ocean environment.” See United States 
Government Accounting Office, “Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the 
U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa.” Washington D.C. Chapter Report, March 2. GAO/NSIAD-98-66, 
1998. Retrieved March 30, 2007 from http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-66. The frequent 
and routine contamination resulting from US military activities elsewhere on Okinawa supports the 
GAO’s conclusion. 
142 Personal interview, March 3, 2005. 
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existing US-Japan Security Treaty) into a global one. As part of this strategy, 
American officials wanted to get Japan to contribute more and in different ways to the 
alliance.143 By summer of that year, however, it became evident that the Futenma-
Henoko issue threatened to derail the talks.144 The Japanese government’s attempts to 
coerce and cajole Okinawans into accepting the new air base had not stopped the 
direct action at the proposed site, nor the initiation of the lawsuit against the JDA for 
its violation of national environmental assessment laws. Washington’s inability to 
stop Okinawa dugong v. Rumsfeld from going to trial promised a longer battle in US 
federal courts. The two governments announced their intention to revisit the Henoko 
plan and Futenma base closure as part of high-level talks between then Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and their Japanese 
counterparts, Defense Minister Yoshinori Ono and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Nobutaka Machimura, in Washington in October 2005.  
Instead of abandoning the project, however, the two governments used the 
opportunity to expand on it, nearly doubling its size and military functions. On 
October 29, the four officials announced what they hailed as a “compromise” 
agreement on a “new” plan. The air base, which now would have two runways and be 
1800m long rather than 1500m, would be built across the tip of Cape Henoko. It 
would be expanded to include a deep-water military port and related facilities in 
neighboring Oura Bay. An additional section of Oura Bay would be “reclaimed” to 
provide land for hangers, maintenance buildings, a fuel supply pier and related 
                                                
143 See Eric Talmadge, “In re-evaluation of military alliance, U.S. pushing Japan to greater role,” The 
Associated Press, April 8, 2005. Retrieved from Encyclopedia.com on May 28, 2009 
(http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1P1-107220581.html). 
144 See Hidemichi Katsumata, “Options spent over relocation of U.S air station,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, 
June 16, 2005. Retrieved from Highbeam on November 2, 2006 from 
http://business.highbeam.com/6124/article-1G1-133265570/options-spent-over-relocation-us-air-
station; and Kana Inagaki, “Tokyo, Washington in stalemate over U.S. military base realignment in 
Japan,” The Associated Press, October 13, 2005. Retrieved from San Diego Daily Transcript on 
October 20, 2005 (www.sddt.com/news/article.cfm?SourceCode=200510131s). 
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infrastructure (see figure 4.5). Although the expanded proposal adds a second runway, 
the “new” plan is a near replica of the far-reaching design the Department of Defense 
developed in 1966 (see figure 4.6), developed. What the US could not accomplish—
or was unwilling to pay for—in the final years of its formal occupation of Okinawa, it 
is now trying to realize by relying on the relations of internal colonial basing.  
 
 
Figure 4.5 Representation of October 2005 Henoko air base plan (Photo by Makishi 
Yoshikazu; graphic additions by the author) 
 
 
Figure 4.6 1966 US military design for offshore air base and a naval port in Henoko 
and Oura Bays. 
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As before, the agreement makes Futenma’s closure conditional on the 
completion of the new facility. Until then, the Marine Corps will continue its daily 
touch-and-go drills over densely populated Ginowan. The Pentagon’s insistence on 
maintaining these particular combat exercises at Futenma begs speculation that 
military officials’ intransigence has to do with the kind of training this offers, and the 
dominant form of combat in which US forces are currently engaged. The city of 
Ginowan is, for all intents and purposes, a real-life urban warfare training area for US 
combat pilots. 
In contrast to media speculation,145 Okinawan reactions to the two 
governments’ announcement were immediate and strident. Over 5000 Okinawans 
took to the streets against the October 29 plan on the day it was announced in 
Washington.146 Elected and grassroots leaders around the island voiced their formal 
opposition to the revised plan. Taking an uncharacteristically harder line, both 
conservative Governor Inamine Keiichi and Nago’s Mayor, Kishimoto Tateo, 
immediately rejected the plan.147 City councils from twelve municipalities, including 
Nago City, passed resolutions condemning the agreement in the week that followed. 
Polls by the Okinawa Times and Ry#ky# Shimpo indicated that popular opposition to 
the new air base reached an all-time high, with over 90% of the population against 
it.148 
                                                
145 “Warm reception expected for new Futenma plan,” The Asahi Shimbun, October 17, 2005. Retrieved 
March 4, 2007 from http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-137616778/warm-reception-
expected-new.html; Inagaki Kana, “Japan says negotiators narrowing gap in talks with U.S. on 
Okinawa air station,” The Associated Press, October 25, 2005. Retrieved November 17, 2005 from 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-114473779.html. 
146 “Engan butekkai e 5000 nin kessh#, kenmin s"ketsu taikai [5000 come together in prefecture rally 
for retraction of coastal plan] Ry#ky# Shimp",  October 30, 2005. 
147 “Chiji ‘engan’an’ o hitei, kitaharachokan to kaidan [Governor consults with Defense Minister 
Kirahara, rejects ‘coastal plan’]” Ry#ky# Shimp",  October 31, 2005. Retrieved November 3, 2005 from 
http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-8066storytopic-3.html. 
148 “Engan’an, fushiji 9-wari Ry#ky#/OTV y"ronch"sa [90% do not support coastal proposal, according 
to Ry!ky! Shimp#, OTV poll]” Ry#ky# Shimp",  November 4, 2005. Retrieved November 10, 2005 
from http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-8171-storytopic-3.html. 
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Employing one of the few means of leverage available to the US within 
Okinawa, American officials dangled an enormous carrot in front of Okinawans. The 
agreement included a plan to move 8000 Marines from Okinawa to the US territory of 
Guam. The deal was explicitly tied to the Henoko project. US State Department 
officials based in Tokyo told reporters that “it would be difficult to transfer the 
Marines without the full implementation of the Futenma relocation plan agreed upon 
by Tokyo and Washington.”149 So in addition to Futenma’s closure, the US 
government has now tied its long-promised reduction of U.S. forces on Okinawa to the 
Henoko air base project.  
The other inducement was the promise of even more construction contracts 
associated with the expanded plan. Although the scale of the base construction is 
beyond the capabilities of Okinawan firms to oversee, which means the Japanese 
government will still rely on large Japanese firms vying for the project, local 
construction companies will benefit. This explains the more “practical” approach 
called for by Goya Mamorimasa, head of the powerful Construction Association of 
Okinawa, who criticized Okinawan officials’ rejection of the revised plan. “Futenma’s 
dangers are a threat to security, so whether it is relocated within the prefecture or 
outside the prefecture is something we should be considering together. While 
relocating it outside the prefecture is preferable, because the conditions for doing so 
are complicated, it seems that we can do nothing other than stick with this [new] 
agreement between the US and Japan. The prefecture should respond in a more 
practical way to the plan put forth by the two governments.”150 
 In a joint press conference with then Prime Minister Koizumi and President 
Bush on November 8, 2005, both were asked about the rising Okinawan opposition to 
                                                
149 “US: Marines stay if Nago plan fails” Asahi Shimbun, November 9, 2005. 
150 “Hy"ka ya genjitsu tai" no koe, chiji no engan’an hitei” [Responses to the governor’s rejection of 
the coastal plan range from praise to pragmatism], Ry#ky# Shimp",  November 1, 2005. 
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the revised plan. Koizumi reminded the assembled press corps that security is about 
benefiting from “safety and peace,” but it requires certain costs. “So with that in 
mind,” he said, “with regards to the local communities that are against the idea, we’ve 
been trying to persuade them with regards to the position we are placed in. And they 
are, in fact, enjoying the security being offered through the U.S.-Japan alliance.” For 
President George W. Bush, the October agreement was a “positive development.” 
Acknowledging Okinawans’ discontent regarding the October 29 agreement, he 
pointed out that, “in a democracy, it’s hard to satisfy all the people all the time.”151  
The two leaders’ shared discourse of national security and democracy evokes 
the terms upon which their new agreement rests in post-reversion Okinawa: 
sovereignty and citizenship. The latest agreement emerged out of yet another crisis, 
one borne of sustained and increasingly widespread opposition to the SACO plan but 
defined by Japanese and US leaders as a diplomatic stalemate. Defined as the latter, 
the solution was an interstate compromise that General Richard Myers might well 
characterize as another example of “making lemonade out of lemons”: a radical 
expansion of the Henoko project.  
The complete revival of the military’s far-reaching 1966 plan was formalized 
in May 2006 as part of the “US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” a 
sweeping agreement on new guidelines for the future of US forces in Japan.152 
Officials asserted, as they have at every post-summit statement since 1972, that the 
agreement represents the two governments’ commitment to “ease the burden on 
Okinawa.”153 In reality, however, the “Roadmap” solidifies Okinawa’s central place in 
the two countries’ evolving military arrangement. The agreement lays the groundwork 
                                                
151 For a transcript of the press conference, see http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Nov/09-
555892.html  
152 For text see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html. 
153 See Inagaki Kana, “U.S. Military Realignment OK'd in Japan” Associated Press Online (May 30, 
2006). Retrieved on April 8, 2006 from http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-124316874.html. 
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to further integrate Japanese and US forces, including basing, intelligence and 
command functions.154 It also positions Japan to increase its military participation in 
American interventions regionally and globally. Ever since Richard Nixon, as vice 
president under Eisenhower, first publically expressed “regret” that Japan was 
constrained by Article 9 of its constitution in its ability to support US forces on the 
Korean Peninsula, American officials have pressed Japanese leaders to rearm and, 
increasingly, to amend the constitution so that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could 
engage in offensive military actions. Such pressure really only found fertile ground in 
the last decade. Whereas for US officials it was about getting Japan to contribute more 
and in different ways to the alliance, for the more conservative and increasingly 
nationalist wing of the LDP, particularly under the leadership of prime ministers 
Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006) and Abe Shinzo (2006-2007), constitutional reform 
and deployments ostensibly alongside the US was about Japan becoming a “normal” 
country (see McCormack 2007).  
In a move that dramatically demonstrated the embrace of this vision and 
Tokyo’s commitment to the broader elements of Roadmap, Prime Minister Abe 
dispatched a Maritime Self Defense Force minesweeper, the Bungo, to Henoko Bay on 
May 17, 2007. It was the first deployment of its kind in postwar Japan. The Bungo’s 
mission in Okinawa, which was to “assist” private contractors in completing an 
environmental survey of the bay in preparation for construction, signaled the 
government’s willingness to use the SDF in new capacities domestically, mirroring 
their increased involvement with US military interventions internationally. The same 
vessel took part in the SDF’s refueling missions in the Persian Gulf in 2004 in support 
of American military actions in Afghanistan. “This intervention clearly shows how 
                                                
154 For a detailed analysis of this arrangement and the politics behind it, see especially chapter four of 
Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace. Verso, 2007. 
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desperate the Japanese government is to make the new U.S. military base in Henoko 
against the wishes of the Okinawan people….Japanese democracy is rotting away,” 
remarked Ashitomi Hiroshi, long-time activist and co-president of the Council 
Opposing Heliport Construction, of the Bungo’s arrival in Henoko.  
Ashitomi might have been speaking of developments in Tokyo. As the Bungo 
carried out its mission in Okinawa, the Diet deliberated over a bill intended “to 
facilitate the implementation of plans to realign US forces in Japan” (Beigun saihen 
tokusoho), which became law on May 23, 2007. As Gavan McCormack (2007a) 
observes, the new law was designed with Okinawa and Henoko particularly in mind, 
but has implications for communities across Japan wherever local opinion and 
democratic processes run counter to the national government’s military priorities. It 
does so by creating a legal infrastructure for financially rewarding local governments 
that accept specific military projects (McCormack 2007a). Because the law stipulates 
that funds be doled out in stages—following consent, survey, construction and 
completion—it further systematizes and becomes a more effective tool by which the 
central government can incorporate local political and economic relations into the 
increasingly more integrated military relationship between the US and Japan. 
 
Conclusion 
The ongoing Futenma-Henoko campaign sheds additional light on how 
internal colonial basing is accomplished. On one hand, the US military’s acquisition 
of a massive new base complex at Henoko, and indeed its very ability maintain its 
presence in the islands, rests on Okinawans’ own ambivalence toward the bases. This 
is engendered by a deep structural economic dependence, which, because it is 
reproduced through Okinawans in their everyday lives, reinforces the general sense of 
the bases as normal and their presence inevitable. On the other hand, it rests on 
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Japan’s deference to its relationship to the United States and resulting systematic 
discrimination of Okinawans. Attempts to implement the SACO “solution” involve 
ever more overt suppression of Okinawans’ means of redress and representation: 
political exclusion and coercion, economic extortion, as well as systematic 
reorganization of already compromised decision-making power away from 
Okinawans. The range of political and economic actions by the central government is 
an indication of the kinds of measures that become increasingly necessary to counter 
local democratic forces opposing continued US occupation.  
It is also such actions that gradually expose the contradictions in a postwar 
regime of foreign military expansion framed in terms of state sovereignty and 
citizenship but rooted in colonial relations. The struggle over the proposed Henoko air 
base is Okinawa’s most significant single campaign in decades. If realized, it will be 
the first new major US military installation built in Okinawa in nearly fifty years—
and the first to be accepted, albeit under compromised circumstances, by Okinawans 
themselves. Waging this long campaign alongside countless smaller ones drains 
immeasurable resources (time, money, energy, spirit) that would likely be channeled 
toward more comprehensive ends. This fact is not lost on Okinawan activists 
themselves. It is in their deliberate efforts to not lose sight of the larger struggle for an 
alternative future for Okinawa that we glimpse the more profound implications of 
foreign military presence in contested territories. Challenges to state sovereignty 
emerging within the Okinawan anti-base movement reveal how the everyday 
experiences of internal colonial basing detailed in this and the previous chapter 
contribute to the unraveling of the assumptions and accommodations of the state-
citizen relation.  
  157 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONTESTED SOVEREIGNTY AND HISTORICAL TRANSITION IN 
OKINAWA 
 
“More people have begun talking about Okinawan independence, or about taking 
more autonomy from the central government. They are saying it’s possible. We didn’t 
think that way before.” 
 
~ Yoshida Chikako, anti-base activist155 
 
 “Chamorro were colonized by the US, then invaded and ruled over by the Japanese 
military during the war, and then re-colonized by the US. Uchinanch# were colonized 
by Japan, invaded and ruled by the US military during and after the war, then after 
reversion returned to what really is a re-colonization by Japan—a result of collusion 
between the US and Japanese governments. Now we are being told once again that the 
US and Japanese governments will ‘lessen our burden’, by moving US soldiers to 
Chamorro land if we accept the new air and naval bases in our land….This is why we 
have to resist together.”  
 
~ Okinawan anti-base activist, remarking on the US and Japanese governments’ 2006 
agreement to move 8000 marines to the US territory of Guam if Okinawans accept the 
expanded plan of building a new air and naval complex at Cape Henoko.156  
 
“What government leaders seem not to understand is that the right to self-
determination does not have to mean independence. They interpret it this way because 
they are stuck in their own statist ideas. The so-called ‘reversion movement’…was an 
exercise of Uchinanch# will, an exercise of our collective right to determine our future 
for ourselves. We haven’t lost the right to self-determination as a people just because 
we chose to be a part of Japan. We still have our right to determine our future.”  
 
~ Chinen Hidenori, Founder, Association of Indigenous Peoples in Okinawa and the 
Ry!ky!s157 
                                                
155 Quoted in Mike Millard, “Okinawa, Then and Now,” Japan Policy Research Institute, Occasional 
Paper No. 11, (February 1998). Retrieved March 12, 2006 from 
http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op11.html. 
156 Personal communication, October 23, 2006. 
157 Personal notes, March 7, 2004. 
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Introduction 
As the quotes above suggest, the ardor with which Okinawans emphasized 
their Japanese identity during the movement to end America’s postwar military 
occupation began to subside once the realities of internal colonial basing set in. 
Chapters three and four illustrate how, while Okinawans’ struggle against US military 
presence did not end after the islands were reincorporated into Japan, their mode of 
struggle changed. Faced with ongoing problems associated with the bases, Okinawans 
began demanding their hard-won citizenship rights of equal treatment under Japan’s 
constitution. However, under conditions of internal colonial basing, Okinawans have 
grown accustomed to Japanese leaders more willing to defer to the ANP" framework 
and US pressures than ensure Okinawans’ protection. As a result, Japanese complicity 
in US military presence has become a central part of activists’ accounts, analyses, and 
claims regarding US military presence and their citizenship. In contrast to the pre-
reversion movement against the presence of US forces, which sought citizenship and 
drew on the discourse of “returning to motherland Japan” (bokoku e no fukki), a 
politicized Okinawan national identity reveals a desire to rework their citizen relations 
via greater autonomy from the state.  
In this chapter I trace the emergence of Okinawan activists’ ethnic perspective 
on their citizen relations in order to better understand the implications of internal 
colonial basing for the state-citizen relation. How is Okinawan subjectivity expressed? 
What does a politicized Okinawan identity reveal about Okinawan activists’ 
perceptions of their citizen relations and their relationship to continued US military 
presence? What do notions of autonomy and self-determination mean for Okinawan 
activists, and what do such meanings portend for the state-citizen relation? 
The politicization of Okinawan ethnicity foregrounds the colonial experience 
and its legacies in interpretations of their Japanese citizenship, and of US military base 
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issues. A key significance of the “ethnic (re)turn” within Okinawa’s anti-base 
movement lies in its facilitation of different, historically novel claims against the 
Japanese state, and by extension against the relations governing internal colonial 
basing. These are not rooted in rights conferred by citizenship, but rather by new 
political identities that call into question the viability and legitimacy of liberal 
citizenship in the Okinawan context. Okinawan activists are variously interpreting 
Okinawans’ experience under US military presence in terms of their collective identity 
as an ethnic minority politically and socially displaced within Japan; as a 
nation/people historically connected to the Ry!ky! Islands and ethnically and 
culturally distinct from the Japanese; and (taking into account the linguistic and 
cultural diversity in the islands) as indigenous peoples denied their right to self-
determination.  
Okinawan activists’ reinterpretations of their subjecthood vis-à-vis the state are 
reflected in their coalitions within and beyond Japan. Ties with Ainu, ethnic Koreans 
and anti-US base activists in the region are based on shared experiences of Japanese 
imperialism, and with the latter on a recognition of how Japanese imperialism 
intertwined with US expansion in the region. Activists’ new articulations of self-
determination and connections—both theoretical and empirical—they make with 
others asserting collective rights mark a convergence of the demilitarization 
movement with contemporary self-determination movements elsewhere. Like most of 
these other movements, moreover, territorialized autonomist claims within Okinawa 
reflect (at least for now) a desire for a form of collective self-determination within the 
state rather than independence from it. Their autonomist but not statist claims reflect 
an historically novel conception of self-determination.  
This chapter builds on the arguments about the changing relationship between 
state formation and military expansion I advanced in previous chapters. In particular, 
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from chapter two I draw on the insight that the politics of decolonization and postwar 
state formation led to a state-centric regime of military expansion which extended a 
particular form of coloniality$internal coloniality$into the institutions governing US 
military presence in Okinawa. I take from chapters three and four the insight that, 
under internal colonial basing, Okinawans’ Japanese citizenship is the mechanism 
through which colonial relations and military expansion shape and sustain one 
another. This chapter builds on these arguments by illustrating how the meanings 
given to everyday experiences of continued American presence increasingly reveal the 
unraveling of the assumptions and accommodations of the state/citizen relation under 
internal colonial basing in Okinawa.  
I begin the chapter by outlining the emergence of a politicized Okinawan 
identity in conjunction with public reinterpretations of their Japanese citizenship 
through the lens of colonial experience. I then trace the rise of new political identities, 
new political ties, and alternative visions of Okinawa’s future in order to highlight 
Okinawans’ global analysis of their experience of internal colonial basing.  
 
From second-class citizens to Okinawan subjects  
 Reversion itself is increasingly problematized, as Okinawans’ experience of 
citizenship is inseparable from continued US military presence and a sense of being 
marginalized within the Japanese state. In light of deliberate reevaluations of the 
Ry!ky!s’ historical relationship with Japan, accounts of US military presence have 
also changed. Rather than a problem resolved by the Japanese state, the bases are 
posited as evidence of Japan’s historical exploitation of Okinawans and their territory. 
The conditions of internal colonial basing fuel Okinawan activists’ perceptions of their 
citizen relations in increasingly ethnic and territorial terms. 
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On the morning of May 14, 2004, roughly 3000 people began a three-day 
march, departing from three different locations around Okinawa Island. Each route 
traced significant moments and places in Okinawa’s militarization and struggle against 
it. The northeastern route began at the encampment at the Henoko fishing port. These 
marchers headed southward along the eastern coastline, stopping in the village of Kin 
to show solidarity with that community’s campaign to stop the US military’s 
construction of a live-fire urban warfare training facility just 300 meters from a 
residential neighborhood and community center. The northwestern route began in the 
city of Nago, whose citizens voted against the construction of the air base at Henoko. 
Marchers on this route continued southward along the western coastline to the village 
of Yomitan, where Allied forces first landed in April 1945, and where villagers hiding 
in Chibichiri Cave committed collective suicide. The southern route began at 
Okinawa’s Cornerstone of Peace, a monument engraved with the names of all 240,000 
persons killed in the Battle of Okinawa —civilian and military, Okinawan, Japanese 
and Allied forces, as well as conscripted Chinese and Korean laborers. The marchers’ 
common destination was the city of Ginowan, where they joined hands on May 16 
with 20,000 others in a “human chain” surrounding Futenma Air Station.  
The date itself is significant for two reasons. May 15 marks the anniversary of 
Okinawa’s reincorporation into Japan in 1972. But for nearly three decades this 
anniversary is also significant for being the focus of Okinawa’s largest regularly held 
protests. The “5.15 Peace March,” which began in 1978, attracts thousands each year 
and culminates in mass rallies or events like the human chain. Sponsored in recent 
years by the labor union-supported Okinawa Peace Action Center, the 5.15 events are 
often criticized and dismissed by conservative forces and the US military due to the 
contingency of “mainlanders” who come to participate in solidarity. But their 
participation cannot diminish the meaning of the day or the meaning of the continued 
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struggle it has come to represent. For many Okinawans, certainly for anti-base 
activists, the date commemorates an ongoing betrayal of the reversion struggle. “This 
is always a painful anniversary,” remarked Shimabukuro Junko, a resident of Ginowan 
and long-time activist, after an evening of painting signs that would be hung the 
following morning on the chain-link fence surrounding Futenma base. “It’s a heavy 
reminder, every year, of how Uchinanch! have yet to achieve the main goal of the 
reversion movement, to get rid of the US military bases. It’s a reminder of how we 
Uchinanch! were fooled into thinking Japan would protect us once we became part of 
the country.”158  
This sense of betrayal by Japan permeates the activist community, many of 
whom fought for citizenship as a way to expel or at least significantly reduce the US 
military. Most activists I interviewed evoked this post-reversion betrayal of their 
allegiance to the Japanese constitution in terms of ethnic difference and 
discrimination. Let me re-quote in part the words of 59-year old peace activist Higa 
Yuriko, who explained her objective of becoming Japanese in terms of wanting the 
rights associated with citizenship: 
 
“It wasn’t that I or most Uchinanch#159 really felt we were Japanese 
instead of Uchinanch! during the reversion movement…though I think 
many certainly tried. And Uchinanch! grew more and more willing to 
put [wartime] experiences behind us because more than anything we 
wanted the US military to leave. We wanted our human rights to be 
recognized. We wanted to be citizens….I wanted to be a citizen of a 
country with a peace constitution. I remember thinking how proud I 
would feel if this became a reality. This is why I wanted to be 
Japanese.”160  
 
                                                
158 Personal notes, May 14, 2004. 
159 Uchinanch# is the name for both an Okinawan person and Okinawans as a people in the Okinawan 
language. Even though the vast majority of Okinawans primarily speak Japanese, they typically use this 
term rather than refer to Okinawans in the Japanese language.  
160 Personal interview, Ginowan, Okinawa. March 20, 2005.  
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Higa’s desire to “be Japanese” did not mean to be ethnically Japanese; it meant to 
become a Japanese citizen and end America’s occupation. However, of her experience 
of citizenship since reversion, she said:  “In the end, becoming a citizen has made me 
feel more Okinawan because we still have to endure the bases, and we have not been 
treated the same as Yamatonch#.” For this veteran activist, her experience of being a 
citizen is inseparable from both her experience of continued US occupation and her 
self-identification as an Okinawan. Under conditions of internal colonial basing, 
moreover, becoming Japanese meant becoming a marginalized Okinawan citizen of 
Japan.  
Chibana Sh#ichi, whose shift in perspective on the state was symbolized in his 
act of flag burning, echoes Higa’s view of Okinawans as different from and 
marginalized by ethnic Japanese. But he also explicitly identifies citizenship as a 
means of Okinawans’ exploitation by the US and Japan: 
  
“After reversion, the government and the US began telling us what an 
important role Okinawa has in both countries’ security, and the security 
of the region. In the end, the citizenship that we won mostly just gave 
us the burden of their so-called security, not ours….Yamatonch! gave 
the Ry!ky!s to America after the war. And in the end it was as if they 
gave the Ry!ky!s to America again, after reversion. They wanted 
American protection during the Cold War, and still want it, but they 
don’t want the US military in their own space….To Yamatonch!, 
Okinawa is Japan’s, not a part of Japan” (Personal interview, April 3, 
2005). 
 
For Chibana, Okinawans’ citizenship is not only ethnically and territorially specific, 
Okinawans are collectively made insecure because of their citizenship.  
It is worth recalling Chibana’s act of resistance. The year was 1987. It was not 
a coincidence that the hugely popular National Athletic Festival, or Kokutai, was held 
in Okinawa for the first time that year. Okinawa was chosen as the venue in order to 
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commemorate the 15th anniversary of the islands’ reincorporation into the Japanese 
state. As a high school student in the 1960s, Chibana had hoisted the Japanese flag 
proudly and in anticipation.  By 1987 the same flag had come to symbolize a long 
history of Japanese oppression, the facilitation of ongoing US military presence being 
the most recent manifestation. 
Not everyone was against Okinawa’s hosting the Kokutai, but those who 
supported it inadvertently contributed to a stronger Okinawan subjectivity vis-à-vis the 
state. The same conservative alliance of business leaders and politician that continue 
to support the bases welcomed the Kokutai and supported it (Ota 2000a:79). But they 
also helped to fuel anti-Japanese sentiment. Two years before the athletic meet, after a 
1985 Ministry of Education survey indicated that “Okinawa ranked decisively at the 
bottom” in flag raising and anthem singing at the nation’s schools, Okinawa’s LDP 
politicians passed legislation requiring the prefecture’s schools to “respect and 
venerate the national flag and anthem.” As David Tobaru Obermiller notes, neither the 
flag nor the anthem was an official state symbol. So conservative leaders’ insistence 
that Okinawans embrace these symbols to demonstrate their patriotism and 
“Japaneseness” reminded many Okinawans of the pressures to do the same before and 
during the Pacific War. As a result the legislation had the opposite effect, creating an 
environment conducive to Chibana’s anti-Japanese actions during the Kokutai  
(2000:13).  
In this context, expectations of equal protection as citizens gave way to 
questions once marginalized within the reversion movement about the logic of 
Okinawans “returning” to Japan. Revelations about Japanese policies toward the 
Ry!ky!s during and after the Pacific War contributed to this reevaluation and 
activism. “Since the reversion, all sorts of information has been uncovered that has 
opened our eyes. Documents have been declassified. Scholars, clever journalists and 
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also average people have investigated,” explained Makishi Yoshikazu, plaintiff in both 
Okinawa dugong v. Donald Rumsfeld and the lawsuit against Japan’s Defense Agency.  
 
“We learned about Japanese leaders’ decision to sacrifice us and our 
territory in order to protect Japan, and the emperor’s offer of the 
Ry!ky!s to the US after the war. Information is still being uncovered. 
It wasn’t until the late 90s that we found out that [prime minister] Sato 
and [US president] Nixon made a secret agreement during the reversion 
negotiations. Sato allowed the US to keep nuclear weapons in Okinawa, 
even though it was not allowed in Japan. This is why it is obvious that 
we can’t trust the Japanese government when it comes to the new base 
at Henoko. All sorts of documents have emerged that expose US and 
Japanese lies and secret deals about that plan. I learned a long time ago 
that if one digs deep enough one will find evidence of the lies and the 
tricks.”161 
 
Progressive educators, journalists and public intellectuals began detailing 
Japan’s discriminatory policies and wartime atrocities in the Ry!ky!s and offering 
new perspectives on Okinawans’ relationship to Japan. In a 1985 essay that appeared 
in the progressive popular intellectual journal Sekai, entitled, “Re-examining the 
History of the Battle of Okinawa,” Ota Masahide detailed the “everyday atrocities” 
committed by the Japanese military before and during the spring of 1945. He 
highlighted the atypical degree to which civilians were forced to become directly 
involved in the battle, and contrasts the thorough preparation by American forces for 
the post-invasion care—albeit strategic—of “non combatants” with the lack of 
preparation, and instead exploitation, on the part of the Japanese military. 
                                                
161 Personal interview, July 14, 2004. Although not confirmed until Wakaizumi Kai, special envoy to 
former Prime Minister Sato, spoke publically in 2004, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato also 
signed a secret communiqué allowing the US to transport and store nuclear weapons in 
Okinawa$despite the fact that the same practice was banned in the rest of Japan. On the secret nuclear 
pact between Nixon and Sato, see Eric Johnston, “Nuclear pact ensured smooth Okinawa reversion” 
Japan Times, May 15, 2002. Retrieved April 4, 2006 from http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20060328a4.html.  
  166 
In his reanalysis of the same battle, tellingly published under the title A New 
History of the Ry#ky#s: The Modern Era and Today, sociologist Ishihara Masaiei 
linked the death of civilians to deliberate policies and practices of the Imperial 
Army.162 In the same study Ishihara helps account for such policies by documenting 
official Japanese views and suspicions of Ry!ky!ans. He draws on secret Imperial 
Army reports from the decades before the Pacific War that reveal persistent views of 
Ry!ky!ans as having a weak national consciousness and low levels of patriotism, a 
strong desire to avoid military service, a lack of regard for whomever might be ruling 
the islands; a lack of connectedness with the “national body” (kokutai), their inability 
to speak standard Japanese and low levels of education (1992). Alongside such 
scholarly and investigative reanalyses of Okinawans’ historical experience in relation 
to Japan were personal testimonies and the process of memorializing those who died 
in the Battle of Okinawa. This led to unprecedented public disclosure of and debate 
over wartime experiences and memories (Figal 2003; Yonetani 2003a).  
Official efforts to deny or downplay Japanese atrocities in the Ry!ky!s have 
fueled both the effort to retell history from a Ry!ky!an perspective and the growing 
disillusionment toward Japan as a source of protection. Attempts by Japan’s Ministry 
of Education to keep details of Japanese aggression in the Ry!ky!s out of school 
history textbooks mirror the better known international controversies over the 
ministry’s rejection of textbooks that include “anti-Japanese” details regarding Japan’s 
colonization of the Koreas, the massacre in Nanking, China, and the Imperial Army’s 
                                                
162 Ishihara points to seven key policies and practices: 1) torture and killing of those considered spies; 2) 
forced “collective suicides” (shudan jiketsu)—which Ishihara argues is a grave misnomer and are more 
appropriately termed forced mass deaths (kyosei sareta shudanshi); 3) displacement from shelter; 4) 
forced evacuations to malaria-infested areas; 5) stealing food; 6) poisoning, stabbing, or strangling to 
death small children to prevent revealing the location of Japanese soldiers to U.S. forces; and 7) siting 
military command posts in areas occupied by civilian evacuees (Ishihara 1992, quoted in Gregory 
James Smits, “Okinawa in Postwar Japanese Politics and the Economy.” Retrieved January 20, 2008 
(http://www.east-asian-history.net/Ryukyu/History/Okinawa/Postwar/index.htm).  
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so-called “comfort women” system of sexual slavery. The prefecture saw its largest 
protest since reversion on September 29, 2007 when over 100,000 people 
demonstrated against the Ministry of Education’s most recent decision to omit 
textbook references to the Japanese Imperial Army’s practice of forcing Ry!ky!ans to 
commit suicide during the Battle of Okinawa. The ministry capitulated by agreeing to 
include some reference to the practice.163 
This same critical ethnic lens began to inform analyses of continued presence 
of US forces. Post-reversion interpretations of US military presence not only began 
drawing on collective memories of the systematic discrimination and exploitation by 
Japan before and during World War Two, but also on collective imaginings of a once 
independent and non-militarized Ry!ky! Kingdom. As Taira K#ji (1997) proposes, 
although the Ry!ky! Islands now make up one of many prefectures of Japan, 
Okinawans today are reassured that their territory is “not a mere prefecture, but 
something special and distinct.” This, Taira suggests, is how Okinawans compensate 
for their “sense of historical melancholy” (1997:140). In Ota Masahide’s 1996 appeal 
to Japan’s Supreme Court ruling against his refusal to sign leases allowing Okinawan 
land to be used by the US military, the governor gave the following account:   
 
“For ages, the Ry!ky! Kingdom had been widely known, even abroad, 
as an unarmed land of courtesy. This was because King Shoshin, who 
was on the throne in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, forbade 
people to carry weapons….The forced acquisition of land for military 
use occurred [in Okinawa] both before and during the war. Prior to the 
abolition of the [Ry!ky!] domain and the establishment of the 
[Okinawa] prefecture in 1879, the Meiji government directed the 
Ry!ky! Kingdom to undertake several reforms toward 
Japanization.…At the time of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan, the Diet 
adopted a resolution about realignment and reduction of the bases in 
                                                
163 See Normitsu Onishi, “Japan Textbooks to Restore Reference to Wartime Suicides.” New York 
Times, December, 27 2007. Retrieved December 27, 2007 from 
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/27/world/asia/27japan.html?_r=2&ref=world&oref=slogin&oref=slogin%3
E. 
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Okinawa. [However] its implementation has largely been neglected. 
With the collapse of the Cold War structure, my people expected the 
realignment and reduction of the bases to make progress, if 
belatedly….The 1972 reversion was a return to the rule of the pacifist 
Constitution and should have been a great turning point for Okinawa. 
What my people sincerely wished for at the time was a reduction of 
bases at a rate at least comparable to that experiences on the mainland, 
together with the restoration of human rights and the establishment of 
home rule” (July 10, 1996).164 
 
Ota draws on a particularly powerful narrative of the Ry!ky! Kingdom as 
historically and culturally pacifist.165 As reflected in his testimony, this narrative 
differentiates the island nation’s historical mode of engagement with its neighbors 
from the overt militarism of Japan and the US. It also highlights the irony of 
Okinawa’s modern existence as a profoundly militarized space—a circumstance not of 
its inhabitants’ own making. In the connection Ota draws between Okinawa’s peaceful 
roots with Japan’s constitution, he seems to imply that Okinawans’ “return to the rule 
of the pacifist constitution” in 1972 repaired a “natural” connection ruptured by US 
occupation. But his references to the Ry!ky! Kingdom’s pacifist tradition and his 
explicit indictment of Japan’s subjugation of the once independent nation reminds the 
court that Okinawans’ “return” to Japan was not a natural development based on 
                                                
164 For an English transcription of the governor’s testimony, see Ota Masahide, “At the Supreme Court 
of Japan as the Governor of Okinawa.” Chapter six in Essays on Okinawa Problems. Gushikawa: Yui 
Publishing, 2000; brackets in original transcription. 
165 This narrative has a long lineage and historically has extended beyond the Ry!ky!s. One story that 
was told to me by several Okinawans is that Napoleon Bonaparte himself was incredulous upon 
learning of a nation without weapons. Captain Basil Hall of the British warship Lyra made a call to the 
Ry!ky!s in 1816. He later wrote in his journal that the kingdom “bore no weapons and its people 
committed no crimes,” which he then recounted to the exiled Napoleon on the island of St. Helena. Hall 
wrote that Bonaparte was “... completely perplexed ... Nothing struck him so much as their having no 
arms.” Regarding his reaction to the notion that the Ryukyus did not engage in war, Hall noted, “'No 
wars!' cried he, with a scornful and incredulous expression, as if the existence of any people under the 
sun without wars was a monstrous anomaly.” (See Gregory James Smits, “Romantic Ryukyu in 
Okinawan Politics: The Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism,” paper presented at the Association for Asian 
Studies, 2006. Retrieved January 20, 2008 from 
www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/g/j/gjs4/Smits_SF06.pdf). Another source of the narrative stems from the 
Ry!ky! Kingdom being the birthplace of karate, which means “empty hand” (i.e. without weapons). 
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historical unity, but rather a choice based on a desire for citizenship and 
demilitarization.  
That Ota drew on such arguments to justify his refusal to sign over Okinawan 
land for the US military also highlights how colonization and Japan’s ongoing 
complicity in US military presence has become central to anti-base activists’ 
explanations of why contemporary US military base matters play out as they do. As 
Okinawans’ experiences and collective histories focused a long lens on their 
relatively short 35-year experience as Japanese citizens, they became a new lens on 
US military presence. Takazato Suzuyo, founder of the organization Okinawan 
Women Act Against Military Violence and the women’s center Space Yui explains 
that problems associated with US military presence 
 
“…have not been addressed by the Japanese government in large part 
due to its deference to its security relationship with the United States. 
The US military is very aware of the historical discrimination of 
Okinawans by the Japanese government—the military uses it. Since 
Japan’s colonization of the Ry!ky! Islands, Uchinanch! have suffered 
under the militarism of Japan and, in the postwar period, the United 
States. But we can’t separate the militarism of the United States from 
the militarism of Japan, because the US is not just here for itself; it is 
here for Japan as well.” 
 
Long-time environmental activist Oshiro Jun’ichi similarly explains the US 
military’s exploitation of Okinawa’s resources in terms of Japan’s historical 
exploitation of the islands, and his disappointment in citizenship: 
 
“I thought that reversion, because it meant we would be citizens, would 
force a greater change in the US military’s ability to pollute and misuse 
Okinawa’s resources. But it really hasn’t. Japanese leaders just repeat 
the US military’s account of any incident. We don’t get the truth. I 
think greater attention to environmental problems created by the 
military bases has resulted as much from a change in American 
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environmental laws and policies. It’s like a new USCAR,166 because we 
still seem to be under a US rule that puts military goals first, rather than 
be protected by Japanese rule. Since reversion Japanese leaders still 
think they can use Okinawa like they did in the past.”167  
 
Thus the process of politicizing Okinawan identity shaped, and was shaped by, 
a broader historical reinterpretation of their contemporary experiences of life under 
internal colonial basing. In the wake of the SACO process in particular, public debates, 
symposiums and forums were organized to examine the issue of Okinawan autonomy 
(Obermiller 2000:12). Activist Yoshida Chikako said of the time, “More people have 
begun talking about Okinawan independence, or about taking more autonomy from 
the central government. They are saying it’s possible. We didn’t think that way 
before” (quoted in Millard 1998). Ota was not the only one who evoked Ry!ky!an 
independence in highly visible national fora. On February 13, 1997, Social 
Democratic Party representative from Okinawa “Uehara Kyosuke asked during a 
budget committee session, ‘What sort of steps are necessary for Okinawa’s 
independence?’ He was told that independence was impossible because the 
constitution does not allow it. Uehara retorted that he ‘was seriously thinking of 
creating a Ryukyu Kingdom’” (Obermiller 2000:12). Long-time politician Oyama 
Ch#j#, who participated in the reversion movement, penned Okinawa’s Declaration of 
Independence: Japan was not the ‘Motherland’ After All in 1997. An edited volume 
with over 30 chapters by public intellectuals, scholars and activists was published 
under the name Where are we Uchinanch# Headed? The Great Okinawan Debate 
(Ota et al 2000b). These provide an indication of Okinawans’ reanalysis and self-
reflection about both the past and the future of the Ry!ky!s. As reevaluations of their 
relationship with Japan foregrounded the role of Japanese imperialism in Okinawan 
                                                
166 As explained in Chapter two, USCAR was the United States Civilian Authority in the Ry!ky!s was 
the ruling agency under US forces in the islands from 1952 until the end of the US occupation.  
167 Personal interview, August 17, 2004. 
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accounts and critiques of US basing, this seemingly local “ethnic turn” also facilitated 
a process of global subject formation among activists. 
 
From Okinawan subjects to global subjects 
“Ry#ky#ans, Ainu and Koreans not allowed”: Connecting empire and peoples within 
Japan  
Reclaiming and politicizing their Okinawan identity in the context of internal 
colonial basing provides Okinawan activists with a broader basis to interpret and 
challenge their political position vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. This is 
reflected in the kinds of relationships they have formed with activists within Japan, 
regionally and globally. Within Japan, Okinawans forged individual and 
organizational relationships with Ainu and Koreans in the 1980s. These connections 
rest on shared experiences of Japanese imperialism and ongoing ethnic 
marginalization.  
Okinawans’ ties with Ainu stand out among their relationships with other 
minority communities in Japan in that they reflect a mutual recognition of their similar 
histories as once independent peoples. The Meiji government unilaterally annexed the 
vast Ainu territory to the north in 1869, only three years before it advanced southward 
and invaded the Ry!ky! Islands. Although their respective experiences of Japanese 
colonization differ in important ways,168 ties between Okinawans and Ainu 
                                                
168 Key differences lie in the form of colonial rule Japan practiced in each. The most salient, of course, 
is the intertwining of Japanese and US imperialism in the Ry!ky!s. Additionally, in its own versions of 
Manifest Destiny, the Meiji government organized massive migration of Japanese into Ainu territory, 
primarily the island of Ezo (renamed Hokkaido by the Japanese government). By the early 1900s, 
ethnic Japanese settlers already far outnumbered Ainu. In contrast, relatively little migration and 
settlement took place in the Ry!ky!s. Instead, Tokyo installed a Japanese-led colonial administration 
and depended on a local ruling cadre of Okinawans on the main island. There are several reasons for 
this differential treatment that warrant further inquiry. Even differences in proximity and sheer size of 
the two territories surely shaped Tokyo’s policies. Only 10-15 miles separate the island of Hokkaido 
from Japan’s main island of Honshu, which made mass migration relatively easy, and Hokkaido 
constitutes 20% of Japan’s current landmass. Okinawa Island—the main island of the Ry!ky!s is 350 
miles from Japan’s southernmost tip of Kyushu, and the Ry!ky! Archipelago makes up only 0.6% of 
Japan. 
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demonstrate recognition of a shared political relationship with the Japanese state. For 
Okinawan activist and folk singer Mayonaka Shinya, the impetus and reasons for 
maintaining connections with activists in the Ainu community was the ability to 
express and mobilize around this shared political position through music: 
 
“As a result of Japanese invasion and annexation, Uchinanch! and 
Ainu have suffered similar fates, in terms of losing our culture through 
assimilation and discrimination. For both the Japanese government 
outlawed our native languages and banned our cultural traditions, and 
even the clothes we wore. Both have suffered similar problems within 
Japanese society. Even though our cultures are different, it was a great 
discovery to me that our music resonates and expresses our similar 
circumstances. My music allows me to celebrate my Uchinanch! 
heritage and be a peace activist. Singing in uchinaguchi169 is my true 
political voice. When I meet Ainu musicians, I realize it is the same for 
them.170 
 
Some of my own encounters with Okinawan and Ainu activists, although 
seemingly coincidental, shed light on the kinds of events that bring these two groups 
together. I first met Okinawans Mayonaka Shinya and Chibana Sh#ichi$the flag 
burner$in February 1998 in Sapporo, on the island of Hokkaido. At the time I was 
living in Hokkaido while doing research on the contemporary rights struggle of the 
Ainu. Chibana was the keynote speaker at an Ainu political gathering held annually on 
“Northern Territories Day” (hopp" ry"do no hi), a dubious holiday established by the 
Japanese government to assert its claim to the four islands in the Kurile island chain, 
which it accuses the Soviet Union of unlawfully seizing in the final days of World 
War Two. Chibana spoke in solidarity with Ainu claims to the four islands and 
Hokkaido, and about the effects of Ry!ky!ans’ loss of control over their islands.171 
Mayonaka Shinya performed at the event, alongside Ainu musician Kano Oki. Kano 
                                                
169 Uchinaguchi is the word for the Okinawan language. 
170 Personal interview, April 3, 2005. 
171 Personal notes, February 8, 1998. 
  173 
and I also met for the first time that day, but we went on to work together for several 
years with Ainu and Okinawan activists in various United Nations fora for indigenous 
peoples. Six years later, on May 15, 2004, I was with an Okinawan friend whom I first 
met at the United Nations. We were in Ginowan City looking for a place to squeeze 
into the 23,000-person “human chain” encircling Futenma Air Station. When I reached 
out for the hand of the person next to me, I found myself staring into a pair of 
oversized mirrored sunglasses and a face half hidden by a checkered kefiya. But the 
long beard and mustache were unmistakable. It was Ainu elder Kawamura Shinichi, 
the person who took me to the hopp" ry"do gathering in Hokkaido in 1998 where I 
first encountered Mayonaka Shinya and Chibana Sh#ichi.  
Similar demonstrations of solidarity, exchanges and political coordination have 
also developed between Okinawan and Korean activists within Japan. Connections 
with Koreans are rooted not only in their shared position as a minority population 
within contemporary Japan, but also in colonial and wartime experience of harsh 
treatment as imperial subjects. The Japanese government forcibly brought generations 
of Koreans over as laborers, and Korean women as sex slaves, during Japan’s 1910-
1945 colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula (Cummings 1997:177-81). Like 
Okinawans, Tokyo conscripted Koreans into the Imperial Army during the Pacific 
War. In the postwar era, Koreans living in Japan have faced serious social and 
institutionalized political discrimination (Ryang 2000; Nozaki et al, 2006). “When I 
was a laborer in Tokyo [in the 1950s], I still saw signs outside of restaurants with 
‘Koreans and Ry!ky!ans not allowed’172 or ‘Ainu or and Koreans not allowed’” 
                                                
172  Ry#ky#jin was the word Kinjo used, which is the Japanese word for a person or people from the 
Ry!ky!s. Its widespread use in the decades following the Pacific War speaks to the extent to which the 
average Japanese person did not view the Ry!ky!s as being a part of Japan. 
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recalled Okinawan Kinj# Yoichi. “We all faced the same attitude and discrimination 
from Yamatonch#.”173  
Okinawan ties with Korean activists are similar to those Okinawans have with 
the Ainu community, in that they are not rooted in formal coalitions as much as they 
center on personal relationships and informal organizational and activist networks. 
Mutual invitations to speak at political gatherings and to participate in protests and 
other political events are common. Since the Henoko sit-in began, Korean members of 
activist networks in Osaka in particular have come to sit in solidarity, and invited 
representatives from the Henoko campaign to speak about the struggle against the new 
air base.  
While ties with the Ainu community and most ethnic Koreans are rooted in a 
shared history of Japanese colonialism and its legacies, ties with some ethnic Korean 
groups reflect the intertwining of Japanese and US imperialism. Connections with 
Koreans who maintain strong political ties with groups on the Korean peninsula are 
also animated by a common desire to address the problems that arose when  Japanese 
colonialism gave way to US military presence in both the Ry!ky!s and on the 
peninsula. It is this complicated history that characterizes Okinawan activists’ 
alliances in the region more generally. 
 
Connecting empires and peoples regionally 
By challenging the dominant historical narrative of Okinawa as naturally part 
of Japan, Okinawan activists evoke a different historical relationship with their 
neighbors, one characterized by peaceful coexistence and trade. Moreover, by 
foregrounding the shared experiences of imperialism, war and prolonged military 
occupation, they bring to light the extent to which this historical relationship has been 
                                                
173 Personal interview, December 22, 2004. 
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altered, and is still being altered, by Japanese and American imperial interventions in 
the region. 
Okinawan activists’ relations with anti-US bases groups in the Philippines, 
South Korea and Guam would appear to be grounded in anti-Americanism due to its 
long military presence in each and the immediacy of ongoing concerns.174 However, 
statements by activists from Okinawa and these other countries suggest that this is not 
the only or (for some) even the primary basis for their solidarity. Instead, these 
alliances are informed as much by a sense of shared experience in relation to Japanese 
imperialism. “Our exchanges and solidarity with anti-US base activists in East Asia 
are the most important to me,” said Tomiyama Masahiro, who has strong ties to South 
Korean anti-base groups and helps keep the Okinawan activist community updated on 
developments in the Korean anti-base struggle. He explained: 
 
“We are each burdened by US military bases, but as you know we also 
have in common our experiences as people colonized by Japan. 
Okinawa was annexed by Japan, and then so was Taiwan and Korea 
and the Philippines and so on. Since the war we have all faced 
America’s militarism—American imperialism. I know a lot of other 
communities face the US military around the world. But for me it’s 
most important to put my effort into these ties [with people in East 
Asia], so we can change our relationship with them. The Ry!ky!s used 
to have a friendly relationship with neighboring countries.”175   
 
Mr. Tomiyama not only evokes a common experience of Japanese colonialism, 
but frustration over how it intervened in the historical relationship between Ry!ky!ans 
and other peoples in the region, which American expansion further transformed. I 
sought Mr. Tomiyama out after seeing photographs of him and other Okinawan 
                                                
174 The US military has been in Guam since the Allies displaced the Japanese military there in July 
1944, and in South Korea since September 1945. US military presence in the Philippines dates from an 
earlier period in America’s expansion. Spain ceded it to the United States in 1898, soon after which US 
forces suppressed the Filipino struggle for independence.  
175 Personal interview, April 30, 2005. 
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activists I knew during a research trip I took to Pyongtaek, South Korea. As in Henoko, 
residents of Pyongtaek and their supporters are currently struggling to stop massive 
expansion by the US military in their community.176 Photos of Tomiyama and other 
Henoko activists were on the “solidarity wall” in the meeting place of Pyongtaek’s 
anti-base activists. Before I left Pyongtaek, I was given a bright yellow flag 
emblazoned with a red circle and slash over the words “US Army.” After I returned to 
Okinawa I noticed the same flag in the Henoko sit-in headquarters and in several 
private homes. It had become a symbol of solidarity with the Pyongtaek community.  
Some Okinawan activists, especially those old enough to have experienced the 
Pacific War, spoke poignantly about how Okinawa’s particular experience of both 
Japanese and US expansionism also connects them with peoples in the region (and 
beyond) as “aggressors” and “victimizers.” “I feel responsible as a former Japanese 
soldier. Not many people know that I was in the Philippines with the Imperial Army,” 
explained an anti-base activist in his late 70s, who asked that I not print his name. 
“And I came to feel responsible for US aggression. I protested America’s war in 
Vietnam. We all did. It was a part of the reversion movement. So I got a real shock 
when I met a group of Vietnamese in the 1980s at a peace gathering in Hiroshima and 
one of them said to me ‘Oh, you are from Okinawa? The land of the B-52s’. He was 
talking about the US bombers that were used in the war. So many of the B-52s left 
from Okinawa that the Vietnamese people saw us as being on the side of US 
aggression. Suddenly my dominant image of Uchinanch! as merely victims of 
America changed.”177   
                                                
176 “U.S. Move Is Spurring Evictions In S. Korea” Washington Post (March 19, 2006). See also 
Christine Ahn, “Postcard from … Pyongtaek,” in Foreign Policy In Focus. Silver City, NM and 
Washington, DC, December 13, 2006. Retrieved June 3, 2007 from http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/3801. 
177 Personal interview, December 11, 2004. 
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In his testimony in a hearing of the Okinawa Prefecture Committee for 
Military Base Land Use, Ie Island landowner Kubota Ichiro evoked the Ry!ky!s’ 
peaceful past with its neighbors as he lamented being implicated in the two countries’ 
militarism: 
 
“Uchinanch! men were forced to join the Japanese Army and go off 
and kill people we had traded peacefully with for centuries. We were 
victimizers. And then under Article 6 of ANP" our land was taken for 
the support of the US military. It was used in the Korean War, the 
Vietnam War, the Gulf War, Afghanistan and now again the Iraq War.  
We may not be brandishing the weapons in our own hands, but we are 
still nonetheless victimizers with the Americans.”178  
 
Frustration over the ways in which Okinawans are compelled, as a result of 
Japanese and American imperial interventions, into violent or competitive relations 
with other peoples in the region is also captured in Okinawan responses to Washington 
and Tokyo’s efforts to push through the May 2006 agreement regarding Henoko. As I 
explained in the previous chapter, the plan introduced the “incentive” of moving 8000 
marines from Okinawa to Guam in exchange for Okinawans’ acceptance of the 
expanded air and naval complex. A few months after the plan was formalized, an 
activist acquaintance in Okinawa remarked on the arrangement in e-mail 
correspondence, emphasizing Okinawans’ experience of this intersecting imperialism 
is as Japanese citizens: 
 
“Chamorros were colonized by the US, then invaded and ruled over by 
the Japanese military during the war, and then re-colonized by the US. 
Uchinanch! were colonized by Japan, invaded and ruled by the US 
military during and after the war, then after reversion returned to what 
really is a re-colonization by Japan—a result of collusion between the 
US and Japanese governments. Now we are being told once again that 
the US and Japanese governments will ‘lessen our burden’ by moving 
                                                
178 Personal notes, May 30, 2005. 
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US soldiers to Chamorro land if we accept the new air and naval bases 
in our land. And because the Japanese government has agreed to move 
the soldiers and build the new bases at Henoko, we are paying for this 
as citizens! We’re paying for our own colonialism, and US colonialism 
of Chamorros. Chamorros are paying for their colonialism, and ours. 
This is why we have to resist together.
179  
 
A similar analysis of the intertwining of US and Japanese colonization informs 
the solidarity with anti-base activists from the region is reflected in events 
commemorating the Pacific War. In June 2000, at the fifty-fifth anniversary of the end 
of the Battle of Okinawa, a “Silent Walk to the Cornerstone of Peace”—the memorial 
for all who died in the Battle of Okinawa—was held as a part of an International 
Women’s Summit. Both were organized by the East Asia-U.S. Women’s Network 
Against Militarism and the organization Okinawa Women Act Against Military 
Violence. The purpose of the silent walk by these activists, who came together around 
gendered violence associated with US military basing, was to commemorate the 
victims of the Battle of Okinawa whose names were not inscribed on the Cornerstone 
monument, particularly so-called “comfort women.” There were women in countries 
throughout the region who were forced by the Japanese military to participate in an 
institutionalized system of brothels to provide sex to Japanese soldiers (Akibayashi 
2002).  
Debbie Quinata, anti-US base activist and current leader of the Chamorro 
Nation of Guam, made the following comments to hundreds of Okinawans gathered in 
2005 to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa:  
 
“I feel a strong kinship with Okinawans. I should tell you that all day 
long, as we traveled around your island, I’ve seen people who look just 
like my aunties and uncles at home. And I’ve talked to people who feel 
just like I do. We are Pacific Island peoples who are tired of our islands 
being militarily occupied by colonial powers.”  
                                                
179 Personal communication, October 23, 2006; emphasis added. 
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Quinata was followed by anti-US military activist and lawyer Corazon Fabros from 
the Philippines, who spoke of how Filipinos share with Chamorros and Okinawans a 
history of Japanese and American invasion and military rule, and subsequent long-
term US military presence.  
A month following this event, Debbie Quinata took the time to point out to me 
another experience shared by Okinawans, Koreans and Chamorros. I was in her native 
Guam. It was our second day of driving around the island in order to give me a sense 
of current US military presence.180 Quinata took a detour to what looked like a tiny 
park, a small patch of grass in front of a shorn hillside. Tropical foliage hung low over 
large gaping holes in the white stone of the hill. A bronze plaque in front of them read: 
 
Japanese San Ramon Caves 
 
The six caves in this cliff are part of an extensive island-wide cave 
system used by the Japanese. The caves are an example of the tunneling 
created by the Japanese military throughout the Pacific islands in the 
1940s. They were built by Chamorro, Okinawan and Korean forced 
labor using primitive tools working under extreme conditions. 
 
Quinata’s incorporation of the San Ramon Caves into her tour of US military 
sites may have seemed like a fascinating historical side trip if I had not already seen 
similar natural and human-made “Japanese caves” in South Korea, the Philippines, 
and Okinawa, and if I had not been taken to see the caves by anti-US military activists 
in each of these places (see figure 5.1). These earthen relics scattered across the region 
embody relations—initially created by the Japanese military and now sustained by the 
                                                
180 Currently, the US military occupies a third of Guam’s roughly 210 square miles. This proportion is 
expected to grow considerably in the next decade if the controversial plan to redeploy Marines now 
stationed in Okinawa to Guam is realized. 
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US military$between a particular people and place and among peoples in these 
different places. That anti-US base activists in each locale thought it important for me 
to see the caves highlights the meaning these activists themselves find in such 
relations. The connections activists are making between their respective histories of 
Japanese imperialism and contemporary experience of US military presence implies a 
global analysis of particular circumstances. In other words, while such connections 
can only emerge out of a strong attachment between a particular people and place, 
they rest fundamentally on these activists’ ability to locate their particular history and 
circumstances within a world-historical context that exposes the imperial dimensions 
of the state system and contemporary foreign military basing. Collectively, they 
expose the irony in the United States’ (and in most cases, at least for a time, local 
populations’) representation of the US military as “liberator” of peoples in the region 
and thus the “solution” to empire, as they condemn continued US military occupation 
sixty years on. It is in their world-historical sensibility that we also see how the 
politics of US militarization in Okinawa increasingly intersects with the politics of 
contemporary self-determination movements globally. Okinawan activists’ global 
analysis of their current circumstances creates political space in which to consider 
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Figure 5.1 Caves used by Japanese military forces. From top to bottom, San Ramon 
Caves in Guam; the entrance to caves at Himeyuri in Okinawa, where Okinawan 
schoolgirls were conscripted to serve as nurses to care for wounded Japanese soldiers 
inside the caves; and a beachside cave in Seoguipo, Jeju Island, South Korea used for 
storing munitions and supplies. 
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Connecting empires globally: Okinawan autonomy and collective rights claims 
Politicizing Okinawan ethnic identity in the current conjuncture makes 
possible the emergence of claims rooted not in rights conferred by citizenship but by 
new political identities that emphasize territorialized collective rights. Activists’ 
broader connections and claims reflect how their analysis links their struggle against 
the relations of internal colonial basing with contemporary anti-imperialist struggles 
more generally.  
One effort in recent years has seen scholars, policy makers and activists181 
come together over a common recognition of the Ry!ky!ans’ ethnic and historical 
distinctiveness as a people (minzoku) to lay out a vision, in concrete terms, of what a 
self-governing Okinawa might look like (Okinawa jichi kenkyu kai 2002, 2004a, 
2005). The group was initially established as the Study Group on Okinawan Self-
governance$Okinawa jichi kenkyu kai, or “Jichiken”$by scholars of constitutional 
law, politics and public policy at the University of the Ry!ky!s and Okinawa 
International University. So while Jichiken is not an activist organization per se, it is 
far from just an intellectual exercise. All members’ biographies reveal their 
progressive and activist backgrounds in the reversion movement and anti-base 
activism since.  
At the same time, the legal expertise and public policy bent of its founders has 
led the group to tackle head-on the practical matters of self-governance, and what it 
would take to get from A to B. This begs the question: Where is B? In general terms, it 
is the point where inhabitants of the Ry!ky!s can collectively think about and decide 
what the islands’ future should look like. Jichiken member Shimabukuro Jun explains: 
 
                                                
181 These are simplistic distinctions which do not capture the rich biographies and personal passions of 
Jichiken members. I use them only to give a sense of the kinds of actors involved in this particular 
project. 
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“Of course we each have personal ideas and preferences about 
Okinawa’s future, but as a group we don’t want to impose a definition 
or a course for self-governance. Rather than deciding what self-
governance entails in concrete political terms, our immediate goal now 
is to get more Uchinanch! thinking and talking about what it means 
and how it might help Okinawa move beyond our current 
circumstances. Along with this we want to get the political structure to 
a point where Uchinanch! could collectively determine our future 
outside the limiting control of the Japanese government.”182    
 
For the members of Jichiken, because Okinawa’s identity as a distinct people is 
inseparable from territory, greater autonomy means greater political and economic 
autonomy over the whole of the Ry!ky! Islands. Central to this would be to reclaim 
Okinawans’ right as a people to negotiate their own diplomatic relations 
(gaik"ken)$now only a right of states$in order to negotiate with the United States 
government directly (Okinawa jichi kenkyu kai 2004b). Jichiken members have spent 
the last several years researching and theorizing different paths Okinawans could take 
to greater autonomy, looking at a range of case studies of “home rule” and different 
forms of self-governance, including Scotland and the Äland Islands (under Finland’s 
jurisdiction).  
After three years of mostly internal working groups, Jichiken began organizing 
its activities toward making the project a more popular endeavor. In 2003 the group 
began holding open meetings, inviting progressive politicians, municipal 
administrators, and anyone else who could lend skills or interest to the project. In 
December 2004, Jichiken convened an international conference of researchers of 
different forms of self-governance. The second day of the conference was a 
symposium aimed at the general public. Early in 2005, the group again held a public 
forum to introduce the project more broadly. It was attended by close to 200 people, 
including progressive intellectuals, local elected officials, municipal administrators, 
                                                
182 Personal interview, June 14, 2005. 
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veteran activists, local media and one curious graduate student from upstate New 
York. The forum was intended to introduce their effort, increase involvement by a 
broader constituency, and to seek input about the next steps.183  
As a way of introducing the possibilities for greater collective autonomy in 
Okinawa, Jichiken members posited three basic paths at the public forum. Notable 
about these proposals is that they capture the transitional moment in Okinawa. The 
first would be to work within the constitution and be based on rights of local 
governance provided for in Article 95 of Chapter VIII, which pertains to local self-
government, and/or to explore the possibilities for Okinawan self-governance in 
current national moves toward greater decentralization; the second would work 
“outside” the constitutional framework, seeking instead a form of territorial autonomy 
where Okinawa’s right to negotiate its own diplomatic relations; the third would 
consider paths to independence. The group published a booklet on the same themes 
aimed at the general public entitled Okinawa as a self-governing region: What do you 
think? (Okinawa jichi kenkyu kai 2005). Together the proposals reflect the 
ambivalence within Okinawa today: while citizenship remains a meaningful category 
for some, it is being challenged and reworked by others.  
Jichiken’s proposal to work outside the constitutional framework resonates 
with ideas and efforts by Okinawan activists for whom Japanese political institutions 
are no longer a viable course for redress. The statement below introduces the handbook 
Questions and Answers: International Human Rights Law and the Ry#ky#s/Okinawa, 
written and self-published in 2003 by the Association for Indigenous Peoples in 
Okinawa and the Ry!ky!s184 (AIPR): 
                                                
183 Personal notes, February 30, 2004. 
184 AIPR members use the inclusive phrase “Okinawa and the Ry!ky!s” to highlight the linguistic and 
cultural diversity among the peoples throughout the Ry!ky! Archipelago. The Japanese government 
instituted the use of “Okinawa” to refer to the all the islands when it overthrew the Ry!ky! Kingdom 
and designated the entire territory Okinawa Prefecture (Okinawa-ken). The frequently used word 
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“It has become abundantly clear that…we, the people of the Ry!ky!s 
and Okinawa are placed outside the framework of protections provided 
for in the Japanese constitution.” 
 
AIPR was founded in 1998 by Chinen Hidenori, owner and head instructor of a 
private English language school, a year after he first participated in a United Nations 
meeting on indigenous rights. Chinen was initially invited to attend the UN by the 
Shimin Gaik# Centre, an indigenous and human rights advocacy organization based in 
Tokyo. Upon returning to Okinawa, he set out to find others who were interested in 
establishing an organization that would approach Okinawan issues from an indigenous 
rights perspective systematically. Chinen writes,  
 
“After that [initial participation], the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ 
became an entry point to fundamentally reconsider the various 
problems Okinawa faces from the perspective of human rights and 
international law. We saw a new means of getting our voices out to the 
world” (Ry#ky#-ha no senj#minzoku 2004). 
 
Like activists such as Takazato Suzuyo of OWAAMV, AIPR members are 
what Sidney Tarrow (2005) identifies as “rooted cosmopolitans”—the “agents of 
interaction” who connect dense social networks together in transnational spaces.185 As 
a group, AIPR members have more experience traveling and living outside Okinawa 
and outside Japan than most Okinawan activists. Although language has at times 
become a barrier without interpretation, most of them have come to feel at ease with 
                                                
Uchinanch# refers only to inhabitants of Okinawa Island, or Uchinaa, in the language dominant there 
and immediately surrounding islands, uchinaguchi. Those from the over one hundred outlying islands 
have not historically referred to themselves as Uchinanch#, though in Japanese and English they are 
subsumed under the term “Okinawan.”  
185 Tarrow defines rooted cosmopolitans as “individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and 
international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external 
opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with transnational allies.” See Sidney Tarrow, The 
New Transnational Activism. Cambridge University Press, 2005:43. 
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international travel, attending UN meetings and global conferences. However, the 
connections AIPR members make challenge the concept of “the transnational” 
employed by Tarrow and other prominent social movements scholars contributing to 
the study of transnational social movements.186 Tarrow’s concept of rooted 
cosmopolitans uses “national” in a state-centric sense, so that the national context is 
the territorialized, domestic political realm of a particular state and “transnational” 
networks are those between people in different nation-state contexts, albeit sometimes 
forged within international institutional settings. This conceptualization would not 
recognize the connections between Okinawan and Ainu activists within Japan as 
transnational in character. An historically grounded view of Okinawan-Ainu 
interactions belies the conventional interpretation, and suggests that more can be 
learned by moving beyond solely a statist view of “the national.” I am not suggesting 
that tracing actions and coalitions outside of state contexts is unimportant or lacks 
analytical value. My own effort to do so in this and the previous chapter highlights the 
extent to which Okinawans are becoming increasingly disillusioned with their ability 
to change their circumstances within Japan’s political institutions, and what might be 
gained by going beyond them. However, by also taking seriously the dynamic 
relations and processes that challenge the taken-for-grantedness of the state, this study 
is better positioned to understand how the state form itself, and international political 
space more generally, might be changing precisely because of cosmopolitans and their 
networks rooted in other kinds of nations.  
                                                
186 See, for example, Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, Transnational Social 
Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. Syracuse University Press, 1997; Jackie 
Smith and Hank Johnston, eds., Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social 
Movements. Rowman & Littlefield, 2002; Sanjeev Khagram,  James V. Riker, Kathryn Sikkink, eds., 
Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms. University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003; and Donatella della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, eds., Transnational Protest and 
Global Activism, Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. 
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The emergence of claims based on Ry!ky!ans’ relationship to Japan as a 
minority and as indigenous peoples reflects an historically new perspective on 
Okinawa’s circumstances. Although the universal identities “minority” and 
“indigenous people” are founded on a general notion of rights, both sets of rights are a 
postwar phenomenon. It was the “modern” resolution of the last major crisis of 
sovereignty$the globalization of the state form consequent upon the decolonization 
movement$that provided the current manifestation of self-determination movements 
a basis within the international human rights regime. With already-codified human 
rights as the blueprint for their ongoing elaboration, however, minority and indigenous 
rights introduced a collective framework that challenges the individualistic rights 
associated with liberal citizenship. I elaborate on the politics of the differences 
between minority and indigeneity in the following chapter, but for now it is important 
to note that both apply to the collective circumstances of a people vis-à-vis a state.187 
The Okinawan context grew to parallel such conditions only after 1972, after 
Okinawans and their territory were subsumed within the state-citizen relationship. 
As with the notion of a distinct nation/people (minzoku) employed by Jichiken, 
because minority and indigenous rights emphasize collective experience, they offer a 
more holistic interpretive framework for thinking about the interrelationship among 
issues often taken up separately (e.g. environment, gender equality, preservation of 
language and other cultural practices, economic rights). This appeals to AIPR activists 
and others who see US military presence as just one problem, albeit a central problem, 
that intersects with many others stemming from Okinawans’ relation with Japan. So 
although military base issues figure prominently in AIPR members’ interpretations of 
Okinawa’s ills, the group’s approach is rooted in two basic convictions. First, that the 
                                                
187 Or states, given that many people’s territories were arbitrarily divided and subsumed within adjacent 
states in the process of decolonization. 
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problems associated with the bases emanate from Okinawa’s unresolved colonial 
relationship with Japan. Second, that Okinawa’s problems ultimately cannot be solved 
within the national political context. AIPR member and high school teacher Ueshiro 
Masako explains how these premises shape the relationship between the organization 
and the larger movement against US military presence. 
 
“Our activities are based on a long-term perspective on the 
Ry!ky!s….Of course we fully support the ongoing campaigns, like 
stopping the construction at Henoko and closing Futenma, and 
particular efforts to address the base problems, and AIPR members 
often participate in anti-base rallies and campaigns. I think we all see 
our activities as AIPR, as an organization, as part of the anti-base 
activities because we raise awareness about the base problems, but also 
because our goal is to change the relationship with Japan. To do this we 
must raise awareness among Uchinanch! about our rights as a people, 
and about how taking our case and forging other relationships beyond 
Japan may help our circumstances. Also, we must assert our rights like 
other sovereign peoples188 of the world.…We need to let the world 
know about the Ry!ky!s, our history, and how the US uses the 
relationship between Japan and the Ry!ky!s to do whatever it wants 
here.”189  
 
For AIPR members, the concept “indigenous people” is meaningful because it 
offers a new way for Okinawans themselves to think about their circumstances and 
their rights. In particular, it foregrounds the historical connection between Ry!ky!ans 
and their territory(ies), as well as the notion that they have a collective right to social, 
cultural, economic and political self-determination within that territory. Within 
Okinawa, most of AIPR activities are aimed at raising awareness about human rights 
and specifically indigenous rights. In addition to holding public meetings to report on 
                                                
188 Indigenous activists demand a voice alongside state governments within the UN, drawing a sharp 
distinction between their participation and that of non-governmental organizations within the United 
Nations and other international bodies. “Indigenous Peoples’ Organization” (IPO) is the official UN 
designation for indigenous groups. 
189 Personal interview, March 3, 2005. 
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their participation in UN fora and other meetings, members hold study groups about 
international rights conventions. As Siddle (2003) points out, media coverage is an 
important part of AIPR’s strategy within Okinawa. AIPR proactively contacts 
Okinawa’s two main newspapers, the Ry#ky# Shimp" and the Okinawa Times, to 
initiate coverage on their activities and the rationale behind them.  
The notion of indigeneity also provides a fundamentally different way for 
those unfamiliar with Okinawa to understand the islanders’ circumstances. Oyakawa 
Y!ko, a women’s counselor in the Chatan city office and AIPR member since 1998, 
explains how the concept of indigeneity figures in what she calls “AIPR’s message” 
outside of Japan:  
 
“The US bases are the immediate cause of so many day-to-day 
problems in our society. So when we have an opportunity to speak to 
people outside Okinawa, we must let them know what is happening 
here. No one really knows. But we also must explain why it is 
happening here. No one knows that we are a different people or that the 
Ry!ky!s was once independent. Most think Okinawa is Japan, and 
Okinawans are Japanese. But a lot of people outside Japan know what 
‘indigenous people’ means. So when we talk about our situation and 
say, ‘This and this and this are happening in Okinawa because of the 
US military bases,’ people are always surprised. When we explain that 
Okinawans are not Japanese but indigenous peoples in Japan, suddenly 
our situation makes sense to them. The term ‘indigenous people’ is a 
kind of global code, or a kind of shorthand. But of course people 
usually respond, ‘I didn’t know there were indigenous peoples in 
Japan’.”190 
 
Political identities like indigenous people and minority are thus seen to provide 
Okinawans with new ways of interpreting their circumstances which, if not concrete 
means of redress, allow them to find and create additional political space for telling an 
alternate version of the history and contemporary circumstances of the Ry!ky!s. In 
                                                
190 Personal interview, March 13, 2004. 
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this regard, Okinawan activists join the Ainu in intervening in dominant 
representations of Japan as a mono-ethnic and historically and territorially coherent 
nation-state (Siddle 2003). In November 2006 Shimabukuro Rin represented AIPR at 
the First Northeast Asia Meeting for Indigenous Organizations, held in Taiwan. Long-
time Ainu activist Hasegawa Yuuki represented the Ainu Resource Centre at the same 
meeting. Such alliances make the interventions each group is making part of a larger 
intervention, evoking previous modes of East Asian interstate relations. 
By intervening in dominant representations of Japan within UN fora focusing 
on indigenous and minority issues, these activists also engage the Japanese 
government in new ways. AIPR has sent its members to various United Nations 
meetings since 1999, though individuals in the organization began attending UN 
meetings in 1996. The organization sends representatives annually to the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations. In doing so they compel the Japanese government 
to formulate and make public Japan’s official position on its historical relationship to 
Okinawa in ways that the government would not have to otherwise. Ongoing Ainu 
activism in international fora, particularly their participation in United Nations 
meetings on indigenous issues, made it impossible for the Japanese government to 
remain silent on Ainu self-determination claims (Dietz 1999; Lewellan 2008). While 
of course official or formal recognition means little in and of itself, until Ainu began 
participating in indigenous for a, Tokyo had no reason to send representatives to UN 
meetings on indigenous issues, let alone make formal statements regarding indigenous 
matters when they arose within other UN agencies and human rights venues.  
In addition to compelling the Japanese government’s participation in new 
kinds of political spaces, leverage comes from the institutional requirements of 
international human rights conventions. As a signatory to various conventions, the 
Japanese government is obligated to report periodically on its compliance with each. 
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For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the 
Japanese government ratified in 1979, recognizes in Article 27 the right of “ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language” (United Nations, 1994a). It is in 
reference to this article of the ICCPR that Japan was finally compelled to acknowledge 
the existence of the Ainu, which it had long denied (Dietz 1999). The Japanese 
government managed to draw out its formulation of its stance on Ainu indigeneity 
over two decades, 191 but in 2001 it finally acknowledged the Ainu as a distinct ethnic 
minority that originally inhabited Hokkaido. In June 2008, the Diet finally passed a 
resolution recognizing Ainu as “an indigenous people with a distinct language, 
religion and culture.”192 By airing their grievances in a political space that compels a 
response by the Japanese government, Okinawans have played the same hand as their 
Ainu counterparts. 
                                                
191 In its first report to the ICCPR, submitted in 1980, the Japanese government briefly stated that 
“minorities of the kind mentioned in the Covenant do not exist in Japan” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Initial Report of Japan to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR/C/10/Add.1, 
1980). By the time Tokyo submitted its second report seven years later, action on the part of the Ainu 
made it difficult for the government to maintain this stance. Although it did not use the term “minority”, 
the government acknowledged that the Ainu “preserve their own religion and language, and maintain 
their own culture” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Second Periodic Report of Japan to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR/C/42/Add.4, 1988). In 1991, the government referred to 
Ainu as a minority, but stressed their equality with ethnic Japanese as Japanese citizens. It added 
information (referring back as far as 1974) on its welfare initiatives and measures aimed at “improving 
their living environment” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Third Periodic Report of Japan to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  CCPR/C/70/Add.1, 1992). Although in 1997 
Tokyo finally acknowledged that the Ainu “lived in Hokkaido… even before the Wajin [ethnic 
Japanese], it still insisted that the land on which they lived was “inherent Japanese territory (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Fourth Periodic Report of Japan to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. CCPR/C/115/Add.3, 1998). Its fifth report in 2006 came two years before the government 
officially recognized the Ainu as an indigenous people, though for the first time it made no attempt to 
describe its official view of their status. The government had clearly come to see such reports as an 
opportunity to detail its policies aimed at “promoting Ainu culture” and “improving the standard of 
living of the Ainu people in Hokkaido” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fifth Periodic Report of Japan to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR/C/JPN/5, 2007).  
192 See Philippa Fogarty, “Recognition at last for Japan's Ainu,” BBC News (June 6, 2008). Retrieved 
June 7, 2008 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7437244.stm). 
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Again, that such a strategy will, on its own, lead to effective redress remains 
unlikely, and AIPR members themselves are quick to point this out. But it does 
contribute to the pressures on Tokyo in new ways. This is perhaps especially the case 
in relation to the government of Japan because demonstrating that its national 
institutions meet, at least in form, “international standards” has long been a concern of 
Japanese leaders. Scholar of Japanese social movements Susan Pharr explains a 
version of what Keck and Sikkink (1998) later termed the “boomerang effect”: that 
activists in Japan have been able to gain leverage in relation to the government “by 
building ties with protest groups abroad and by taking part in international conferences 
where foreign media attention can be directed to social problems within Japan” (Pharr 
1990: 231). Long-time Japanese human rights activist and founder of the indigenous 
rights advocacy group Shimin Gaik# Centre, Uemura Hideaki, makes a similar 
observation, though he is less sanguine than Pharr was seventeen years ago:  
 
“Although I think the Japanese government’s so-called ‘peace-keeping 
mission’ in America’s war in Iraq suggests that it is trying to create a 
different, tougher image and prove that it can be a major military 
partner of the US in the future, unlike the United States the Japanese 
government still appears to care about its international image. Japan 
still has a national inferiority complex which makes Japanese leaders 
want to demonstrate in the international arena that Japan is just like a 
modern Western country, which at least says it protects rights. Of 
course the irony here is that it was in part because of Japanese leaders’ 
desire to be like a modern Western country that led them to expand 
imperially, including to the Ry!ky!s. And obviously Western 
governments’ records don’t often live up to their rhetoric, which gives 
the Japanese government similar leeway. The government’s human 
rights record is abysmal from our standpoint. But we can still use its 
susceptibility to external expectations to make it change its stance on 
issues. Then we go from there.”193 
 
                                                
193 Personal interview, June 1, 2005. 
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Politicization of Okinawan identity and employment of political identities like 
“indigenous people” also creates opportunities for new kinds of interventions around 
militarization. Okinawan activists offer a new lens on the politics of US military 
presence in Okinawa, which in turn contributes significantly to the growing focus on 
and awareness of the militarization of indigenous and minority territories$both by the 
state that claims sovereignty over their territory and, in cases like Okinawa, through 
the state’s complicity in foreign military basing. The following statement, given by 
Omine Nariko to the 2005 United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
(WGIP),194 is emblematic of the kinds of oral reports AIPR members make in the 
WGIP and related fora195 about the everyday effects of US military presence and 
structures contributing to its continuation: 
 
“Last year, I had an opportunity to speak to the Working Group 
about my homeland in relation to the theme ‘conflict resolution.’…I’m 
afraid to say the situation has not changed at all since last year. In fact, 
it is getting worse every day.…First, just three weeks ago, on July 2nd, 
a 10-year old girl was sexually molested by a US military 
servicemember. This is the latest in a long history of sexual violence by 
US military personnel against Okinawan women. Second, in August of 
last year, just after our delegation returned to Okinawa, a U.S military 
transport helicopter crashed into a local university and the surrounding 
neighborhood. The U.S military prohibited city officials, university 
                                                
194 The Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) was established under the auspices of the 
Commission on Human Rights in 1982. It became the first regularly held forum within the United 
Nations on indigenous issues. The WGIP was the culmination of years of pressure from indigenous 
activists, mostly from the Americas. Buoyed by “native” civil rights movements and other anti-
imperialist movements around the world, indigenous mobilization gained strength in the 1970s and 
began reaching, in solidarity, across what they argued were to them arbitrary borders. In the twenty-five 
years since its inception, however, the WGIP has grown to become the largest, regularly held meeting 
in the entire UN system. The original mandate of the WGIP was two-fold: to elaborate a draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and to update the international community on 
developments within indigenous communities. The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration in 
September 2007. 
195 AIPR has also sent representatives to meetings of the subsequent Draft Declaration Working Group, 
the World Conference Against Racism (which they attended with Resident Koreans, Ainu and other 
communities as a delegation from Japan), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and hearings convened by the Commission on 
Human Rights to review member states’ compliance with international human rights.   
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authorities, police and the press from entering the crash site. We 
Okinawans were not allowed to investigate the crash. Third, the U.S. 
military has built a new live-fire urban warfare training facility located 
just 250 meters from a residential area and highway. In Guam, the U.S 
military tried to build a facility like this, but cancelled the plan because 
it was too close to a residential area. Those who live close to the 
Okinawa facility have led a growing opposition against its construction. 
In response to strong opposition, the Japanese government and U.S 
military finally agreed to relocate the facility. However, the U.S 
military insists that it will use the current location until a substitute is 
completed. It began using the facility last week. They can do this 
because of the unequal “Status of Forces” agreement governing US 
military practices in Japan, which allows the US to ignore the rights of 
Okinawans, and because the Japanese government does not stand up to 
protect Okinawans.” 
  
Okinawan indigenous rights activists are also forging new kinds of alliances, 
as they seek to strengthen their ties with other indigenous groups mobilizing around 
militarization (Siddle 2003). At the 2004 Working Group for Indigenous Populations, 
members of AIPR co-sponsored a strategy workshop entitled Indigenous Peoples and 
Militarization with the Shimin Gaik# Centre (Dietz, Omine and Oshiro 2005).196 
AIPR’s formal call for “indigenous rights and militarization” to be adopted by the 
WGIP as its main theme, which changes annually, was echoed by several indigenous 
organizations. This call was heeded and, in 2006, the UN saw its first formal meeting 
on the issue of indigenous rights and militarization—in effect a global conference on 
internal colonial basing. 
Although mobilizing as a minority and an indigenous people has allowed a 
group of Okinawan activists to create new political spaces in which to intervene in 
dominant understandings of Japan and US military presence in Okinawa, the 
international cache of the concept ‘indigenous people’ itself has been slower to catch 
on among Okinawan activists than AIPR members originally hoped. Although some 
                                                
196 This author participated in the workshop as a representative of the Shimin Gaik# Centre. 
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Okinawan scholars use the term (see, for example, Taira 1997), it has yet to gain a 
place in everyday self-descriptions. The problem seems to stem from preconceptions 
of the term as a descriptor of a particular way of life, rather than as a political position 
vis-à-vis states.197 “I think too many associate the term with$what do you call 
it?$the hunter-gatherer tradition, which isn’t compatible with Uchinanch! self-
perception of our traditional lifestyle,” explains member Toma Shisei.198 Ambivalence 
may also reflect a degree of local resistance to the institutionalizing effects 
characteristic of the NGO sector (c.f. Feldman 1997), particularly when the influence 
is seen to come from Japan. “Initially I think some activists were suspicious of the 
idea [of mobilizing around indigeneity] because it seemed to be the idea of a Japanese 
NGO,” offered Oyakawa Y!ko, referring to the early influence and ongoing support 
by the Tokyo-based Shimin Gaik# Centre. She continued: 
 
“A lot of Uchinanch! have experience with Japanese activists who are 
well-intentioned but come to Okinawa proclaiming, ‘I’ve come to help 
Okinawans fight the US military!’ They raise their fists at the gates of 
the US bases, make stops at Henoko and Kin to validate their 
Okinawan ‘peace tour’, and they leave saying, ‘Don’t give up!’ 
(gambatte!), as if the problem is just ours to solve and can only be 
solved here. Most don’t have a deeper consciousness about Japan’s 
role, which is to say their own role, in our circumstances. This attitude 
feels patronizing and a lot of Uchinanch! activists are, frankly, tired of 
it. But of course some Japanese are different. The Shimin Gaik# Centre 
is different. That group’s starting point is that Japan is a colonizer of 
the Ry!ky!s, and so Japanese people must stand up and take 
responsibility. [SGC founder] Uemura-san sees the struggle against US 
bases and for Ry!ky! rights as equally the responsibility of 
Yamatonch!, about making their country a better country. He always 
says, ‘Let’s not give up’ (gambarimash").”199 
                                                
197 At the same time, Japan’s ideographic language captures the political meaning of indigenous peoples 
and indigenous rights quite well. The term “indigenous peoples” (senj# minzoku) highlights the 
chronological ordering of human settlement and (though implied) rule in a given territory:  sen 
(preceding, or before) j# (to live) minzoku (nation, or people). Accordingly, indigenous rights 
(senj#ken) locates rights with a people who lived in given territory first. 
198 Personal notes, June 23, 2004. 
199 Personal interview, March 13, 2004. 
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That the term indigenous people as a political identity may not catch on 
popularly within Okinawa does not seem to concern AIPR’s members. They see merit 
in the formal and informal interventions it allows Okinawans to make outside 
Okinawa—within Japan, at the United Nations and elsewhere—and in what the notion 
has lent to local discussions about Okinawa’s future. The sentiments of member 
Miyazato Gosamaru, a 41-year old physical therapist, capture those expressed by other 
members about the use of the term indigenous people, and why its meaning is what 
makes it useful but not absolutely necessary:  
 
“Looking at Okinawa’s history and our current circumstances from an 
indigenous rights perspective makes perfect sense to me. It also offers 
new places in which Uchinanch! have a voice, where we can stand 
alongside the US and Japanese governments, and other nations like us 
whose sovereignty is, for statist political reasons, not recognized. But it 
might not be the term Okinawans want to use to describe themselves. In 
the end, of course I don’t care about the term. I care about the outcome. 
It’s not really necessary to use the term ‘indigenous people’ within 
Okinawa. We can talk about the idea of self-determination (jit" 
ketteiken) in different ways. We don’t have to use difficult or 
unfamiliar terms or labels. What we notice is that more Okinawans 
understand and agree that, as a people, we have a right to decide our 
future for ourselves (minzoku toshite jibun no shorai o jibun de kimeru 
kenri). From this perspective, AIPR is getting support, even from 
veteran activists. They were skeptical of our activities at first. I think 
they thought our movement was faddish, but then they recognized that 
we were serious, and of course they agree with our direction, and 
efforts to get more people involved in thinking about how Okinawa’s 
future could be different.”200  
 
Thus while the political idea of indigeneity has helped AIPR members contribute to 
the opening of a dialogue amongst Okinawans about the Ry!ky!s as a locus of rights, 
                                                
200 Personal interview, June 4, 2005. 
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the label itself is not essential to continuing the dialogue regarding their future and 
their relation to Japan and the United States.  
 
Meanings of self-determination 
The future most Okinawan activists envision does not, at least for now, involve 
independence. At the same time, their alternative to Ry!ky!an independence is clearly 
not the status quo; it is not citizenship according to the dominant rendering. They 
overwhelmingly articulate something new: a self-determination rooted in citizenship, 
but which differs from and challenges the notion of self-determination located in the 
individual liberal subject via a representational state. Instead they imagine a self-
determination located in the collectivity within the state. 
When I asked AIPR members what self-determination means to them, like 
Jichiken members nearly all answered that it was a collective decision for all 
Okinawans and that AIPR’s goal was to help realize that decision. Pushing each of 
them a bit more on what they personally hoped for Okinawa, only one of the six core 
members saw independence as the end goal. Instead they expressed a desire to see a 
different political arrangement where Okinawa would remain a part of Japan but 
Okinawans would exercise collective autonomy in the Ry!ky!s. “What government 
leaders seem not to understand is the right to self-determination does not have to mean 
independence. They interpret it this way because they are stuck in their own statist 
ideas,” offered Chinen Hidenori. “The so-called ‘reversion movement’ should be 
viewed in this way. It too was an exercise of Uchinanch! will, an exercise of our 
collective right to determine our future for ourselves. We haven’t lost the right to self-
determination as a people just because we chose to be a part of Japan. We still have 
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our right to determine our future, but this means that it’s our decision how to execute 
our self-determination,” he said.201 
 This same sentiment—the vision of reworking Okinawa’s political relationship 
with Japan so that Okinawa has more autonomy—was shared by over 80% of the 
nearly 100 anti-base activists I interviewed. For all of them, “more autonomy” meant a 
form of ethnicized and territorialized autonomy, via which people across the Ry!ky! 
Islands would have greater political, cultural and economic control over the islands 
than the central government. What greater self-determination might look like in 
practice was expressed in a number of ways. For example,  
 
“We need to have more control over which corporations participate in 
Okinawa’s tourist industry. Now, major Japanese corporations have 
come to dominate the hotel and airline industries, so that most of the 
profits leave Okinawa.” 
 
“The education system needs to provide for instruction in Ry!ky!an 
languages.” 
 
“Our agricultural products are becoming less diverse due to outside 
pressures to practice mono-cropping. Tobacco is taking over.” 
 
“National textbooks obscure the real history of the Ry!ky!s and our 
relationship to Japan. History education needs to be rethought with the 
oversight of Uchinanch! scholars and perspectives.” 
 
“Exploitation of our natural resources by outsiders must be stopped. 
More monitoring of resource use would be possible if we had more 
autonomy. Now the bases and construction and Japanese corporate 
interests take priority.” 
 
“Okinawans must have the right to negotiate with the US and close the 
US bases.”202 
 
                                                
201 Personal notes, March 7, 2004. 
202 Personal interviews, July 3, 2004; October 17, 2004; January 30, 2005; March 4, 2005. 
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When asked if autonomy within Japan differed from their “ideal future,” 
roughly one-half of my interviewees replied that an independent Ry!ky!s is their 
ideal, but not feasible or practical (approximately 40%) or not practical for a 
considerably long time (approximately 60%). Different ways in which the latter 
expressed “a long time” ranged from 50 years, several generations, and the remainder 
of this century. Among those who saw an independent Ry!ky! nation as the ideal 
outcome, in addition to a general uneasiness about it “going well,” the main reasons 
they gave for the impracticality of independence include: concerns about Okinawa’s 
ability to compete economically; the related fear of becoming an impoverished island 
that then would be forced to turn to outsiders (especially Japan) for assistance, risking 
dependence and coercion of a neo-colonial sort. Reflecting the power of dominant 
rhetoric in Japanese media, and perhaps drawing on collective histories of the 
Ry!ky!s as a Chinese tributary state, some interviewees expressed a concern over 
China asserting hegemonic power over an independent Ry!ky!s. More expressed their 
distrust in Japanese, American and also Okinawan leaders when they cited the 
potential for Okinawa to be reoccupied militarily by the US and/or Japan, or (for a 
few) the risk of future Okinawan leaders’ decision to make a deal with either of the 
two countries and allow military basing again. 
Finally, the concept of self-determination articulated in my interviews is a 
demilitarized one. Not surprisingly, all interviewees saw eventual if not immediate 
removal of the US bases as an essential element of an autonomous arrangement. Much 
more telling than their thoughts on US bases were their answers regarding Japanese 
military presence at this juncture. Without exception, anti-US base activists did not 
want Japanese military forces to remain in the Ry!ky!s. Only two out of nearly 100 
activists added that it might become necessary in the future (the same two also 
expressed concerns about a more powerful China). Okinawans’ historical mistrust of 
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Japan’s militarism is bolstered by their increasing lack of faith in the government’s 
willingness to protect its Okinawan citizens.  
As with activists’ emphasis on Ry!ky!an histories of independence and 
colonialism in their reinterpretation of their citizenship and US military basing, the 
new political identities and ideas of self-determination emerging within the Okinawan 
anti-base movement implicate Japanese rule in ways far beyond a critique of any one 
particular administration’s policies. They challenge the very meaning and legitimacy 
of the Japanese state in Okinawa’s socio-political context. Individually and together, 
these identities and the ideas embodied in them de-center the Japanese state as the 
locus of sovereignty and as a legitimate source of protection.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I sought to complicate this study’s narrative of what citizen 
relations have meant for Okinawa and the anti-base movement. In the previous 
chapters, I demonstrated how, because reincorporation of Okinawa into Japan changed 
the terms through which US occupation continued, it also shaped the ways it is 
challenged. Okinawans’ citizenship had the effect of channeling most protest through 
institutionalized channels. This chapter shows that, as a relation rooted in coloniality, 
Okinawans’ citizen relations also shape the mode of struggle in another, potentially 
transformative way. The conditions of internal colonial basing reinforce Okinawans’ 
experiences as ethnically marginalized citizens, facilitating a global analysis of their 
citizen relations and more fundamental challenges to the Japanese state.  
However, Okinawan activists’ rearticulation of the territorial relations with the 
state does not displace citizenship as a meaningful relation. Rather, the emergence of 
new identities, claims and visions alongside longer-standing demands for equal rights 
reflects a transitional moment in which the contradictions of internal colonial basing 
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dislodge liberal citizenship as the only meaningful relation. The alternative future 
articulated by many Okinawan activists is nation-centric rather than state-centric, yet 
still claims territorial autonomy over social, political, cultural and economic life. Of 
course the potential challenges embodied in such a redefinition of self-determination 
and citizenship are not lost on Japanese leaders. As the following chapter will show, 
how the Japanese government is taking a relationship to Okinawan rearticulations of 
their citizenship sheds light on the politics of collective rights within Japan, which 
increasingly parallels the contestation over sovereignty globally. 




THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE RIGHTS: MULTICULTURALISM, 
TERRITORIALITY AND THE SUBJECT OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
“Take time to enjoy Okinawans’ vibrant and distinct island culture, which enriches 
Japan’s diversity.”  
 
~ Unnamed Japanese official, speaking to world leaders gathered for the Group of 
Eight meeting in Okinawa in 2000.203 
 
“In post-colonial Africa and Asia, autochthonous groups/minorities/ethnic 
groups/peoples cannot… claim for themselves, unilaterally and exclusively, the 
‘indigenous’ status in the United Nations context. …These States whose existence as 
such is, in the majority of cases, very recent - have not only the right but also the duty 
to preserve their fragile territorial integrity. The risk to such States of breaking up (or 
‘balkanization’) which such unilateral claims to ‘indigenousness’ imply naturally 
cannot be taken lightly.” 
 
~ UN report on the status of state treaties and other arrangements between 
governments and native peoples, in light of increasing indigenous rights claims in 




In the face of increasing collective rights claims emanating from the Ry!ky!s, 
the Japanese government’s response is puzzling. On the one hand, successive 
administrations have taken pains to avoid making official statements domestically and 
internationally regarding the Ry!ky! population’s collective position within Japan, 
namely their status as an ethnic minority or as indigenous peoples. This has been the 
case even when the government is obliged to comment formally as part of its 
                                                
203 Ry#ky# Shimpo, July 19, 2000. 
204 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Fifty-first session, document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20, 
paragraphs 88-90. Retrieved September 3, 2005 from http://daccess-
ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20&Lang=E. 
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international human rights commitments. On the other hand, Japanese officials went 
out of their way to highlight and indeed celebrate the distinct history and culture of the 
Ry!ky! Kingdom in the most prominent of settings, the Group of Eight summit, 
which the Japanese government hosted in Okinawa in 2000. On a related note, Tokyo 
surprised many in when it reversed course and endorsed the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, only to trump this by recognized the Ainu as an 
indigenous people in 2008. 
This chapter explores these divergent approaches by situating the emergence 
and meanings of Okinawans’ collective rights claims, and Tokyo’s responses, within 
national and global context. Why is the government responding to Okinawan activists’ 
new political identities, alliances, and claims differently in different venues? How do 
national and international relations and priorities shape the government’s approach to 
Okinawan claims—and how does the government’s approach shape its relations with 
collective rights claims-makers and other states? What do emergent challenges within 
Okinawa portend for the state-citizen relation, for sovereignty, and for US military 
presence in the islands?  
Just as Okinawan collective rights proponents have learned from Ainu efforts 
within Japan and similar efforts elsewhere, so too have Japanese leaders learned from 
successive administrations’ experience with Ainu activism, as well as other 
governments’ approaches to self-determination claims within their respective borders. 
Tokyo’s divergent responses to Okinawan collective rights claims reflect official 
attempts to shape representations of the Ry!ky!s’ place in Japan—and therefore the 
territory’s place in its relations with the United States. Viewed in the national context, 
official celebrations of Ry!ky!an difference are an effort to co-opt and depoliticize 
this difference, reflecting the central government’s emphasis on a discourse of 
“multicultural Japan” that celebrates regional difference within Japan. Representing 
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Ry!ky!an difference as an integral part of Japan allows Tokyo to assert Japan’s 
territorial reach and shore up its commitments to the US. Such efforts both draw on 
and contribute to strategies of other national governments facing self-determination 
claims within their borders. Rather than merely a case of each government acting to 
protect its own borders, however, the Japanese government’s stance is part of a 
collective effort to delegitimize and/or narrow the meaning of collective rights claims 
globally as a way to preserve the state system and modern territoriality as constituted 
in the postwar era.  
It is this convergence with global politics and Okinawan activists’ alternative 
visions of Okinawa’s relationship with Japan that shed light on the potential 
implications of collective rights claims in Okinawa for both the state-citizen relation 
and for the presence of US forces. The shifts in identity and claims within the anti-
base movement reflect the current world-historical context in which self-determination 
movements have the state as their object of struggle. Contemporary self-determination 
claims in Okinawa mirror those emerging elsewhere, in that, rather than reproduce or 
reject the state, emergent Okinawan claims reflect a desire to rework it and, in 
particular, the exclusionary nature of liberal democratic citizenship under internal 
colonial basing. In their challenge to the state, therefore, Okinawans problematize the 
very premises legitimating US military presence, namely, state sovereignty and 
citizenship. By contributing to the erosion of citizenship and the crisis of the Japanese 
state in the Okinawan context, the United States is pulling the legitimating rug out 
from under its own military presence in the territory.  
 This chapter builds in particular on the previous chapter’s insights about the 
meanings Okinawan activists give to their experiences of internal colonial basing, and 
how these inform their effort to rework their citizen relations. I begin this chapter by 
considering the Japanese government’s differential reactions to Okinawans’ 
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expressions of ethnic difference alongside its approaches to Japan’s other ethnic 
minorities. This directs my attention to how Japan’s national policies intersect with its 
geopolitical relations. In the second half of the chapter, I explore how the politics of 
collective rights within Japan are shaped by, and shape, contestations over the 
meaning of sovereignty globally. This informs some concluding remarks about the 
implications of Okinawan collective rights claims for the state-citizen relation, for our 
understanding of sovereignty, and for US military basing in Okinawa. 
 
The indigenous other within: Okinawa as part of “multicultural Japan” 
Silence and celebration: The Japanese government’s puzzling approach to Ry#ky#an 
difference 
 The government’s divergent responses to Okinawan collective rights claims suggest 
Japanese officials have learned from the government’s drawn out engagement with 
Ainu claims that silence on particular topics and in particular venues may be effective. 
Such an approach has not precluded official representations of the islands, and even 
their distinct history and culture, as an important part of Japan and its geopolitical 
relations. 
In contrast to the fairly regular statements the government has made regarding 
Ainu in UN fora in which Ainu participate, Japanese officials have not referred to 
Okinawans or to the Ry!ky!s despite regular participation by Okinawan activists. This 
has also been Tokyo’s general strategy even when it is obliged to submit reports on the 
status of its measures to uphold international conventions concerning minorities, 
despite the fact that Ry!ky!ans, at 1.3 million strong, are the largest minority group in 
Japan.205 This strategy is notable in part because, as I explained in the previous 
                                                
205 For example, in its 2000 report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in 
which it acknowledged ongoing racism of several different groups within Japanese society, the 
government did not make any reference to Okinawans. Tokyo omitted Okinawans again in 2006, in its 
most recent periodic report to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for which the 
government is obliged to address the status of the protection of minority rights. 
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chapter, it is through such obligatory state reports that Tokyo elaborated, albeit very 
slowly, its official position on its relationship to the Ainu and its policies toward them. 
The government’s silence regarding Okinawans suggests that Japanese officials are 
extremely reluctant to engage in the same process regarding Okinawa.  
One exception seems to prove the rule. Tokyo did respond, quite stridently and 
at length, to a formal report filed by UN Special Rapporteur Doudou Diene (2006) 
following his official visit to Japan. Charged with investigating “contemporary forms 
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance”, Diene focused 
his comments regarding Okinawans on how the presence and impact of US forces 
relates to their collective marginalization. The report begins by noting Japan’s 
overthrow of the Ry!ky! Kingdom and the implementation of “colonialist and 
assimilative policies” (p. 6). Referring to the present, the report states that Okinawans 
are still “rarely consulted on the decisions affecting their island and its future” (p. 14). 
Highlighting the disproportionate siting of US bases concentrated in Okinawan 
territory given its size relative to the rest of Japan, it observes that “the most serious 
discrimination [Okinawans] presently endure is linked to the presence of the American 
military bases in their islands” (p. 14). The report lists a range of effects of the bases, 
noting the systemic negative impact of the bases on “the environment, indigenous 
culture and customs of the Okinawa people” (p. 6). It also points to systemic 
discrimination in the courts, where Okinawans “have almost always lost” cases 
seeking redress for military base impact. Diene concludes the section on Okinawa with 
the statement: “As a consequence, some of the people of Okinawa want it to become 
an independent territory, in order to stop being subject to permanent human rights 
violations” (p. 14).  
Obviously Diene’s is not the first formal report presented in an international 
setting to detail the impact of US military presence in the islands, or to account for 
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military base problems by referencing Japan’s discriminatory treatment of Okinawans. 
Okinawans themselves and third-party NGOs have done so for years. However to this 
author’s knowledge this is the first time such charges regarding US military presence 
have been levied on behalf of an international body.206 This helps explain why Tokyo 
chose this opportunity to address Okinawan matters explicitly.  
In its formal response to Diene’s report, the Japanese government begins by 
challenging the Special Rapporteur’s report en toto on the basis that his comments and 
conclusions are beyond his mandate, given that the “issue of the military bases has no 
relation to the issue of racial discrimination” (Government of Japan 2006:3). The 
government then cites “factual errors” in the report, including its “rare consultation 
with Okinawa” over matters affecting the prefecture. It also takes issue with the 
reasons the report notes for disproportionate US military presence in the Ry!ky!s. It is 
“because of geopolitical and military reasons and not because of discriminatory 
intentions on the part of the Japanese government” (p. 5).207 Repeating Japanese and 
American officials’ common refrain about “lessening the burden” of the bases on 
Okinawans, the government cites the SACO agreement as key evidence.208  
In the end, the government’s response to the Diene report was not about the 
situation or status of Okinawans as much as it was about how US military presence 
                                                
206 At most, reports from UN bodies ask for information, or merely allude to the problems associated 
with US military presence rather than make specific charges. The 2001 report by the UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which monitors progress on the international convention of 
the same name. CERD’s report calls on the government of Japan to provide more information on the 
ethnic composition of its population, including the Okinawan community, adding, “The population on 
Okinawa seeks to be recognized as a specific ethnic group and claims that the existing situation on the 
island leads to acts of discrimination against it.” See “Comments of the Japanese Government on the 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on its initial 
and 2nd periodic reports: Japan,” document  A/56/18, AnnexVIIA, August 10, 2001. Retrieved October 
9, 2006 from 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/cbe5e3370454667bc1256aa700473a65?Opendocument. 
207 The government’s response also correctly points out that some court cases have resulted in 
judgments awarding plaintiffs damages, and it corrects the number of military plane crashes in 
Okinawa, which it claims was wrong in Diene’s report. 
208 For the complete text of Diene’s report, the Japanese government’s retort, and the response to both 
by a consortium of NGOs within Japan, see www.imadr.org/multi/erd/. 
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should be understood by international institutions. Indeed, the government goes out of 
its way to downplay Okinawan difference, dismissing at the outset any connection 
between US military presence and the issue of ethnic discrimination. In this way, 
Tokyo’s response to the Diene report is actually quite consistent with its strategy of 
silence on Japan’s relationship to Okinawans, and their circumstances as an ethnic 
minority or indigenous people. However, this stands in contrast to the government’s 
embrace of the islands’ distinct history and culture on an even more prominent 
international stage. 
When the Japanese government hosted the 2000 Group of Eight (G8) Summit 
in Okinawa, the conference appeared to be an official celebration of Ry!ky!an history 
and culture (Yonetani 2001). A new two-thousand yen note was released just before 
the meeting, depicting the gate of Shuri Castle, the political center of the Ry!ky! 
Kingdom. The luxury hotel and conference site, which was built especially for the 
summit on the southern outskirts of Nago City—the municipality expected to also 
“host” the new air base on Cape Henoko—was given the name “Bridge between 
Nations” (Bankoku Shinry"kan). This was the motto of the Ry!ky! Kingdom at the 
time of its unification in the 15th century. Throughout the meeting, Japanese officials 
treated the world’s leaders to the islands’ distinct cuisine, music and dance. Foreign 
leaders were each presented with a shirt made of minsa, the Ry!ky!s’ traditional 
hand-dyed and hand-woven fabric. One Japanese official encouraged world leaders to 
“…take time to enjoy Okinawans’ vibrant and distinct island culture, which enriches 
Japan’s diversity” (Ry#ky# Shimpo, July 19, 2000).209   
                                                
209 Official treatments of Ry!ky!an history did downplay one key part—the history of the kingdom’s 
demise as a result of Japanese colonization.  On the “Okinawa History” pages of the government’s 
official G8 Summit website, the kingdom’s overthrow came under the heading of “The Birth of 
Okinawa Prefecture” and is described rather vaguely as having been “brought to a close.” In its brief 
entirety, it reads, “The Meiji Government, which came into being as a result of the Meiji Restoration of 
1868, transformed the Ryukyu Kingdom, first into the domain of Ryukyu in 1872, and later into the 
prefecture of Okinawa in 1879. The Ryukyu Kingdom was thus brought to a close. This is known as the 
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Given such overt celebration of the Ry!ky!s’ distinct history and culture, did 
the G8 summit mark the beginnings of a sea change in Japan’s stance regarding 
Okinawa? Yes and no. Historically, Japanese leaders have emphasized Ry!ky!an 
cultural differences as self-referential markers of Ry!ky!an inferiority, and as a basis 
for discrimination and assimilation. And so Tokyo’s deliberate decision to highlight 
Okinawan difference in such a positive manner, and in such a prominent venue, does 
suggest a change. But the historical record begs the questions, to what end, and why 
now? I suggest the answers lies, first, in Japan’s shifting national project and, second, 
in its relation to the US and an international system experiencing a crisis of 
sovereignty more generally.   
 
Multicultural Japan: Territoriality and the discourse of “regional difference” 
Viewed within a broader national context, in which mobilization by Ainu, 
Koreans, Okinawans and other groups challenge still dominant narratives of Japan as a 
monoethnic nation-state (tan’itsu minzoku kokka),210 the government’s celebration of 
Okinawan difference is part of the Japanese government’s effort to steer the 
redefinition and representations of Japan’s national identity and assert its territoriality.  
Tokyo’s recent shifts in its approach to the Ainu community are relevant and 
instructive. At the time of the G8 summit, it had only been three years since Tokyo 
officially recognized the Ainu as an ethnic minority, which in theory obliges the 
government to protect their distinct sociocultural traditions. This recognition coincided 
                                                
‘Ryukyu Disposition.’” See 
www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/economy/summit/2000/outline/eng/okinawa/oki0302.html. 
210 See, for example, Michael Weiner, ed., Japan’s Minorities. London: Routledge, 1997; Donald 
Denoon et al, Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic to Postmodern. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001; and Soo Im Lee, Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, and Harumi Befu. Japan's Diversity 
Dilemmas: Ethnicity, Citizenship, and Education. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2006. 
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with the government’s enactment of the Ainu Cultural Promotion Act (CPA).211 Much 
like its embrace of Okinawan cultural difference during the G8 Summit, on the surface 
the CPA appeared to be a fairly dramatic about-face on the part of the central 
government, which had for nearly two decades officially denied the existence of the 
Ainu as a distinct ethnic group warranting protection as such. In reality, however, the 
law focuses on only one element$culture$of the original draft submitted jointly by 
the Ainu Association of Hokkaido and the Hokkaido prefectural government in 1984. 
The legislation omits all references to and provisions for indigenous rights, which 
formed the core of the original draft. Instead the Japanese government inserted its own 
definition of Ainu culture in the law’s opening text, which goes on to accord the 
Office of the Prime Minister and other central government agencies the power to 
decide what specific aspects of Ainu culture will be targeted for promotion, who will 
receive funding, the extent of such funding, and so on.  
“Without provisions for indigenous rights, it is an empty law,” remarked long-
time Ainu activist Abe Yupo after the law’s enactment. “It can’t address the most 
pressing problems we face. And it doesn’t even give Ainu much power to preserve our 
culture. In actuality it is more of a law for Japanese promotion of Ainu culture.”212 
The fact that, under the law, the central government routinely awards funding to ethnic 
Japanese who practice or teach Ainu traditional arts and language bears out Abe’s 
early concerns. It also sheds light on the law’s place in Japan’s apparent embrace of its 
indigenous Ainu minority; it is a means of discursively and politically managing 
expressions of difference. 
Thus although Tokyo’s official embrace of visible expressions of Okinawan 
difference at the G8 Summit arguably marks a change, this enthusiasm must be 
                                                
211 The law’s formal name is the Ainu Culture Promotion and Dissemination of Information Concerning 
Ainu Traditions Act. 
212 Personal notes, November 30, 1997. 
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viewed in the context of official approaches to the Japanese national project. The 
government’s expropriation of Okinawan cultural symbols was part of its self-
celebration of a new “multicultural” Japan. Japan’s leaders are beginning to recognize 
that incorporation of the “other(s) within” can no longer happen through assimilation 
or outright denial. It requires careful co-optation. Careful because it is clear that 
Japan’s leaders are not, in practical terms, embracing an inclusivist approach to the 
nation as a political ideal (Burgess 2007). Xenophobic and especially anti-immigrant 
discourse has flourished in the last decade, fueled by public comments by conservative 
Japanese politicians. Official policies concerning migrant labor and resident foreign 
nationals are as strict as ever (Arita 2003; Burgess 2007; Debito 2006; Deine 2006). In 
his study of multiculturalism discourses and policies in Japan, Chris Burgess (2007) 
points to the lack of government sponsorship of cultural events or official designations 
that commemorate the different cultural heritage of ethnic groups in Japan.  
Although these approaches suggest that encouraging and celebrating ethnic 
plurality is not at all part of the official ideology, Burgess’ observation that there is not 
merely one discourse about multiculturalism in Japan offers insight. One of the more 
prominent discourses of “multicultural Japan,” he explains, does not celebrate the 
existence of other ethnic populations as much as it celebrates social variation and 
regional difference within Japan—amongst Japanese (Burgess 2007). It is from this 
perspective that Tokyo’s emphasis of Ry!ky!an difference (and its recognition of 
Ainu indigeneity) is best understood. It is about re-presenting the link between people 
and place. In contrast to other ethnic minorities within Japan, the government cannot 
deny the historical connection between the Ainu and Ry!ky!ans and their respective 
territories. And yet today both territories are not only taken for granted as part of the 
Japanese state, they are critical to its current construction: Hokkaido because of its 
sheer size and historical role—it constitutes fully twenty percent of Japan’s landmass 
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and remains the northern “buffer” facing Russia and the Asian continent—and the 
Ry!ky!s because of the central role the islands have been forced to assume in Japan’s 
military arrangements with the US. To officially recognize and celebrate the distinct 
culture and history of these two peoples as inherently part of a diverse Japan is to 
reinforce Japan’s territorial and political reach.  
This directs our attention to the second reason that Japanese officials embraced 
Ry!ky!an history and culture at the G8, which involves how collective rights claims 
within Japan relate to Japan’s geopolitical relationships. As an international space 
within which Tokyo could represent Okinawan difference as a marker of Japanese 
diversity, the G8 summit also presented Japanese leaders the opportunity to assert the 
state’s reach to a particularly powerful audience at a particularly critical time. As I 
detail in the previous chapter, Tokyo faced increasingly powerful and increasingly 
visible challenges to its support of US military practices in the islands. Okinawans 
elected Governor Ota and other officials running on anti-base platforms. The 
widespread anti-base sentiment following the 1995 gang rape contributed to 
Okinawans’ skepticism about the 1996 SACO Agreement. Just three years before the 
summit Nago city residents voted down the cornerstone of the agreement, the plan to 
build a new US air base at Henoko. Both governments’ refusal to recognize the 
referendum’s outcome led to an even stronger and more widespread campaign to stop 
the project. Moreover, the dust had barely settled on the Japanese government’s stand-
off with the Okinawan government after Ota refused to renew the leases on private 
lands occupied by the US military.  
By the time of the 2000 summit, however, it looked as if Tokyo would make 
good on its promise to facilitate the Pentagon’s restructuring of US forces on the 
island. Through political coercion and economic extortion, the central government had 
regained ground against anti-base forces within Okinawa. Its lawsuit against Ota had 
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been successful, and the Diet had ensured future use of Okinawan land by transferring 
the power to sign leases on behalf of Okinawan landowners from the governor of 
Okinawa to the prime minister. Tokyo had also resumed communication with the 
Okinawan government and reinitiated the transfer of economic stimulus monies after 
its preferred candidate for governor, Inamine Kenichi, was elected. The very choice of 
Okinawa, and specifically Nago City, as the summit location had everything to do 
with these reversals. It was understood as a quid pro quo for Inamine’s cooperation 
with the Henoko air base plan. Thus as a political space within which Japanese leaders 
represented Okinawan difference as integral to the modern Japanese state, the summit 
became a way for Tokyo to both reaffirm its territorial reach and demonstrate to US 
and other leaders its apparent ability to manage an increasingly uncooperative 
Okinawan citizenry. In other words, the summit provided the Japanese government a 
stage on which to perform the role of state.213  
As with all such performances of state, this was a collective endeavor. US and 
Japanese leaders’ representations of Okinawa during the summit discursively linked 
its role as “host” to US forces in the postwar era to the solidity of the state system. 
Former President Bill Clinton praised Okinawa for playing “an especially vital role” in 
the endurance of the US-Japan alliance, adding: “Asia is at peace today because [the 
U.S.-Japan alliance] has given people throughout the region confidence that peace will 
be defended and preserved” (quoted in McCormack and Yonetani 2000). US and 
Japanese leaders hailed the prefecture as an integral part of the system of states and the 
embodiment of the ideals of the G8 (Yonetani 2001). Like his Japanese hosts, Clinton 
chose to draw attention to the distinct history of the Ry!ky!s. In doing so he evoked a 
connection between the final wishes of the last Ry!ky! king and the presence of US 
                                                
213 While beyond the scope of this study, this line of argument is warranted in an analysis of the 
geopolitics of Ainu-Japan relations. By representing Ainu difference as part of a diverse Japan, Tokyo 
strengthens its historical claim to the Kurile Islands in its ongoing negotiations with Russia. 
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military as a force for peace. Standing in front of the Cornerstone of Peace, the 
memorial for the Battle of Okinawa, Clinton remarked,  
 
“In 1879, Sho Tai, the last King of the Ry!ky!s, left Shuri Castle for 
the last time. One of his final acts as King was to read a poem that 
summed up his hope for the future. ‘The time for wars is ending. The 
time for peace is not far away. Do not despair. Life itself is a treasure.’ 
In the end the words of Sho Tai, if we can make them real in our time, 
is the very highest tribute we can pay to all those people whose names 
are on this magnificent memorial.”  
 
Clinton’s quotation of Sho Tai and the particular phrase “life is a treasure” 
(nuchi du takara, in the Ry!ky!an language of Okinawa Island) to justify ongoing US 
military presence profoundly offended Okinawan peace activists. For them, Sho Tai’s 
words are a sacred mantra that implies very different means to achieving peace. But 
for US and Japanese leaders at the summit, like their predecessors at different times 
throughout history, the Ry!ky!an narrative and its cultural symbols became political 
devices, to construct a particular “reality.” As I demonstrated in chapter two, at times 
this has rested on downplaying Okinawan difference so that the islands appear to be 
naturally part of Japan. At other times it has rested on emphasizing Okinawan 
difference as a way to justify separating the Ry!ky!s from Japan. In the current 
period, the distinct history and culture of the Ry!ky!s are employed by US and 
Japanese leaders in a novel way, to suggest that the islands and their inhabitants are 
integral to a modern, multicultural Japanese state—and the smooth functioning of its 
international relations. As the remainder of the chapter demonstrates, this effort 
reflects a broader politics of collective rights and the struggle over the meaning of 
sovereignty globally.   




Debating the subject of sovereignty: The Ry!ky!s in global context 
Globalization of collective rights and state efforts to counter them 
By mobilizing around territorialized collective rights, Okinawan activists are 
not only challenging in unprecedented ways the meaning and legitimacy of the 
Japanese state in the Okinawan context, they are also at the forefront of a global 
struggle over where sovereignty resides. Together with Ainu activists, they add to the 
range of voices rejecting the process of state making framed as a modern resolution to 
colonialism. Simultaneously, Tokyo’s efforts to co-opt and depoliticize such assertions 
shape, and are shaped by, other governments’ approaches to self-determination claims 
within their respective borders. 
In particular, Okinawan activists’ mobilization as an indigenous people and a 
minority makes them part of the global debate over the meaning of these concepts and 
their enactment in international and national policies. A key catalyst of this debate is 
the increasing saliency of non-state collective rights and of the concept “indigenous 
people” as a political identity throughout the world. The histories and geographies of 
those relying explicitly on indigenous rights as a basis for claims-making has shifted 
dramatically over the past twenty-five years. What was in the 1970s a political identity 
associated with the rise of native or aboriginal rights movements in settler nations (e.g. 
North and South America, Australia and New Zealand) is now employed by ethnic 
groups across Asia, Africa, Europe and (though less so) the Middle East. Participation 
in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations is one indicator that this identity 
increasingly resonates across the spectrum of peoples/nations subsumed within states 
in the postwar decolonization process. In recent years more than half of all indigenous 
participants in the WGIP are from non-settler nations, primarily in Asia and Africa. 
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This is up from one-third of all participants in 1996 and one-quarter in 1993 (Dietz 
2001). Entry by Okinawans (and Ainu) into explicitly indigenous rights activism is 
part of this widening scope.  
Just as the emergence of collective rights claims in Okinawa constitutes in part 
the global phenomenon of contemporary autonomist movements, so, too, is the 
Japanese government’s emerging stance on such claims a part of this broader story. 
Tokyo’s official stance regarding Okinawan collective rights claims aligns it with 
other states seeking to delegitimize and/or narrow the meaning of such claims within 
their borders and globally. Not surprisingly, the increasing saliency of collective 
rights, and particularly indigenous rights, around the world has not been lost on state 
governments. In a move that draws directly on the successful effort to limit the scope 
of postwar decolonization, which I detailed in chapter two as the politics creating the 
conditions for contemporary indigeneity, today governments are seeking to formally 
limit the scope of who can legitimately claim collective rights. Two interrelated 
strategies have emerged. The first is to insist on a definition of “indigenous people.” 
The second is to impose an interpretation of certain communities’ historical 
experiences that underscores their “minority” status. Close examination suggests that 
this emergent classification scheme is neither random nor neutral. Official uses of the 
categories “indigenous people” and “minority” correspond quite closely to the spatial 
and temporal patterns of participation at the United Nations I describe above: The 
label “indigenous people” is readily conferred on activists from settler nations and 
Northern Europe,214 while most national governments insist, in different ways, that the 
more recent activists from Asia and Africa mobilizing as indigenous peoples are 
“minorities.”  
                                                
214 Recognized as indigenous in Northern Europe are the Saami peoples, whose collective territory 
stretches across Scandinavia. 
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Why this geographical distinction between indigenous peoples and minorities? 
The distinction stems from these concepts’ respective relationship to sovereignty and 
territory, whose dominant definitions were institutionalized through postwar power 
relations. Within international law, indigenous rights hinge on the collective right to 
self-determination in relation to a particular territory, drawing on the “right of all 
peoples and nations to self-determination” enshrined in Article three of the UN 
Charter. And although place is the central analytic through which indigenous peoples’ 
rights and struggles are often understood, this identity is premised on much more than 
just land rights. In theory it claims sovereignty on all dimensions$political, 
economic, social and cultural. Minority rights, in contrast, are founded on the notion 
of plurality but are still rooted in individual rights. They aim at “pluralism in 
togetherness” through equal protection as individual citizens within a state. Minority 
rights are also not by definition tied to a particular territory.215 To the extent that 
national rights legislation adopts international human rights codification, and/or to the 
extent that governments concern themselves with their human rights record, the 
distinction between indigenous rights and minority rights taking shape at the 
international juridical level matters a great deal. It is about the meaning of sovereignty. 
In the years since Ainu and Okinawan activists began participating in 
international meetings on indigenous issues, the Japanese government has both gotten 
a boost from, and contributed to, coordinated efforts by state governments to limit who 
can claim indigeneity and what indigenous rights entail. To begin with, nearly all 
Asian and African governments reject outright any indigenous claims within their 
borders, which lends legitimacy to Tokyo’s position.216 Two decades ago most 
                                                
215 Though many indigenous activists, including members of AIPR, understand and articulate their 
minority status as being inextricably linked to territory and the result of colonization.  
216 Exceptions to this within Asia are Taiwan and the Philippines. The government of Taiwan, 
established a representative council at the parliamentary level for twelve different ethnic communities 
that inhabited the island before widespread migration of Han Chinese in 1945. The government of the 
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governments in these regions were, like the government of Japan, completely 
unconcerned with “indigenous rights issues.” None sent representatives to UN or other 
international meetings on indigenous issues. However, like Japan’s response to Ainu 
and Okinawan activism, this all changed as communities across these regions began 
organizing explicitly as indigenous peoples and became an increasingly visible and 
audible force within international fora on indigenous rights.217 Activists not only 
expose systemic forms of collective discrimination and violence by their governments, 
they continue to lay out an historical argument that state claims to their respective 
territories and resources are not valid from the perspective of indigenous rights. In 
response, Asian and African governments began participating in indigenous rights 
fora, becoming more assertive in their public rejections of the applicability of the 
concept “indigenous people” in their respective countries (Bose 1996; Sanders 1999; 
Gumisai 2007).  
While particular governments’ arguments reflect different historical 
circumstances and representations, as Bauer and Bell (1999:350) point out they 
generally fall within definitional, practical and policy concerns.218 Definitional 
arguments primarily rest on the inapplicability of the concept of indigenous people in 
Asian and African national contexts. This argument associates the experience of 
indigenous peoples with only European colonialism, with Asian and African 
governments routinely asserting that the entire population within their respective 
borders is indigenous vis-à-vis their former European colonizers. Echoing the liberal 
                                                
Philippines similarly recognizes several ethnic communities throughout the archipelago. Exceptions in 
Africa include Burundi, which recently included in its constitution guaranteed representation for the 
Twa people, whose territory stretches across Africa’s Great Lakes region. The government of 
Cameroon recognizes nomadic pastoralists and Baka (more commonly referred to as “pygmies”) as 
indigenous peoples. The government of Morocco recently changed its position to allow the teaching of 
the Amazigh (Berber) language (See Gumisai’s “‘Indigenous’ people fight for inclusion” in Africa 
Renewal, vol. 21 no. 1, April 2007, page 6).   
217 See the “List of Participants” in the final reports of the WGIP, available at http://cwis.org/un.html. 
218 Although Bauer and Bell focus in particular on arguments made by governments within Asia, their 
observations apply well to the arguments made by representatives of African governments. 
  219 
argument made by representatives of powerful Western states in the latter’s effort to 
limit decolonization in the immediate postwar period, most governments in Asia and 
Africa insist that all individuals within their borders were liberated by statehood and 
citizenship. The practical argument emphasizes the difficulty in parsing long and 
complicated histories of ethnic movement and merging. The political argument is one 
also voiced consistently and loudly by the settler nation governments; it questions the 
legal implications and potential for conflict if only certain ethnic groups are accorded 
rights, particularly territorialized rights, that challenge existing property ownership.  
Of course Japan is among the few anomalous countries in these two regions, in 
that it did not experience formal colonization by Europeans.219 But it has benefited 
from the prevailing notion that the concept of indigenous peoples is bound up with 
European, or Western, colonialism.  Tokyo has expressed both definitional and 
practical concerns, while extolling the virtues of liberal citizenship. Japanese officials 
insisted for years that Ainu were no different from, and enjoyed the same protections 
as, other Japanese citizens. When the Japanese government finally voted in favor of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in September 
2007, it did so with explicit reservations about the meaning of indigeneity (Lewellan 
2008). Adopting the United States’ and other Western governments’ concept of 
internal self-determination220 and liberal approach to indigenous rights, the Japanese 
                                                
219 Thailand and China share this distinction, though both were also subject to periods of partial foreign 
control. In Africa only Ethiopia and Liberia claim a history free from formal European colonization. 
Though Ethiopia endured occupation by Mussolini’s Italy in the early 1940s, and Liberia has often 
faced undue influence by the United States. South Africa is historically best understood as a settler 
nation. 
220 Throughout the drafting of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Japanese 
government joined governments of key Western states, namely the United States, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and Russia, in opposing the inclusion of an unconditional right to collective self-
determination, which state representatives argue would render the declaration inconsistent with existing 
(state-centric) international law. In 2001 the United States National Security Council elaborated what 
has become the standard conception of internal self-determination in the indigenous context. It 
provided the following official definition as “guidance for the U.S. delegations to the UN Commission 
on Human Rights, the Commission's Working Group on the UN Draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights 
and to the OAS Working Group on the similar OAS Draft Declaration, and to the preparatory meetings 
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government does not recognize any collective right to self-determination that would 
challenge the territorial integrity of existing states, and it does not recognize collective 
rights if their exercise would compromise the (property) rights of other citizens.  
This particular stance positions Japan alongside powerful governments of 
settler nations, which have long sought to limit, in legal terms, the political scope of 
indigenous rights. Having been compelled by popular mobilization to recognize the 
conceptual equivalency between the global term “indigenous peoples” and nationally 
institutionalized, legally potent terms like American Indian, Indigena, First Nations, 
Aleut, Inuit and Aborigine, the governments of settler nations are well beyond 
disputing the existence of indigenous peoples within their borders. But like their Asian 
and African counterparts, these governments are no less concerned about the potential 
loss of control over territory and resources. Their strategy is to make indigenous rights 
mean relatively little in practical terms. Therefore settler governments seek a 
definition of indigenous peoples rooted in individual rather than collective rights, 
along with the qualified right to internal self-determination.  
Japan’s overt alliance in recent years with powerful settler nations regarding 
the legal meaning of indigenous rights—the group of governments came to be known 
and even self-identify as CANZUS+J221—is surely an indicator that Japanese officials 
had grown less confident in the government’s ability to continue denying the existence 
of indigenous peoples within Japan’s borders. At the time Japan’s representatives at 
                                                
to the UN World Conference Against Racism”: “Indigenous peoples have a right of internal self-
determination. By virtue of that right, they may negotiate their political status within the and are free to 
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right of 
internal self-determination, have the internal right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to 
their local affairs, including determination of membership, culture, language, religion, education, 
information, media, health, housing, employment, social welfare, maintenance of community safety, 
family relations, economic activities, lands and resources management, environment and entry by non-
members, as well as ways and means for financing these autonomous functions.” See U.S. National 
Security Council, “Position on Indigenous Peoples,” January 18, 2001. Retrieved on July 8, 2008 from 
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/indigenousdoc.html. 
221 Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Japan. 
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the UN voted in favor of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the 
government still maintained that no indigenous peoples lived within Japan’s borders, 
citing the lack of an international definition of the concept of indigeneity. The Diet’s 
recognition of the Ainu just a year later is remarkable as a reversal in the 
government’s long-held position, and even more so as a testimony to the decades-long 
effort by Ainu activists.222 However it is less remarkable in its implications if we 
consider that, given the government’s qualifications to its vote on the declaration, 
recognition of the Ainu (and by extension Okinawans) is predicated on the 
governments’ formal rejection of an unconditional right to self-determination and a 
limited concept of collective rights. 
In current efforts to define and codify indigenous peoples and minorities, then, 
we see a merging of interests between powerful Western governments and most 
governments throughout Asia and Africa. However to consider such efforts as an 
indicator of governmental concern only for what happens within their respective 
borders is to miss the forest for the trees. Limiting the geographic and political scope 
of indigeneity has as much to do with the implications of globalized indigenous claims 
for the state system as a whole and the power relations it upholds. A UN report on the 
status of state treaties and other arrangements between governments and native 
peoples captures the concerns of member states in the face of increasing indigenous 
rights claims in post-decolonization Asia and Africa: 
 
In post-colonial Africa and Asia, autochthonous 
groups/minorities/ethnic groups/peoples cannot… claim for 
themselves, unilaterally and exclusively, the ‘indigenous’ status in the 
United Nations context. …These States whose existence as such is, in 
the majority of cases, very recent - have not only the right but also the 
                                                
222 For an insightful analysis of the forces that culminated in the Diet’s recognition, see Ann-elise 
Lewallen’s “Indigenous at last! Ainu Grassroots Organizing and the Indigenous Peoples Summit in 
Ainu Mosir.” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 48-6-08, November 30, 2008. Retrieved July 20, 2009 
www.japanfocus.org/-ann_elise_lewallen/2971. 
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duty to preserve their fragile territorial integrity. The risk to such 
States of breaking up (or ‘balkanization’) which such unilateral claims 
to ‘indigenousness’ imply naturally cannot be taken lightly. 
 
The report goes on to offer the following solution to the current crisis of sovereignty:  
 
The situations described above, the scenario of which is African or 
Asian States, should be analysed in other forums of the United Nations 
than those that are currently concerned with the problems of indigenous 
peoples; in particular in the Working Group on Minorities of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities.223 
 
From this perspective, self-identification as indigenous peoples, and what this 
might indicate about an ethnic population’s experience of their citizen relations, does 
not matter. What matters is that state structures collectively put in place via the 
decolonization process endure. To this end the report emphasizes both the “right” and 
the “duty” of individual Asian and African states to protect their territorial integrity. 
But it goes farther than this. By specifically addressing what should be allowed in the 
UN context, it claims a role for the collectivity of states in managing local challenges 
to modern territoriality. Such a claim reflects the extent to which the modern 
resolution to the last crisis of sovereignty—decolonization and the expansion of the 
state form—overdetermines dominant understandings of and responses to the current 
crisis of sovereignty.  
Asserting a role for the collectivity of states in managing local challenges to 
state territoriality is also instructive for the kinds of power relations it justifies. As this 
study demonstrates, power relations in the current historical period depend on 
maintaining structures of inequality not just among but also within states. US military 
presence in the Ry!ky!s is not merely dependent on the US government’s ability to 
                                                
223 UN doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20; paragraphs 88-90; emphasis added. 
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sway Japanese leaders; it fundamentally rests on, and reinforces, Japan’s colonial 
regard toward and treatment of Okinawans. These particular relations of internal 
colonial basing rest, in turn, on international basing arrangements formalized in the 
postwar period by the “collectivity of sovereigns” (c.f. Ruggie 1993) as way to ensure 
continued military expansion via the relations among states.  
 
Reworking the relations of internal colonial basing  
Viewed in relation to the current struggle to define the subject of sovereignty, 
new ideas and practices emerging within Okinawa’s struggle reveal an historically 
novel reinterpretation of and challenge to the state-citizen relation. Although 
counterintuitive, by seeking to rework their relationship to the state rather than 
pushing for independence, Okinawans and their counterparts making similar 
challenges elsewhere present the greater challenge to state sovereignty. To be sure, 
truly separatist movements pose a threat to the territorial and political integrity of 
states, insofar as their success would result in lost territory and associated resources 
and power. Indeed, the specter of secession sustains most state justifications for 
repressing, often violently, contemporary movements for self-determination. But 
because the resulting polity would most likely take the nation-state form (e.g. East 
Timor or Eritrea), this scenario merely reinscribes the state form, and with it the 
system and the power relations it upholds.  
In contrast, by articulating a notion of sovereignty wherein the nation is 
separate from the state, non-secessionist self-determination movements (e.g. Nunavut, 
Chiapas or Okinawa), seek to transform the state-citizen relation, rather than 
reproduce it. The challenges animating the Okinawan anti-base movement reflect a 
desire to reconfigure the state and its imperial dimensions. Like other non-secessionist 
self-determination movements, Okinawan articulations of, and efforts to realize, a 
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territorialized collective autonomy within Japan challenge fundamental assumptions 
undergirding the state-citizen relationship. They mark a rejection of the modernist 
project (c.f. McMichael 2005). Their effort calls into question the notion of the state as 
the only legitimate repository of sovereignty and the guarantor of rights. Furthermore 
their emphasis on collective autonomy within the state subverts the idea that 
individuals are the building blocks of the state. However, rather than rejecting 
citizenship altogether, Okinawan activists are challenging citizenship as governed by 
the relations of internal colonial basing. Their analyses and emerging claims suggest a 
reformulation of citizenship so that it could accommodate a nations-state. In this way, 
the alternative forms of sovereignty embodied in more recent Okinawan demands are 
indicative of transformative pressures on the state in the current historical period.  
 
Conclusion 
Situated in national and global context, the claims emerging within Okinawa’s 
anti-base movement$rooted in identities separate from the state but equally 
territorial—make the transitional moment within Okinawa more than just about the 
effects of internal colonial basing on the Okinawa-Japan relationship. They reflect a 
broader politics of collective rights and the struggle over the meaning of sovereignty. 
As this and the previous chapter demonstrate, Okinawan activists’ nation-centric 
challenge to the Japanese state resonates with movements elsewhere, reflecting 
broader efforts to reformulate citizenship according to an historically specific notion 
of self-determination.  
Also a part of this broader story, the Japanese government’s approach to 
Okinawan activists’ rearticulations of their citizenship reflects the contestation over 
sovereignty both nationally and globally. While clearly not ready to embrace a 
multiculturalism that requires attention to systematic discrimination or policies for 
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autonomous ethnic development and promotion, the central government does have a 
use for the symbols of difference. Multiculturalism that emphasizes social variation 
and regional difference within “the nation” makes celebrating Ry!ky!an difference a 
claim of territorial and political reach. This stance aligns Tokyo with the US and other 
state governments in a collective effort to delegitimize and/or narrow the meaning of 
collective rights claims within their borders and globally.  





Drawing conclusions from the Futenma-Henoko Struggle 
I begin this concluding discussion with an update on the Futenma-Henoko 
struggle, which captures some of the core arguments of the dissertation. Nearly 
fourteen years after US and Japanese negotiators agreed to close Futenma Air Station 
in “five to seven years” in exchange for a new base, the Marine Corps continues daily 
combat training flights over Ginowan. However, pilots now see the words, Don’t fly 
over our city! US HELOs out now!, which Mayor Iha Yoichi recently had painted in 
giant lettering on the roof of the Ginowan City Hall. Meanwhile, no real progress has 
been made on even preliminary construction of the new military complex at Henoko. 
On the one hand, this circumstance demonstrates vividly the power of the popular 
opposition to the plan itself and to the indefinite US military presence the plan signals. 
On the other hand, that the new base project was expanded in the May 2006 
“Roadmap to Realignment,” rather than abandoned in the face of a decade of sustained 
opposition, speaks to the confidence both governments have in their ability to realize 
the project and sustain US military presence in Okinawa. 
Recent shifts within national politics in both the US and Japan introduced, for 
a time, greater uncertainty regarding the new base and Futenma’s conditional closure. 
Although Okinawans realized long ago that little difference exists between 
Republicans and Democrats in terms of US military basing policy, the historic nature 
of the election of Barack Obama in November 2008 led some to be cautiously hopeful 
that it might lead to self-reflection about what was originally a plan negotiated by a 
Democratic administration, or to a rejection of the expansion reformulated by the Bush 
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Administration.224 Within weeks of his inauguration, however, President Obama sent 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Japan to sign an accord with the Prime Minister 
Fukuda Yasuo—known as the “Guam Agreement”—which reaffirmed the 2006 
accord.  
A cause for greater hope was the campaign of Hatoyama Yukio of the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), whose landmark election in September 2009 shifted 
power away from the long-ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party. Reflecting 
the foreign policy aspirations of the DPJ, Hatoyama ran on a platform criticizing US 
unilateralism and the neo-liberalism of “American-style globalization,” and advocated 
forging a “more mature” and less deferential relationship with the United States, 
wherein Japan would be an equal partner that could negotiate with its broader interests 
in mind. Although drastic changes to the alliance were unlikely, a Hatoyama 
administration was expected to slow down and perhaps even reverse the path 
embarked upon by the more conservative and nationalist LDP administrations of the 
last decade, namely Japan’s increasing involvement in US military interventions 
globally. Hatoyama and the DPJ appear much more interested in building multilateral 
relations, beginning in East Asia.225 In this context, Hatoyama’s campaign platform 
included an explicit promise to renegotiate the 2006 agreement so that the new base 
would not be built on Okinawa, and maybe not even in Japan. He also promised to 
reexamine Japan’s commitment to bankrolling key provisions of the agreement.226  
                                                
224 Personal communications, summer-fall 2008. 
225 See Yukio Hatoyama, “A New Path for Japan,” New York Times, August 27, 2009. Retrieved August 
30, 2009 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edhatoyama.html. For an overview 
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226 In the 2006 Roadmap, the Japanese government agreed to fund the new military complex and related 
facilities at Cape Henoko, the bulk of relocating marines to Guam, and new facilities in Guam. 
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Political cleavages within Hatoyama’s government quickly came to light as the 
new prime minister vacillated on the Futenma-Henoko issue. While Hatoyama made 
good on his promise to end the SDF’s refueling missions in support of US military 
action in Afghanistan,227 he began backtracking on his pledge to Okinawans soon after 
his election.228 Only after public criticism from members of the more progressive 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and People’s New Party (PNP), both part of 
Hatoyama’s coalition government, did the prime minister pushed for reopening talks 
with the US about the basing agreement. This was the first indication of where 
Okinawa stood in the new administration’s priorities. Only by taking a strong stand on 
the Futenma-Henoko issue had Hatoyama gained the support he needed from the SDP 
and PNP to win the election and forge a ruling coalition. In other words, the issue was 
theirs, not his.  
In response to Hatoyama’s campaign promise, the Obama administration 
initially sent mixed signals regarding the possibility of reopening talks on the Henoko 
project. Defense Secretary Robert Gates took a hard line when he visited Japan one 
month before Hatoyama’s election, stating that the administration would not 
renegotiate the agreement and reiterating the additional threat embedded in the 
agreement. Namely, that no new base at Henoko not only meant no closure of 
Futenma, but also no relocation of the 8000 marines from Okinawa to Guam.229 In 
contrast, Barack Obama surprised many during his November 2009 visit to Japan 
                                                
227 Sachiko Sakamaki and Takashi Hirokawa. “Japan Ends Refueling Ships in Support of War in 
Afghanistan.” Bloomberg News, Jan. 15, 2010. Retrieved January 20, 2010 from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=aLKi3fb1j9NA. 
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when he announced the US agreed to study the 2006 agreement.230 The two 
governments established a joint working group at the end of 2009, which promptly fell 
apart, presumably after several other US officials stated publicly that the working 
group was not a concession to Japan, nor would it lead to reopening the 2006 
agreement.231  
Hatoyama’s administration further signalled its lack of commitment to 
Okinawans when it abruptly postponed the decision regarding the new base until May 
2010. Given that renegotiating an alternative arrangement in such a short time was 
highly unlikely, the new prime minister appeared to be anticipating the upper house 
elections scheduled for early summer 2010. Although the DPJ controls an 
unprecedented majority in the powerful lower house, the party needs to win an 
outright majority in the upper house if it wants to break free of its dependence on the 
SDP and PNP, whose members’ commitment to Okinawa is much stronger than the 
rank-and-file DPJ. Popular support of the new administration in the run up to the 
election would have smoothed the way for Hatoyama to reaffirm Japan’s commitment 
to the 2006 agreement without jeopardizing his party’s control. Instead his support 
among the Japanese electorate plummeted. This was partly due to Japan’s continuing 
economic woes, partly to a political funding scandal involving one of Japan’s most 
powerful politicians and the current secretary general of the DPJ, Ozawa Ichiro, but 
also because of Hatoyama’s perceived dithering on Henoko, which was among several 
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key campaign promises he failed to keep.232 Although most Japanese support the US-
Japan alliance more generally, not immediately capitulating to Washington was one of 
the few decisions for which Hatoyama still garnered public support.233  
 After months of deliberation and persistent pressure from US officials, the 
prime minister indicated his administration’s plans to press ahead with the Henoko 
project.234 At a March 18 press conference, he announced plans to “draw up a 
government proposal later this month. Following that, we will ask for the 
understanding of the U.S. government and the people of Japan too, though perhaps 
mostly that of Okinawans.”235 Speaking at an open meeting with Okinawa governor 
Nakaima Hirokazu in Okinawa on May 23, Hatoyama invoked Japan’s national 
security in the face of ‘‘remaining uncertainties in East Asia,’’ especially on the 
Korean Peninsula. ‘‘As prime minister, I have to say we cannot allow the situation in 
which deterrence provided by the U.S. forces in Japan will diminish,’’ he explained.236 
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American and Japanese officials issued a joint statement on May 28 
reaffirming the basic outline of the May 2006 agreement.237 The new pact stipulates 
that Futenma’s functions will be moved to a new facility at Henoko. The accord also 
reiterates the conditional incentive of relocating approximately 8,000 Marines to 
Guam, which remains dependent on “tangible progress made by the Government of 
Japan toward completion of the replacement facility [at Henoko].” At the same time, 
nowhere does the statement refer to Futenma’s closure. Instead it refers only to its 
“return,” and not to Okinawans, but specifically “to Japan as part of the Alliance 
transformation and realignment process.” This distinction must be understood 
alongside the two governments’ plans, initiated in the 2006 Roadmap to Realignment 
and further elaborated in the May 28 statement, to “expand the shared use of facilities 
between U.S. forces and the SDF” with an eye toward “closer bilateral operational 
coordination, improved interoperability and stronger relations with local 
communities.” This may very well mean a greater influx of SDF in the future, perhaps 
as the recipients of facilities, like Futenma, the US identifies for “return.” The plan to 
increase the shared use of facilities reflects the two governments’ recognition that US 
forces are increasingly unwelcome in Okinawa and elsewhere. However, it does not 
recognize, or at least seriously underestimates, the inevitable opposition any increase 
in SDF numbers and visibility would also face under conditions of internal colonial 
basing.238  
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The accord also includes proposals that appear intended to appease critics 
beyond Okinawa. First, as if addressing environmentalists and others who have little 
knowledge of the Henoko project, the statement introduces the concept of a “Green 
Alliance” between the two countries in their approach to basing, which would involve 
“consider[ing] ways to introduce renewable energy technology into U.S. bases in 
Japan and under development in Guam.” The notion of the “Green Alliance” will 
remain window dressing to those who know any details of the broader arrangement, 
for not mentioned is the massive landfill planned for Henoko and Oura Bays, and the 
predicted destruction of the critically endangered dugong and surrounding coral reef 
ecosystem.  
Second, the statement names Tokunoshima, an island roughly 200km north of 
Okinawa Island, as a possible site for some of Futenma’s training exercises.239 The 
Hatoyama administration publically cited the island in April as one possible location 
for training, as the prime minister’s appeals to officials from around Japan to consider 
accepting US forces met with refusal.240 Whether Futenma’s flight training would in 
fact be moved off Okinawa if the new base is completed at Henoko seems unlikely. 
Part of the planned construction near Henoko is intended for the base’s new mission—
becoming home to the MV-22 Osprey aircraft—and the May 28 accord does not 
mention changes to this plan. Also, in April the Pentagon reacted unenthusiastically to 
the idea of shifting exercises even to Tokunoshima, citing operational difficulties 
                                                
suggests, any sustained increase in SDF in Okinawa will undoubtedly be met with fierce local 
opposition by anti-base activists.  
239 Part of the Ry!ky! Islands, Tokunoshima is roughly halfway between Okinawa Island and 
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Ry!ky!s from Japan following the end of World War II, but formally reincorporated into Kagoshima 
Prefecture in 1953. 
240 At a May 27 meeting of Japan’s National Governors' Association, governors from prefectures that 
already host Self-Defense Force bases rejected Hatoyama’s recent appeals, reiterating that their 
prefectures would not accept U.S. forces. See “Joint statement on Futenma designed to show Hatoyama 
met May deadline,” Mainichi Daily News, May 28, 2010. Retrieved May 28, 2010 from 
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100528p2a00m0na014000c.html. 
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given the island’s distance from its bases on Okinawa Island.241 Finally, there is also 
the question of whether moving training to Tokunoshima would resolve or merely 
expand the problem of local opposition to US military presence. For of course 
transferring a few training exercises off Okinawa Island changes very little for 
Okinawans; nearly forty bases will remain in operation on the island. Moreover, 
despite promises of massive financial incentives and public works projects, 
Tokunoshima’s three villages have been the sight of protests against possible US 
military presence since April, and reactions on the small island to the May 28 accord 
were similarly oppositional. Any transfer of training to Tokunoshima will thus most 
likely give birth to a new anti-US military movement.242  
Opposition was also immediate from within Hatoyama’s own government, 
signaling a potential split with the left and an apparent solidification of the DPJ as a 
centrist partner of the US. Fukushima Mizuho, leader of the Social Democratic Party 
and cabinet minister for consumer affairs and gender equality, announced her refusal 
to support the May 28 agreement. As if to underscore his administration’s 
reconciliation with the United States and the continuity it ultimately implies, 
Hatoyama promptly fired Fukushima.243 Given the relatively few seats held by the 
SDP, the party’s withdrawal from the coalition, should it come to that, would not 
jeopardize the DPJ’s rule because of the large number of seats the latter gained in 
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September 2009. Significantly, the People’s New Party seems to be standing by 
Hatoyama’s decision. However, to what extent this rupture in the coalition and the 
new accord with the US will ultimately have on the DPJ is unclear, and depends on 
more than just the Futenma-Henoko issue. The prime minister’s unpopularity on 
numerous fronts will likely lead to considerable DPJ losses in the July 2010 upper 
house election. But Hatoyama and other DPJ leaders, most of whom came to power 
through the ranks of the LDP and remain centrists within the DPJ, clearly weighed the 
political losses incurred from backtracking on the promise to Okinawa against the 
potential losses—vis-à-vis the US and the Japanese electorate—that would result from 
backtracking on a major agreement with the US.244  
How Hatoyama’s lack of commitment to Okinawa will be received must be 
considered in light of the history of US-Japan-Okinawa relations, and in light of the 
fact that most Japanese are in favor of US military presence in Japan. Historically, 
they have not demonstrated an interest in resolving the US military’s disproportionate 
presence in Okinawa. In this context, getting the US to pay for more of the relocation 
of Futenma—an issue yet to be resolved between the two governments, but next on 
Tokyo’s agenda—would be considered an overall “win” for Japan. Similarly, getting 
the US to accept relocation of any of Futenma’s military functions off Okinawa Island 
would also be considered a “win” for Japan, even though it would only come at the 
expense of Okinawans’ acceptance of yet another base. If Hatoyama or the next prime 
minister—assuming the DPJ holds onto power—can gain either of these concessions 
from the US, it would, from the perspective of Tokyo and much of the electorate, 
reflect the “more mature” relationship the DPJ seeks, wherein Tokyo can negotiate 
with Japan’s broader interests in mind.  
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At the same time, what the Japanese electorate sees as “Japan’s interests” is 
changing. Hatoyama and the DPJ leadership may have seriously underestimated the 
frustration amongst the Japanese public over the Futenma-Henoko issue, and what lies 
behind it. Clearly the electorate desires a stronger Japan that will stand up to the US. 
However, although US media coverage of the recent dispute between Washington and 
Tokyo paints the Japanese citizenry with one brush stroke, this sentiment is most 
likely the shared vision of otherwise quite ideologically opposed segments of the 
population. On the one hand, it reflects the views of those Japanese whose increasing 
sense of nationalism is evident in rising support for reform of Article 9 and for taking 
aggressive stances toward North Korea and China. On the other, it also reflects the 
views of those who see an increasingly belligerent and militarized Japan—militarized 
by the US or Japan itself, or both—as jeopardizing rather than contributing to security 
and stability in East Asia and beyond. That Hatoyama was elected in the first place on 
a platform that criticized the political and economic hubris of the US and advocated 
greater multilateralism within East Asia suggests that it is the latter segment of 
Japanese that will hold sway. Of course, to what extent they will continue to see 
Japan’s interests as including Okinawa’s interests remains to be seen. In the meantime, 
however, it appears as if Hatoyama and the DPJ would have been wise to listen to 
their coalition partners and take their own rhetoric more seriously.  
What is also clear is that the struggle will continue—both the Futenma-Henoko 
campaign and the broader movement to demilitarize Okinawa. Not surprisingly, the 
May 28 accord was met with tremendous frustration and anger in Okinawa, over what 
is viewed as yet another betrayal by the Japanese government. As the back-and-forth 
between Tokyo and Washington unfolded, Okinawans stopped hoping that things 
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would be different under the DPJ.245 For many, the recent high-level exchanges, not-
so-veiled threats and broken promises only reinforce the sense of resignation and 
ambivalence the dissertation identifies as crucial to the continuation of US military 
presence. However, activists continue to mobilize and protest against the new military 
complex and the conditional closure of Futenma.246  
The anger and frustration that emerged among the general population and even 
conservative local leaders over the 2006 expansion has not waned. Riding the wave of 
hope that Hatoyama would renegotiate the plan, voters ousted Nago City’s pro-base 
mayor in January 2010. On April 25, Okinawans held the largest anti-base 
demonstration since reversion, with over 100,000 gathering in Ginowan after it 
became clear that Hatoyama would likely abandon his campaign promise. 17,000 
encircled Futenma Air Station on May 16, in the “human chain” protest that in recent 
years has marked the anniversary of the Ry!ky!s’ reincorporation into Japan. In 
contrast to his predecessor, Governor Nakaima Hirokazu has maintained his 
opposition to the plan, while both the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly and Okinawa’s 
mayors unanimously passed resolutions calling for the immediate closure of Marine 
Corps Air Station Futenma and redeploying the air units outside Japan.247 Following 
the May 27 announcement, Susumu Inamine, the new mayor of Nago, said he would 
not engage in negotiations regarding the Henoko base, adding that the probability of 
the base being built there is “zero.”248 
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Civil disobedience at Henoko continues, and has spread to include an area 
nearby identified as the future site of new helipads to accommodate the air base’s 
expanded training mission involving the controversial MV-22 Osprey. “As long as we 
have a dream of restoring peace on the island, we'll simply continue our campaign to 
pressure the government to abandon the relocation plan,” explained Ashitomi Hiroshi, 
co-president of the Council Opposing Heliport Construction and one of the leaders of 
the direct action.249 Transnational activism has also increased, centering especially on 
ties and collaborations with Chamorro activists in Guam. Their mutual framing of the 
current circumstances foregrounds the intersection of the colonial relations each 
confronts, capturing the point of departure and central analytical lens of this study: the 
politicization of Okinawan identity and emergence of collective rights claims vis-à-vis 
the Japanese state. It also reinforces a key argument of the dissertation. Namely, that 
Okinawans’ resistance and claims upon the state resonate with movements elsewhere, 
reformulating citizenship rights in substantive, historically concrete terms that 
challenge the abstract formal rights of the liberal subject, and politicize the meaning of 
sovereignty.  
 
The Okinawan struggle as a lens on social change 
Through an examination of the anti-US military base movement in Okinawa, 
the dissertation sheds light on struggles over sovereignty in the contemporary 
relationship between state formation and military expansion. I use the concept of 
internal colonial basing to shed light on the particular state structures and social 
relations that sustain US military presence in Okinawa, and condition the emergence 
of demands for greater autonomy. The increasing convergence of the Okinawan 
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movement with contemporary self-determination movements elsewhere generated 
broader, and comparative, questions about colonial relations embedded in the modern 
state system. However, questions about the broader political context of contested 
sovereignty within a state proved difficult to answer from the perspective of 
conventional scholarship on state formation, foreign military basing, and social 
movements. The relations that structure the Okinawan case are not captured by the 
concepts and categories that traditionally animate these literatures. This is because the 
subject of citizenship and sovereignty is nearly always taken for granted. This study 
has attempted to examine the social construction of these reified institutions, as 
opposed to making generalizations that presuppose their existence.  
The dissertation demonstrates that analysis of struggle over, and changes in, 
the meaning and practice of citizenship and sovereignty must be informed by an 
historical approach to state and subject formation as always-ongoing processes 
constituted by concrete social relations. The methodology of incorporated comparison 
(McMichael 1990) allows for a reconstruction of the politics of US military presence 
in Okinawa both temporally and spatially. I am able to show how processes of state 
and subject formation in the Okinawan/Ry!ky!an context interrelate with global 
political dynamics at conjunctural moments. Political shifts within the Okinawan 
demilitarization movement over time are seen as mutually constituted with the 
historical (re)construction of not just the Japanese state, but state formation more 
generally: postwar decolonization and the conjoint transformation in military 
expansion, and more recently the emergence of alternative self-determination claims 
elsewhere.  
These connections are revealed by exploring everyday experiences of 
militarization and what is made of them by Okinawans themselves. This attention to 
meaning becomes key; the dissertation foregrounds, in particular, how experiences 
  239 
and meanings of ties to “place” shape social and political identities in relation to 
changes in political context. In doing so this study sheds light on how and why 
citizenship remains a meaningful category for some, while it is challenged and 
reworked by others. In turn, the reworking of citizenship and sovereignty reflected in 
new political identities and claims within the Okinawan movement and elsewhere 
sheds light on how the state form itself, and international political space more 
generally, might be changing. This demonstrates the analytical gains to be made by 
employing struggle in a methodological sense, as a window on particular world-
historical processes and relations rather than as an object of study in itself. By using 
the struggle methodologically, I show that the struggle itself is the medium through 
which citizenship and sovereignty assume new meanings, which in turn problematize 
the assumptions undergirding the Japanese state and the projection of US power. 
 
Coloniality, foreign military basing, and the struggle over the subject of 
sovereignty  
The dissertation begins with a basic historical observation: that the story of 
colonization is a story of militarization. Despite dominant representations today, the 
study demonstrates that colonial relations did not disappear as a feature of military 
expansion and foreign military basing with the historical institution of modern 
territoriality on a global scale in the postwar period. I identify four historically 
contingent forms of the general phenomenon I call colonial basing:  
 
• direct colonial basing: a state’s military presence in its existing formal colonial 
territories 
• post-colonial basing: a state’s military presence in its former colonial 
territories  
• cross-colonial basing: a state’s military presence in the formal colonial 
territories of other states  
• internal colonial basing: a state’s military presence in indigenous or otherwise 
contested territories within its or other states’ borders 
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Considered together, these four forms demonstrate how, and the extent to 
which, the state system sustains and shapes militarized colonial relations. They also 
help me better specify the particular configuration of colonial relations governing US 
military presence in the Ry!ky!s. The concept of internal colonial basing captures one 
manifestation of how empire “works” in the current historical conjuncture. US basing 
in Okinawa rests not only on Japan’s compromised sovereignty vis-à-vis the United 
States, but also on the Ry!ky!s’ compromised sovereignty vis-à-vis Japan. Reflecting 
the postwar regime of military presence extended to the Ry!ky!s, however, politically 
and discursively US basing in the islands came to rest on state sovereignty and 
citizenship. 
Okinawan activists’ challenge to these legitimizing premises directs my 
attention to how US military presence shapes, and is shaped by, Okinawans’ citizen 
relations in the post-reversion era. Legitimization of US military presence is at once 
state-driving and reproduced by Okinawans themselves, within the institutions and 
structures of their citizen relations. This happens as interstate relations and national 
political and economic policies intertwine with Okinawans’ everyday routines of life 
and work, and ordinary relationships. It is this very “intimacy” of occupation that 
sustains the relations of internal colonial basing. While the institutions associated with 
citizenship provided new forms of representation and new bases for important 
challenges to immediate problems, they also have a depoliticizing effect on the anti-
base movement, insofar as they redirect energy and claims away from the long-
standing goal of ending US military presence. Simultaneously, management of the 
effects of US basing happens via the US-Japan Security Treaty, which provides the 
legal-political and discursive framework for ensuring that military operations and 
planning continue. The Japanese government’s consistent deference to the treaty in the 
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Okinawan context severely limits the extent to which the latter’s citizenship provides 
protection from the bases’ effects. 
At the same time, the politics surrounding the Futenma-Henoko struggle also 
illustrate how institutions associated with citizenship are not unilaterally 
depoliticizing. As the Japanese government’s actions fueled the erosion of confidence 
in national channels of redress and disillusionment in the Japanese state, activism 
continued along different paths. Sustained civil disobedience on land and at sea has so 
far successfully prevented any real progress on the construction at Henoko. Increasing 
transnational activities and coalition-building has helped to shift the debate over the 
Henoko project, and base issues more generally, beyond local and bi-lateral “base 
politics.” This provides opportunities to intervene in dominant narratives about US 
military presence, de-centering the terms through which the US-Japan Security Treaty 
dominates the definition of basing problems and solutions. In this way, state efforts to 
push SACO through at any cost contributed to Okinawan activists’ increasing 
engagement in more challenging forms of activism. 
As a relation rooted in coloniality, Okinawans’ citizen relations also shape the 
mode of struggle in another, potentially transformative way. Over time, the conditions 
of internal colonial basing have reinforced Okinawans’ experiences as ethnically 
marginalized citizens, while simultaneously eroding the legitimacy of the Japanese 
state in a way that sustains citizenship as a salient identity. Reevaluations of the 
Ry!ky!s’ historical relationship with Japan have contributed to a rethinking of 
reversion itself and its implications for US military presence. Japanese complicity in 
the continued presence of US bases has become a central part of activists’ accounts, 
analyses, and claims regarding US military presence and their citizen relations. While 
the institutions associated with citizenship remain central as a means of activism, 
activists’ engagement as citizens is increasingly informed by this ethnic perspective.  
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The significance of the politicization of Okinawan identity in the current 
conjuncture is that it facilitates historically novel claims against the Japanese state and 
the relations governing internal colonial basing. These are not rooted in rights 
conferred by citizenship, but rather in new political identities—minority, 
nation/people, indigenous peoples—that foreground collective claims to territory. 
These political identities inform, and are informed by, anti-base activists’ connections 
with other activists and movements, both within and Japan and beyond. Activists’ ties 
rest on shared experiences and critiques of empire. They share a critique of Japanese 
expansion and how Japanese imperialism intertwines with US imperialism in a way 
that transformed their historical and contemporary relations. Activists’ broader 
connections, including finding models for a self-governing Okinawa and relations with 
indigenous activists in international fora, mark a convergence of their demilitarization 
movement with contemporary self-determination movements elsewhere.  
By adopting territorialized collective rights claims, Okinawan activists’ add to 
the range of voices rejecting the postwar process of state making framed as a modern 
resolution to colonialism. As with many other contemporary self-determination 
movements, however, Okinawan activists’ rearticulation of the Ry!ky!s’ relationship 
with the state does not reject citizenship as a meaningful relation, but rather seeks to 
transform its instantiation under conditions of internal colonial basing. Situated 
globally, then, Okinawa serves as an example of the transitional character of the 
current historical moment.  
Simultaneously, the Japanese government’s efforts to co-opt and depoliticize 
Okinawan expressions of difference shape, and are shaped by, other governments’ 
approaches to self-determination claims within their respective borders. Today, 
Tokyo’s (and Washington’s) novel representation of Ry!ky!an difference as part of a 
modern, multicultural Japanese state- and its international relations reflects broader 
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efforts to steer the dominant narrative of the Japanese nation and, closely related to 
this, efforts to sustain Japan’s relations with the US and an international system 
experiencing a crisis of sovereignty. Governments are collectively seeking to 
“internalize” contemporary self-determination claims, rooting them in a liberal 
formulation of individual rights and rejecting interference with existing property 
relations. Thus the politics of collective rights within Okinawa parallel contestations 
over collective rights nationally, which in turn constitute an important and 
transformative part of a broader debate within the international system. The shifts in 
identity and claims within Okinawa’s anti-base movement reflect the current world-
historical context in which the legacies of colonialism, under relations of empire, fuel 
broader efforts to rework citizenship and sovereignty. 
 
Contradictions, transitions and global social change 
In identifying the social relations and state structures that make the Okinawa 
anti-base movement part of these broader efforts, the dissertation demonstrates that the 
struggle is not a linear process of transformation, or emancipation. Rather it is 
contradictory, operating on several fronts. It is fueled by individual and allied action. 
Its “multi-issue” character captures the ways in which militarization intersects with 
gendered, ecological, political, cultural and economic relations. The multiplicity of 
activists’ political identities and claims intertwine and overlap, and as they do so they 
constrain, create, and shift scales. Collective rights claims rooted in notions of 
Ry!ky!an nationhood and indigeneity exist alongside demand for equality as Japanese 
citizens. In particular, the simultaneity of different notions of self-determination in 
Okinawan political identities and associated rights claims speaks to how the 
transitional moment in Okinawan society reflects the contradictions of the current era. 
As I have attempted to show, the mobilization of territory and the (re)defining of place 
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in relation to people is a dialectical process. In this instance, it is not a reaction by 
Okinawans to state power but an interaction within state power.  
Okinawans’ place-based yet (conceptually and empirically) transnational 
struggle engages the kind of politics of difference that constitute both a challenge and 
an emergent alternative to empire ( c.f. Escobar 2001). While not reflective of a linear 
process, the broader politics embodied in the Okinawan struggle are transformative. 
Today, the unfulfilled, or partially fulfilled, promise of the entitlements of citizenship 
as part of the modern national project would appear to facilitate what Shami (1996) 
refers to as “erasure through inclusion,” whereby particular identities and 
corresponding experiences are subsumed, and in the dominant rendering erased, via 
their inclusion within the universalizing category of citizenship. This process of 
“erasing colony” happened on a global scale via postwar decolonization, when 
dominant powers orchestrated a limited decolonization that subsumed countless 
nations within emerging and existing states. The process continues today, as state 
governments individually and collectively seek to manage contemporary challenges to 
state territoriality. However, as this study illustrates, the processes defining national 
membership via erasure cannot be seen as unilaterally disempowering. The same 
processes that marginalize, displace, and depoliticize also create the conditions$and 
political space$for individuals and groups to rework definitions of difference.  
This paradox is revealed through the effects of internal colonial basing, which 
serves to underline the compromised sovereignty of the state, and doubly so its 
collectively marginalized citizens, through a postwar regime of militarization rooted in 
colonial relations. Under such conditions, reclaimed identities serve to leverage power 
in challenging discriminatory practices obscured by liberal discourses espousing the 
equality of citizenship. Although counterintuitive, the return to particular “small-n” 
national identities and away from a universal National identity makes it possible for 
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groups to reinterpret their circumstances in collective and indeed world-historical 
terms of minority and/or indigenous rights. In this way, reclaimed identities also 
become a basis to rework the content of modern sovereignty.  
As I have argued, such reworking proceeds on two related fronts – first, 
identifying the coloniality of power embedded in the process of state system 
completion under UN auspices, and second, exposing the articulation between 
coloniality and militarization of the state system under US hegemony. The latter 
relationship is the stimulus for a more fundamental challenge to the liberal narrative 
informing modern citizenship, a critique animating movements for collective rights to 
territory, culture and resources. By tracing the historically specific relations, structures 
and processes within which challenges form, the dissertation shows how the short-
term politics and everyday experiences of internal colonial basing condition long-term 
struggle and social change. 
The contemporary relationship between state formation and military expansion 
reveals itself as a nexus of global social change. This study thus supports and builds 
on Gerard Ruggie’s (1993) insights about “unbundled territoriality” by presenting 
foreign military basing as a particularly potent, and a particularly violent, instance, 
which offers an understanding of how the rearticulation of international political space 
is occurring today. The particular political space created in the “unbundling” of 
territoriality via the US-Japan basing arrangements is rooted in coloniality but framed 
in terms of sovereignty and citizenship. Contradictions therein lead to transformative 
efforts, as Okinawans challenge and rework citizenship as governed by the relations of 
internal colonial basing. These challenges thus implicate the postwar security relations 
among states as much as they do the US and Japanese governments in the problems of 
US military presence in the Ry!ky!s. So although foreign basing arrangements are a 
key expression of the modern liberal project, the Okinawan struggle offers a new lens 
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on their construction as such. Under conditions of coloniality, the contemporary 
regime of military expansion and occupation creates political space to challenge 
liberalism’s foundations.  
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